2019 SCC Vol. 6 July 28, 2019 Part 5

Central Excise Act, 1944 — Ss. 11-A, 11-A(2), 11-A(2-B) and Expln. 2 thereto and 11-AB — Payability of interest on differential duty paid with delay: The principle that value of goods at the time of removal is to reign supreme. However, in a case of retrospective escalation of price though later agreed, being received and consequential differential duty being admittedly payable, it would result in S. 11-A r/w S. 11-AB applying to the true value. Thus, in any of the circumstances, namely, non-levy, non-payment, shortlevy and short-payment, if any duty has been determined or paid as has been provided under S. 11-A, necessarily assessee becomes liable to pay interest from the first date of the month succeeding the month in which the duty ought to have been paid. [SAIL v. CCE, (2019) 6 SCC 693]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 22 Rr. 3(2) and 11 & Or. 41 R. 33 — Death of one of the several appellants during appeal: There can be no doubt that Order 22 Rule 3 CPC is applicable also to appeals filed under Order 41 CPC. Order 22 Rule 3(1) declares that where one of two or more plaintiffs dies and the right to sue does not survive to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone inter alia the court on an application can substitute the legal representatives of the deceased plaintiff and proceed with the suit. Sub-rule (2) of Order 22 Rule 3 provides that if it is not so done, the suit shall abate as far as the deceased plaintiff is concerned. Order 22 Rule 3 therefore is applicable when either a suit or an appeal is filed by more than one plaintiffs or appellants as the case may be. This is no doubt apart from it applying when there is a sole plaintiff or sole appellant. In such a situation, on the death of one of the plaintiffs or appellants and the right to sue does not survive to the remaining plaintiff/plaintiffs or appellant/appellants alone, then the LRs of the deceased party can come on record. Should he not do so, ordinarily, the proceeding will abate as far as the deceased party is concerned. [Hemareddi v. Ramachandra Yallappa Hosmani, (2019) 6 SCC 756]

Constitution of India — Arts. 226 & 32 and Art. 21 and Sch. VII List II Entries 1 and 3 — Public interest litigation — Issuance of directions for CBI investigation — Principles summarized: Primary responsibility of State Police to investigate all offences which are committed within its jurisdiction, emphasized. Direction for investigation can be given only if an offence is, prima facie, found to have been committed or a person’s involvement is prima facie established, but direction to CBI, or any other authority, to investigate whether any person has committed an offence or not cannot be legally given. Such direction would be contrary to concept and philosophy of life and liberty guaranteed to a person under Art. 21 of the Constitution. [Shree Shree Ram Janki Ji Asthan Tapovan Mandir v. State of Jharkhand, (2019) 6 SCC 777]

Cooperative Societies — Cooperative Housing/Housing Society — Expulsion of members/Admission of new members in their place/Readmission of expelled members upon their expulsion being set aside: In this case, the Housing Society in a general body meeting expelled 27 members, there were also certain resignations after such expulsion and subsequently 15 new members including the alleged contemnors were inducted against the vacancies. Expulsion of those 27 members was subject-matter of challenge and finally by judgment and order dt. 18-10-2010 the claim of those who were expelled, was accepted. Alleged contemnors violated the orders passed by the Supreme Court and despite having furnished appropriate undertakings, failed to vacate and hand over possession, however, there were certain equities in their favour: in that they were inducted as members not clandestinely but against the resultant vacancies after expulsion of certain members, that they had paid all the instalments in time, that on the basis of such instalments paid by the members including the alleged contemnors the construction was completed, and that they were put in possession of the apartments soon thereafter and it was only as a result of the expulsion orders of the contempt petitioners getting set aside that the alleged contemnors were to vacate their apartments and make way for the contempt petitioners. Going by the reports made by the architect, a new building could be constructed with 18 apartments i.e. that after satisfying the requirements of all the alleged contemnors there would still be some apartments left, from the sale of which money for construction could be garnered. The Supreme Court issued directions for vacation of flats by alleged contemnors (said new members) and allocation of same to re-admitted members (said members whose expulsion was set aside). Directions issued qua construction of a new building for allotment to alleged contemnors and issues pertaining thereto, considering the interest of all. [Sant Lal Gupta v. Umesh Kumar Jain, (2019) 6 SCC 745]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 437 and 439 — Bail — Condition of heavy deposits for bail — Reasonableness: In this case, seven pilgrims were killed and ten were injured in a stampede outside a temple.  High Court granted bail to Chief Priest of Temple, on condition that he would pay Rs 10,00,000 each (total amount of Rs 70,00,000) to legal heirs of deceased. The Supreme Court held that bail cannot be made conditional upon heavy deposits beyond financial capacity of applicant. Incarceration of petitioner is not necessary for investigation or petitioner will evade process of law or tamper with evidence if set at liberty. Government has also paid compensation to victims. Condition of payment to family members/legal heirs for grant of bail, waived. [M.D. Dhanapal v. State, (2019) 6 SCC 743]

Debt, Financial and Monetary Laws — Debt, Debt Recovery and Relief — Wilful defaulters/Abusers of Banking and Financial System — RBI Master Circular on Wilful Defaulters i.e. Revised Circular dt. 1-7-2015 r/w RBI Circular dt. 1-7-2013 — Representation by a lawyer in the in-house proceedings — Non-requirement of: In-House Committees i.e. Committee/Review Committee qua declaring a borrower as a wilful defaulter is not a Tribunal and not vested with State’s judicial power. Thus, no lawyer has any right under S. 30 of the Advocates Act to appear before the In-House Committees. [SBI v. Jah Developers (P) Ltd., (2019) 6 SCC 787]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 302 or S. 304 Pt. I or Pt. II — Murder or culpable homicide — Free fight — Single blow: In this case deceased sustained fatal injury on his head which was caused by accused R. The Supreme Court held that merely because accused R caused injury by blunt side of farsa, High Court was not justified in altering the conviction to S. 304 Pt. II IPC. Even in a case of a single blow, but on vital part of body, the case may fall under S. 302 IPC and accused can be held guilty under S. 302 IPC. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, more particularly that it was a case of free fight, considering the fact that the weapon used by accused R was farsa and he caused fatal injury on vital part of body, High Court committed a grave error in altering the conviction of accused R from Ss. 302/149 IPC to S. 304 Pt. II IPC. Conviction of accused R, altered from S. 302 IPC to S. 304 Pt.I IPC and he was sentenced to undergo eight years’ RI with a fine of Rs 5000. [State of M.P. v. Kalicharan, (2019) 6 SCC 809]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302 and 307 — Murder: In this case injured witness turned hostile and there was also delay in recording statement under S. 161 CrPC. Co-accused in this case was acquitted. The Supreme Court held that identification by PWs 1 and 4 of appellant G as one of the perpetrators who had fired on deceased and B (PW 3) is unreliable and should not be accepted without substantial corroboration to establish involvement of appellant. Bullets recovered from body of deceased were also not sent for ballistic examination. On the whole, posecution failed to prove that the evidence has a ring of truth, is cogent, credible and trustworthy, hence, conviction of appellant G, also set aside. [Guman Singh v. State of Rajasthan, (2019) 6 SCC 804]

Service Law — Appointment — Compassionate appointment — Entitlement to: Delay in pursuing claim/approaching court would militate against claim for compassionate appointment as very objective of providing immediate amelioration to family would stand extinguished. [Punjab State Power Corpn. Ltd. v. Nirval Singh, (2019) 6 SCC 774]

Join the discussion

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed.