2016 SCC Vol. 8 October 14, 2016 Part 5

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss. 7, 8, & 16 — Arbitrability of dispute: Exclusion of jurisdiction of civil court in respect of disputes arising under trust deed governed by Trusts Act, 1882, by virtue of arbitration clause in trust deed, not permissible. [Vimal Kishor Shah v. Jayesh Dinesh Shah, (2016) 8 SCC 788]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Ss. 9 and 89: Arbitration award/proceedings between government corporations in terms of the “Permanent In-House Administrative Machinery” i.e. dehors 1940 Act or 1996 Act, hence, can be challenged by way of civil suit. [Northern Coalfields Ltd. v. Heavy Engg. Corpn. Ltd.,(2016) 8 SCC 685]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 197 and 319 — Sanction for prosecution: Sanction under S. 197 CrPC and/or sanction required under a special statute (as postulated under S. 19 of Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988), is a mandatory prerequisite even where cognizance is taken under S. 319 CrPC. Further held, determination rendered by court under S. 319 CrPC is not subservient to decision of competent authority under S. 197 CrPC as order granting or declining sanction can be assailed by taking recourse to judicial review. [ Surinderjit Singh Mand v. State of Punjab, (2016) 8 SCC 722]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 311/231(2), 309 and 482 — Recall of witnesses: Interests of victim/the collective (represented through the prosecution) and accused must be balanced. Concept of fair trial cannot be limitlessly stretched to permit recall of witnesses endlessly on ground of magnanimity, etc. [State of Haryana v. Ram Mehar, (2016) 8 SCC 762]

Equality before Law and Religious Personal Laws in India: With the adoption of the Constitution, the transition to equality before law stopped short of providing a resolution to status-based legal systems in personal laws. Personal laws that are not based on a framework of both equality of genders, and equality between genders wholly limit the import of constitutional guarantees relating to equality before law. This article traces the development, modification and distortion of personal laws in the colonial period. It looks at the judicial reading of personal laws in relation to the Constitution; besides also looking at the doctrine of an “essential practice” and “secular activity”. The article also discusses the content and merits of a statutory intervention that sets the standards of equality in the personal sphere. [The Case For Legislating Equality In The Private Sphere by Vikramjit Banerjee, Suhaan C. Mukerji and Aymen Mohammed, (2016) 8 SCC (J-1)]

Family and Personal Laws — Partition/Family Arrangement/Settlement: In respect of joint family immovable property worth more than Rs 100, when family arrangement/settlement has been orally made, no registration is required and would be admissible in evidence but when reduced in writing, registration is essential, without which it is not admissible in evidence. But even without registration, written document of family settlement can be used as corroborative evidence as explaining the arrangement made thereunder and conduct of the parties. [Subraya M.N. v. Vittala M.N., (2016) 8 SCC 705]

Infrastructure Laws — Energy and Power — Electricity — Tariff: Revision of tariff in PPA between generating company and distribution licensee, when tariff has been fixed on basis of the then prevailing general tariff order of SERC, which itself is subject to revision as per law; and tariff not fixed based on any one-to-one contractual negotiation between the parties, is permissible in terms of revised tariff order(s) as per law. [Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Tarini Infrastructure Ltd., (2016) 8 SCC 743]

SCs, STs, OBCs and Minorities — Reservation/Concession/Exemption/Relaxation and Affirmative Action — Reserved category post: As appellant provisionally appointed to post of Chemical Examiner against ST reserved category post subject to verification of his caste claim of Halba community and Caste Certificate Scrutiny Committee recording appellant’s caste as Koshti which attained finality, thus, appellant does not belong to Halba community, a notified Scheduled Tribe in Maharashtra and as such termination order passed on ground that he belonged to caste Koshti which was not a Scheduled Tribe in State of Maharashtra calls for no interference. Further held, dictum in State of Maharashtra v. Milind, (2001) 1 SCC 4: 2001 SCC (L&S) 117 would be inapplicable in this case since therein appointments which had become final were protected which was not so in this case. [B.H. Khawas v. Union of India, (2016) 8 SCC 715]

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