2016 SCC Vol. 10 December 7, 2016 Part 2

Associations, Societies and Clubs — Body discharging public functions but not amounting to “State” — BCCI: Due to obstructionist and defiant attitude of BCCI towards reform of BCCI and supervision of transition by Court appointed Committee, as suggested by Justice Lodha Committee and affirmed in Cricket Assn. of Bihar, (2016) 8 SCC 535, as directions already having issued by order dt. 7-10-2016 in Cricket Assn. of Bihar, (2016) 10 SCC 23, hence, additional directions issued instead of appointing Administrators for BCCI. [BCCI v. Cricket Assn. of Bihar, (2016) 10 SCC 231]

Crimes Against Women and Children — Female foeticide/Infanticide — Effective implementation of 1994 Act to prevent sex selective abortion of female foetus: Further directions issued for Implementation of Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 and Rules to prevent and abolish female foeticide/Infanticide. [Voluntary Health Assn. of Punjab v. Union of India, (2016) 10 SCC 265]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 378 and 386(a) — Appeal against acquittal — Interference by appellate court — Scope of: There cannot be any straitjacket formula as to under what circumstances the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal, but the same depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. [Mahavir Singh v. State of M.P., (2016) 10 SCC 220]

Municipalities — Municipal Taxes — Liability to bear: Liability to pay municipal taxes is not on lessee, where lease deed specifically exempts lessee from payment of municipal taxes. [Welspun Projects Ltd. v. State Transport, Punjab, (2016) 10 SCC 203]

Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 — Ss. 2(a), (f), (g) & (s), 3, 17 to 20, 26 and 31 and Preamble & Statement of Objects and Reasons — Remedies under 2005 Act: Expression “respondent” in S. 2(q) or persons who can be treated as perpetrators of violence against women/against whom remedies under 2005 Act are actionable cannot be restricted to expression “adult male person” in S. 2(q). Thus, remedies under 2005 Act available even against a female member and also against non-adults. Restricting perpetrators of violence against women/acts actionable under 2005 Act to only “adult male person” fails the test of reasonable classification. Firstly because, restriction of “respondent” in S. 2(q) to “adult male person” obstructs and defeats the purpose of the legislation, that is, protection of women from any kind of violence/abuse whether physical, sexual, verbal, emotional or economic. Secondly, the innovative protective provisions and remedies for protection of women against perpetrators under 2005 Act in Ss. 3, 17(2), 18(6), 19 and 20 become toothless and ineffective by said restriction. Thirdly, restriction of “adult male person” in S. 2(q), is anomalous with definition of “domestic relationship” in S. 2(f) and “shared household” in S. 2(s), especially when viewed in light of amendment to S. 6, Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (w.e.f. 9-9-2005). Fourthly, restricting meaning of “respondent” in S. 2(q) to only “adult male person” is not based on any intelligible differentia having rational nexus with object sought to be achieved. Fifthly, Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Bill, 2002 did have the words “adult male” in the meaning of “respondent” in S. 2(q) but surprisingly, the 2005 Act did so. Sixthly, the words “adult male” are also absent in the meaning of “respondent” in S. 2(m), Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 which is in pari materia with Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005. [Hiral P. Harsora v. Kusum Narottamdas Harsora, (2016) 10 SCC 165]

Rent Control and Eviction — Bona fide requirement of landlord: Lessor’s freedom and right to choose more suitable premises amongst the available alternative accommodations, cannot be dictated by tenant. [Bhupinder Singh Bawa v. Asha Devi, (2016) 10 SCC 209]

Securities, Markets and Exchanges — SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 1997 — Regns. 27, 3(1), 4, 10 and 12 r/w Regns. 14, 22, 23 and 24 — Withdrawal of public offer: Once public offer is made, general principle is that it cannot be withdrawn except for circumstances under Regn. 27. Under scheme of Regulations, public offer has to be made after due diligence and after ascertaining that it was capable to implement said offer and withdrawal of offer has to be as per Regn. 27. So long as justification for withdrawal does not fall under Regn. 27, delay caused by SEBI in giving its comments on public offer by itself is not enough to justify withdrawal from public offer. [Pramod Jain v. SEBI, (2016) 10 SCC 243]

Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 2002 — S. 13(2): As auction of immovable properties of defaulter was hastily done by Bank without fresh notice, and grant of sale certificate while case pending before DRAT/High Court and concurrent findings of fact by Debts Recovery Appellate Tribunal as well as High Court established that material irregularities were committed in conducting said auction-sale, hence, held, creditor Bank could have waited for some time when proceedings were pending before DRAT as well as High Court before conducting auction and confirming the sale. Thus, there is no reason to disturb concurrent findings arrived at by courts below as to irregularities committed in holding said auction and the setting aside of the sale. Setting aside of the sale, confirmed. [Oasis Dealcom (P) Ltd. v. Khazana Dealcomm (P) Ltd., (2016) 10 SCC 214]

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