2018 SCC Vol. 1 February 7, 2017 Part 5

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss. 34 and 37 — Award — Noninterference with, when the same is reasonable and on the basis of a plausible view: When it comes to setting aside of an award under the public policy ground, it would mean that the award should shock the conscience of the Court, and would not include what the Court thinks is unjust on the facts of the case seeking to substitute its view for that of the arbitrator to do what it considers to be “justice”. [Sutlej Construction Ltd. v. State (UT of Chandigarh), (2018) 1 SCC 718]

Constitution of India — Arts. 19(1)(a) & (2), 21, 14 and 32 — Artistic creation: Restriction on public viewing of artistic creation (cinema or theatre) of expressive mind should be as per prescription law: In this case writ petition was filed before Supreme Court for direction staying nationwide release of a documentary film containing video clip pertaining to petitioner and also for direction or order to CBFC to delete the clip. Petitioner claimed rights especially under Arts. 14 and 21 that he should not be projected in manner in which film is going to depict. It was held that Court would be slow to pass any restraint order and petition has to be dismissed. [Nachiketa Walhekar v. CBFC, (2018) 1 SCC 778]

Constitution of India — Arts. 19(1)(a) and 19(2) — Freedom of expression — Cinema, theatre: Artistic licence should be determined objectively on facts of each case. Restriction on creativity should be reasonable, depending upon kind of restriction imposed and its impact. [Manohar Lal Sharma v. Sanjay Leela Bhansali, (2018) 1 SCC 770]

Constitution of India — Arts. 19(1)(a) and 32 — Freedom of expression by artistic creation covered by Art. 19(1)(a) — Scope: In this case State Government imposed restriction on public exhibition of a film (Padmaavat/Padmavati) even after grant of certificate by CBFC under Cinematograph Act on ground of maintenance of law and order. A writ petition was filed seeking interim stay of government order/notification: It was held that once CBFC grants certificate, non-exhibition of film would be violation of statutory provisions as well as fundamental right. Grant of certificate raised prima facie presumption that regulatory measures provided under S. 5-B of Cinematograph Act and Guidelines issued by Central Government including public order must be taken into consideration by authority concerned. Maintenance of law and order prime responsibility of Government, hence interim stay of State Government notifications/orders deserves to be granted. Other States also restrained from issuing such notifications/orders. [VIACOM 18 Media (P) Ltd. v Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 761]

Constitution of India — Arts. 21, 14, 15, 141 and 145(3) — Fundamental rights vis-à-vis social morality — Sexual orientation freedom: Challenge to part of S. 377 IPC which criminalised consensual carnal intercourse between adult humans. Suresh Kumar Koushal, (2014) 1 SCC 1 upholding S. 377 IPC, held, requires reconsideration, hence, matter referred to larger Bench. [Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 791]

Constitution of India — Pt. III — Linking of Aadhaar: Last dates for linking of Aadhaar with bank account, mobile number and social welfare schemes, extended to 31-3-2018 pending adjudication of dispute regarding the same before the Court. [K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 809]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 204 — Issue of process summons: Order issuing process summons against appellant-accused cannot be interfered with by Supreme Court in its appellate jurisdiction under Art. 136. It is more so, when appellants would get full opportunity to raise all factual and legal pleas in accordance with law while contesting complaint on merits. [Leena Vivek Masal v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 1 SCC 781]

Education Law — Medical and Dental Colleges — Migration/Transfer: Interim order directing migration from one dental college to another, pending writ appeal in High Court, held, unsustainable. Nature of said interim order amounts to final order. [Dental Council of India v. Anhad Raj Singh, (2018) 1 SCC 723]

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Ss. 25-K, 25-O and 2(s) — Benefit under S. 25-K — Applicable if unit has more than 100 workers: In this case dispute was whether unit has more than 100 workmen, status of employee, whether workman or supervisor. High Court reversed finding of Tribunal and held that unit did not have more than 100 workers but only 99 workers. Said finding of High Court, held, did not warrant interference under Art. 136 of the Constitution as it involved questions of fact, and there was no perversity in this case. [National Kamgar Union v. Kran Rader (P) Ltd., (2018) 1 SCC 784]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 168 — Fatal accident — Compensation: While computing monthly income of female agricultural labourer, it is needed to impute value for her contribution to household work. [Laxmidhar Nayak v. Jugal Kishore Behera, (2018) 1 SCC 746]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 173 — Compensation — Contributory negligence: If one drives a vehicle without a licence, he commits an offence but by itself, the same may not lead to a finding of negligence as regards accident. Thus, it was held that deduction of forty per cent made on ground of contributory negligence in this case is without any basis. [Dinesh Kumar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 1 SCC 750]

Police — Generally — Police service — Candidates having criminal antecedents, including those not honourably acquitted — Suitability of, for police service: Acquittal is not conclusive of suitability of candidate, unless it is honourable acquittal. Employer can go into issue of suitability. Even if candidate has self-declared his criminal antecedents, employer still has right to consider such criminal antecedents to decide his suitability. [State (UT of Chandigarh) v. Pradeep Kumar, (2018) 1 SCC 797]

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 — S. 24: Matter referred to larger Bench involving issue that proceedings under repealed LA Act, 1894 whether would lapse in view of S. 24(2) when compensation had been deposited before Land Acquisition Collector but landowners had declined to receive it and continued with litigation. [Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra, (2018) 1 SCC 733]

Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 — S. 3(2)(v) [prior to amendment by Act 1 of 2016] — Requirement of Intention of accused: There is requirement of intention of accused to belittle person belonging to SC/ST community, for punishment under S. 3(2)(v). As there was absence of any evidence proving such intention, conviction under S. 3(2)(v), set aside. [Asharfi v. State of U.P., (2018) 1 SCC 742]

Stamp Act, 1899 — Ss. 2(16), (16)(c), (14) & (12) r/w Sch. I Art. 35 — Definition of “lease” under S. 2(16) of Stamp Act — Nature and scope: Definition of “lease” under S. 2(16) of Stamp Act is extensive in nature in comparison to definition of that term contained in S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Any instrument by which tolls of any description are let, is considered as “lease” under S. 2(16)(c) of Stamp Act for purpose of payment of stamp duty under that Act. Thus, where Municipal Corporation, on accepting bids of appellants, awarded contract to appellants for collection of “tehbazari” and “parking fees”, such contract, held, was in the nature of a “lease” as defined in S. 2(16)(c) of Stamp Act. Hence, was chargeable to stamp duty in terms of Art. 35 of Sch. I of Stamp Act as a “lease”. [Nasiruddin v. State of U.P., (2018) 1 SCC 754]

Trade Marks Act, 1999 — S. 21 — Special leave to appeal to Supreme Court: High Court, based on a detailed consideration of the materials brought on record by both the parties, inter alia, concluded that the petitioner had not demonstrated that it was the first user of the logo/mark and that it was the respondent who was the first user. High Court was also of the view that notwithstanding the class of customers serviced by the parties before it, it could not be said that the two logos/marks would not give rise to confusion amongst the customers. In this case, held, the view recorded by High Court was a perfectly possible and justified view of the matter and the conclusion(s) reached could reasonably flow from a balanced consideration of the evidence and materials on record. Therefore, special leave to appeal to Supreme Court against the order of High Court, refused. [Royal Orchid Hotels Ltd. v. Kamat Hotels (India) Ltd., (2018) 1 SCC 728]

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