Armed Forces — Promotion — Army Medical Corps: As Tribunal has not considered relevant material, matter regarding entitlement to DACP (Dynamic Assured Career Progression) remanded to Tribunal for reconsideration afresh. [Union of India v. K.P. Singh, (2017) 3 SCC 289]
Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — S. 2(j) — Interpretation of “industry” occurring in S. 2(j), ID Act, 1947: As serious doubts expressed in reference order dt. 5-5-2005 passed by five-Judge Bench in Jai Bir Singh, (2005) 5 SCC 1 about correctness of view taken in Bangalore Water Supply & Sewerage Board, (1978) 2 SCC 213 regarding interpretation of expression “industry”, hence considering wide ranging implications of issue, matter directed to be placed before nine-Judge Bench. [State of U.P. v. Jai Bir Singh, (2017) 3 SCC 311]
Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Act, 1966 (18 of 1966) — Ss. 28 to 30 — Delay in making/publishing award — Applicability of old LA Act, 1894 or new LA Act, 2013, to acquisition proceedings under the KIAD Act: KIAD Act, a law regulating acquisition of land for public purpose and for payment of compensation, is a self-contained code. In terms of the judgment rendered in M. Nagabhushana, (2011) 3 SCC 408, once the proceedings are initiated under the KIAD Act, neither S. 11-A of the old LA Act, nor S. 24(2) of the new LA Act would be applicable. Therefore, proceedings initiated under KIAD Act would not lapse, because of no award having been passed within two years from the date of publication of final declaration. [Land Acquisition Officer v. Anasuya Bai, (2017) 3 SCC 313]
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 353 & 354 and 235 — “Judgment” — Meaning and scope of: Though “judgment” is not defined in CrPC, it is clearly laid down therein as to how the judgment is to be pronounced. Under CrPC, it is imperative on trial court to pronounce judgment in open court by delivering whole of the judgment or reading out whole of the judgment or reading out operative part of the judgment and explaining the substance of the judgment in a language understood by the accused or his pleader. Thus, without pronouncement of a judgment in open court, signed and dated, it cannot be treated as a “judgment”. [Ajay Singh v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2017) 3 SCC 330]
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 216, 397 and 401 — Power of court under S. 216, to alter or add any charge — Scope of, and manner of exercise of: Power of court under S. 216, to alter or add any charge, vested under S. 216 vested in court is exclusive to the court and there is no right in any party, neither de facto complainant nor accused nor prosecution, to seek such addition or alteration by filing any application as a matter of right. [P. Kartikalakshmi v. Sri Ganesh, (2017) 3 SCC 347]
Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166, 168 and 173 — Compensation — Determination of — Multiplier method: Multiplier method is to calculate net pecuniary loss upon an annual basis, involving ascertainment of loss of dependency or multiplicand having regard to circumstances of case and capitalising multiplicand by an appropriate multiplier, as determined by age of deceased or that of claimant, as case may be. In injury cases, description of nature of injury and permanent disablement are relevant factors and it has to be seen as to what would be impact of such injury/disablement on earning capacity of injured. There should be no departure from multiplier method on ground of “just” compensation since multiplier method is accepted method for determining and ensuring payment of just compensation and is expected to bring uniformity and certainty of awards made all over country. Multiplier system is based on doctrine of equity, equality and necessity. A departure therefrom is to be done only in rare and exceptional cases. [Sandeep Khanuja v. Atul Dande, (2017) 3 SCC 351]
Constitution of India — Arts. 136 and 262 — Maintainability of SLP/appeal under Art. 136 in view of bar to jurisdiction under Art. 262: Appeal under Art. 136, against order of Tribunal constituted under S. 9, Inter-State Water Disputes Act, 1956, enacted under Art. 262, is maintainable. Bar to jurisdiction of Supreme Court under Art. 262 is only with regard to taking cognizance of an original water dispute or complaint and does not encompass any appeal under Art. 136 against order of duly constituted Tribunal exercising original jurisdiction to adjudicate such water dispute. What is excluded under Art. 262 is “dispute” or “complaint”. Term “dispute” means a controversy having both positive and negative aspects. Term “adjudication” is the legal process of resolving a dispute and implies a hearing by a court, after notice, of legal evidence on factual issue(s) involved. Thus once water dispute as defined in Art. 262(1) is adjudicated by Tribunal constituted under 1956 Act, a person aggrieved can always invoke appellate jurisdiction under Art. 136. It was never intention of Constitution-makers that final order of Tribunal would remain immune from challenge. Thus challenge to maintainability of appeal under Art. 136 and interim orders passed during its pendency, on ground of bar of Art. 262(1) not tenable. [State of Karnataka v. State of T.N., (2017) 3 SCC 362]
Constitution of India — Art. 226 — PIL: Regularisation of temporary daily-rated workers working in High Court directed by High Court as a one-time measure, but indifference to proper procedure, precedents and rules and regulation relating to regularization, not permissible. [State of J&K v. Distt. Bar Assn., Bandipora, (2017) 3 SCC 410]
Constitution of India — Art. 14 — Nature, Ingredients, Scope and Applicability: Benefit/Relief conferred on basis of, indulgence, error or illegality cannot be extended. [Ram Naresh Rawat v. Ashwini Ray, (2017) 3 SCC 436]
Service Law — Pay — Pay scale, fixation and revision — “Permanent” and “Regular” employee: Daily-wage employees were entitled to minimum wages and allowance as per revised pay scale but without increment, only after regularisation of their service, as per seniority and rules, would they be entitled to increment and other benefits. [State of M.P. v. Dilip Singh Patel, (2017) 3 SCC 455]
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 — Ss. 5, 3 and 4 — Termination of pregnancy: Termination of pregnancy after 20 weeks to save life of pregnant woman, permissible when there is grave danger to physical and mental health of pregnant woman and death of foetus outside womb is inevitable. Also, affidavit seeking such abortion must be filed by woman concerned herself. Relator action is not permissible. [X v. Union of India, (2017) 3 SCC 458]
Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971 — Ss. 5, 3 and 4 — Termination of pregnancy after 20 weeks to save life of pregnant woman: Right to make reproductive choices is also dimension of personal liberty of woman. Reproductive choices can be exercised to procreate as well as to abstain from procreating. Right to privacy, dignity and bodily integrity of woman should be respected. No restrictions whatsoever on exercise of reproductive choices such as woman’s right to participate in sexual activity or insistence of usage of contraceptive methods. Reproductive rights include woman’s entitlement to carry pregnancy to its full term, to give birth and subsequently raise children. Overriding consideration is that she has right to take all such steps as necessary to preserve her own life against avoidable danger to it. [Meera Santosh Pal v. Union of India, (2017) 3 SCC 462]
Karnataka Value Added Tax Rules, 2005 — R. 3(2)(c) and R. 31 — Trade discount given post issuance of tax/sale invoice: First proviso to R. 3(2)(c), prescribed that a discount to be eligible for deduction had to be in accordance with the regular practice of the dealer/terms of any contract or agreement entered into in a particular case and the tax invoice or bill of sale issued in respect of the sales relating to such discount showed the amount allowed as discount. The actual quantification of the trade discount, depending on the nature of the trade and the related stipulations in any contract with regard thereto, may be deferred till the happening of a contemplated event, so much so that the benefit thereof is extended at a point of time subsequent to that of the original sale/purchase. [Southern Motors v. State of Karnataka, (2017) 3 SCC 467]
U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976 (6 of 1976) — Ss. 2(d), 11 and 12-A — Liability to pay tax to local authorities (Zila Panchayat) by industries, in area declared as industrial development area — Exemption from tax under S. 12-A, on ground that said area having been declared as industrial development area is excluded from panchayats, consequently panchayats are not entitled to realise taxes: Exclusion of any area as industrial development area from panchayat has serious consequences since persons residing within said industrial development area are immediately deprived of facilities and benefits extended to them by respective panchayats. Deprivation of said benefits has to be made by a conscious decision in accordance with condition as contained in Art. 243-Q of the Constitution. Proviso to Art. 243-Q(1) contemplates certain circumstances under which a municipality may not be constituted as an urban area or part thereof, when such area is specified by notification. In consonance with said proviso, S. 12-A has been inserted in 1976 Act which specifically provides for issuance of notification and exclusion from Panchayat area is consequent and dependent upon such notification. Thus, for treating industrial area as industrial township, notification under proviso to Art. 243-Q(1) of the Constitution was contemplated which is also statutory scheme under 1976 Act. As no notification issued by State Government declaring said area as industrial township as contemplated under 1976 Act, hence, exemption under S. 12-A was not available to appellants. [MGR Industries Assn. v. State of U.P., (2017) 3 SCC 494]
