Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madhya Pradesh High Court: This petition was filed before the Bench of Vivek Rusia, J.

Facts of the case were such that petitioners are daughters of respondent who had sold his property to other respondents. After the sale was concluded one of the respondent to whom the property was sold filed an application under Sections 109 and 110 of M.P. Land Revenue Code, 1959 before the Tehsildar seeking mutation of his name which was allowed.

Petitioner being aggrieved by the same filed an appeal before the Sub-Divisional Officer Revenue, Garoth. SDO allowed the appeal and set aside the order passed by Tehsildar on the ground that the Tehsildar did not inquire about the status of the property if it was a self-earned property or ancestral property before passing the order of mutation. Being aggrieved by the order of SDO an appeal was preferred before the Additional Commissioner who set aside the order passed by SDO and therefore confirming the order of Tehsildar, hence, this petition was filed.

It was brought before Court that petitioners had already filed a Civil Suit challenging the sale deed which was executed by respondent in favour of one of the other respondent claiming their right and title over the property.

High Court observed the settled law that the orders passed by the Revenue Authority were not binding on the Civil Court and Revenue Court could not have decided the title of the property. Court viewed that lest a Civil Suit is pending the issues raised in this petition could be decided before Civil Court. With the aforementioned observation, this petition was dismissed. [Bharat Kunwar v. Mangilal, 2019 SCC OnLine MP 609, dated 05-04-2019]

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT): A Bench comprising of Justice S.J. Mukhopadhaya, Chairperson and Justice Bansi Lal Bhat, Member (Judicial) dismissed an appeal filed against the order of National Company Law Tribunal, Bengaluru dismissing appellant’s application under Section 9 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

The appellant had filed a petition under Section 433(e), 434(1) and 439 of Companies Act, 1956 before the Karnataka High Court. The petition was transferred pursuant to rule 5of the Companies (Transfer of Pending Proceedings) Rules, 2016 to NCLT. The petition was treated as an application under Section 9 of the I&B Code by the appellant. Demand Notice under Section 8(1) was issued. After hearing the parties, NCLT dismissed the application on the ground of pre-existing dispute. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal was filed.

Raghavendra M. Bajaj, Advocate for the appellant submitted that the Corporate Debtor had agreed to pay dues by 5 different times. But the Corporate Debtor claimed the existence of ‘dispute’. It raised objections regarding non-completion of project within time and completion of the same in haste with defects.

The Appellate Tribunal noted that the objections were raised by the Corporate Debtor much prior to the filing of petition under Companies Act. It was held that such disputes cannot be decided by NCLT but only by a civil court of competent jurisdiction on basis evidence. Therefore, as there existed a dispute raised prior to filing of petition under Sections 433(e) and 434(1) of Companies Act, it was held that the application under Section 9 of I&B Code was not maintainable. [Yash Technologies (P) Ltd. v. Base Corpn. Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine NCLAT 1, dated 03-01-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: While disposing of a petition, a Single Judge Bench comprising of Yogesh Khanna, J. set aside the directions given by a Civil Judge to the Commissioner of Police to organise training programmes for police officials.

The Civil Judge was dealing with a civil suit (property dispute) between two private parties. During the course of proceedings, the parties settled the dispute. The suit was disposed of and decree sheet was ordered to be prepared. Aggrieved thereby, the Commissioner of police preferred the present appeal.

A short question before the High Court was, “In a list between two private parties, can a trial court travel beyond the pleadings to pass such like directions since it is not exercising writ jurisdictions?”

The Court relied on its earlier decision in University of Delhi v. Neelam Gaur, 2002 SCC OnLine Del 500 and observed, “a Civil Court does not possess inherent power to give directions of general nature having far-reaching effect, whatever laudable object such directions may seek to achieve viz., giving training to its officers by the petitioner, such directions ought not to have been passed especially, when the lis before the court did not require passing such directions.” Resultantly, the Court set aside the order of the Civil Judge so far it related to the directions given to the petitioner herein. [Commissioner of Police v. Gayatri, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 13048, dated 18-12-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Patna High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Mohit Kumar Shah, J. while hearing a civil writ petition ruled that the district administration was not empowered to order sealing of a property and direct eviction of the possessor therefrom.

The present petition was filed praying for quashing order of Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Gaya whereby petitioner’s shop had been sealed on the basis of a complaint of his landlady alleging that despite demanding the petitioner-tenant to vacate the shop, he had refused to do so and had instead, threatened her.

The Court opined that the District administration was not empowered to seal the shop of the petitioner at the instance of his landlady. Petitioner’s eviction or sealing of his shop could have taken place only after following the due process of law. If the landlady wanted to evict the petitioner, she was free to approach the Court of competent civil jurisdiction for the said purpose.

In view of the above, the petition was allowed and impugned order was quashed. District Administration was directed to open the seal of petitioner’s shop and hand over its possession to him within three days of the date of the present order.[Ram Pravesh Yadav v. State of Bihar, 2018 SCC OnLine Pat 2170, decided on 05-12-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Karnataka High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of G. Narendar, J. hearing a civil writ petition set aside the order of revenue authority passed after 30 years, ruling that the said power was exercised after a lapse of a long time and hence was unreasonable.

The present matter pertained to mutation of revenue entries for a property by revenue authorities, suit in relation to which was pending in the court of Civil Judge, Nelamangala. Despite pendency of the suit in a lower court, the Assistant Commissioner, Bangalore rural district directed mutation of names of respondents 4 to 10 in the revenue records pursuant to registration of sale deed in 1977. The said order was confirmed by Deputy Commissioner, Bangalore district. The instant petition was filed for quashing of the order of Deputy Commissioner.

The Court noted that admittedly, the suit pending in lower court was instituted prior to the passing of orders by the Assistant Commissioner and the Deputy Commissioner. Relying on its judgment in S. Shivanna v. Tehsildar, Bangalore North Taluk, 2005 SCC OnLine Kar 604 the  High Court allowed the petition holding that the impugned orders were vitiated on the ground that the said power had been exercised after an extraordinary and unexplained delay of around 30 years.

Further, revenue courts ought not to adjudicate rights with regard to the immovable property once the dispute is seized of by a civil court. The impugned order of revenue authorities was set aside and they were directed to enter details of pending suit in the records which would be deleted after disposal of the suit. [Prakash v. Dy. Commr. Bangalore Rural District,2018 SCC OnLine Kar 2282, decided on 15-11-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Patna High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Sanjay Kumar, J. set aside a trial court order abating a title suit ruling that declaration of voidability of a document is within the jurisdiction of a Civil Court.

Petitioner before this Court was the plaintiff in a title suit filed in trial court for cancellation of registered sale deed allegedly executed by her father in favour of the respondent-defendant. The petitioner’s submission before trial court was that the land in dispute is joint family property and that her aged had lost his consciousness for the last six months before his death. The respondent-defendant taking advantage of his mental condition executed the sale deed by committing fraud and forgery. The trial court, noting the submissions of the petitioner, abated the said suit in terms of Section 4(c) of Bihar Consolidation of Holdings and Prevention of Fragmentation Act, 1956. Aggrieved thereby, the instant petition was filed for quashing the said order.

The High Court noted that the petitioner’s father neither received any consideration money nor executed any document nor affixed his thumb impression on the purported sale deed. The court relied on full bench decision in Ramkrit Singh v. State of Bihar, 1979 SCC OnLine Pat 30 and observed that if a document has to be set aside, civil suit would be maintainable; but a mere declaration of title or a mere declaration that the document is void can be done by the consideration authority. In the instant case, the purported sale deed was voidable and therefore it was within the jurisdiction of civil court to cancel or set aside the said document.

The Court noted that cancellation of purported sale deed was sought by petitioner on the grounds of fraud and forgery which could be determined only after recording evidence of the parties. As such, the impugned order was set aside and trial court was directed to proceed with the suit. [Gangotri Devi v. Bhukhan Singh,2018 SCC OnLine Pat 1984, decided on 02-11-2018]

 

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of A.S. Chandurkar, J. allowed a civil revision application filed by the tenant — Dena Bank, against the order of the trial court whereby its application under Order 7 Rule 11(d) CPC for rejection of the plaint filed by the landlord for its eviction was dismissed.

The Bank filed the abovesaid application stating that in the light of provisions of Section 17(4-A) read with Section 13(4) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities Act, 2002 (SARFAESI), the civil court had no jurisdiction in the suit. However, the application was rejected. Aggrieved thus, the Bank approached the High Court.

The High Court noted that according to Section 17(4-A), any person who is aggrieved by any of the measures referred to in Section 13(4) of  SARFAESI being taken by a secured creditor can approach Debts Recovery Tribunal and can raise a grievance. A person claiming tenancy or leasehold is also entitled to make such application under Section 17. As per Section 34, a civil court has no jurisdiction to entertain any suit or proceeding with regard to any matter which the DRT is empowered to adjudicate under SARFAESI. The High Court, on the basis of the above, held that the trial court rejected the application of the Bank without having regard to Section 17(4-A) and therefore committed a jurisdictional error. Hence, the order impugned was quashed and set aside. The application filed by the Bank under Order 7 Rule 11(d) was allowed. However, it was open to the landlord to take such other steps as permitted under law. The civil revision was accordingly allowed. [Dena Bank v. Pravin Vithalrao Dorkhande,2018 SCC OnLine Bom 2800, decided on 26-09-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Punjab and Haryana High Court: In this case, two revision petitions were disposed of together by a Single Judge Bench comprising of Anil Kshetarpal, J., where issues were identical.

This revision petition was filed against an order where application for rejection of plaint was dismissed. The Plaintiffs were alleged with not signing the documents of guarantee. The plaintiff had approached the Civil Court in the matter related to SARFAESI Act, 2002 where according to Section 17 of the Act any person affected is entitled to file an application before the Debt Recovery Tribunal (DRT). In pursuance of Section 34 of the Act which bars Civil Court’s jurisdiction in matters covered under SARFAESI Act, defendant i.e. Nationalized Bank pleaded that Civil Court had no jurisdiction. Trial Court referred the case of Mardia Chemicals Ltd. v. Union of India, (2004) 4 SCC 311 where it was held that in cases of fraud, Civil Court does have jurisdiction.

This Court observed that the pleadings of the plaintiff suggests that the word fraud had been deliberately used so as to oust the jurisdiction of Debt Recovery Tribunal and in a decision of Madras High Court V.Thulasi v. Indian Overseas Bank, 2011 SCC OnLine Mad 670 it was held that where it is found that the word fraud has been deliberately used as a clever drafting in order to bring the suit before Civil Court such efforts will be repelled by the Court. High Court enabled the DRT by virtue of provisions of SARFAESI Act, 2002 to deal with the issue of whether the plaintiffs had stood guarantee to the loan received by the borrowers or not. Therefore, both the revision petitions were allowed and the matter will be taken up by the DRT. [State Bank of Patiala v. Satya Jyoti Rice Mills,2017 SCC OnLine P&H 4657, order dated 02-11-2017]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

High Court of Himachal Pradesh: A Single Judge Bench of Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. dismissed a Regular Second Appeal holding that in the instant case, jurisdiction of the Civil Courts was ousted by Section 171 of the Himachal Pradesh Land Revenue Act, 1954; and there was no substantial question of law that arose to be considered by the High Court.
The appellants questioned the partition proceedings right up till the Court of the Financial Commissioner; and thereafter filed a suit for declaration, permanent prohibitory and mandatory injunction before the trial court. One of the issues framed by the learned trial court was with regard to the jurisdiction of the civil court to entertain such kind of a suit, particularly in view of the bar as imposed by Section 171 of the aforementioned Act. The learned trial court held that it had no jurisdiction, particularly when the appellants had failed to prove the violation of any provisions of the Act or even violation of the principles of natural justice. Appellants filed an appeal before the learned first appellate court, which too, came to be dismissed. The appellants then filed the instant appeal, again questioning therein the impugned orders.
The High Court perused Section 171 of the Act and decisions of the Supreme Court and observed that the statute ousting the jurisdiction of the civil court is required to be strictly construed. It was also noticed that the appellants had not sought declaration of the title rather they had filed the suit with the allegation that the partition was not properly effected as they were not allotted any land by the road side. This obviously was a matter which lay entirely within the purview of the revenue authorities under the Act. The findings recorded by the learned courts below were based on the correct appreciation of the pleadings and evidence and were pure findings of fact which were immune from challenge in a second appeal. No question of law much less substantial question of law arose for consideration in the instant appeal. Accordingly, the appeal was dismissed. [Ajudhia Devi v. Dhian Singh, 2017 SCC OnLine HP 1522, order dated 4.10.2017]

Case BriefsSupreme Court

Supreme Court: Dealing with the question as to whether the Civil Court would cease to have jurisdiction to try the suit of eviction if the suit property came under notified area during pendency of the suit, the Court held that as on the date of the institution of the suit legal right in favour of the landlord had already accrued and it stood crystallised under the law applicable to the building at that time, if during the pendency of the suit, Rent Act becomes applicable to the premises in question, that would be of no consequence and it would not take away the jurisdiction of civil court to dispose of a suit validly instituted.

Referring to various rulings of this Court, the Bench of Dr. A.K. Sikri and N.V. Ramana, JJ said that in order to oust the jurisdiction of civil court, there must be a specific provision in the Act taking away the jurisdiction of the civil court in respect of those cases also which were validly instituted before the date when protection of Rent Act became available in respect of the said area/premises/tenancy. Further In case aforesaid position is not accepted and the protection of the Rent Act is extended even in respect of suit validly instituted prior in point of time when there was no such protection under the Act, it will have the consequence of making the decree, that is obtained prior to the Rent Act becoming applicable to the said area/premises, inexecutable after the application of these Rent Act in respect of such premises. This would not be in consonance with the legislative intent.

In the present case the premises in-question was initially outside the ambit of rent legislation, however, during the pendency of the suit and before it could be finally decided, the area in question was brought within the sweep of rent legislations by requisite notifications. The effect of such coverage was to give protective umbrella to the tenants. As a fortiorari, the landlord can now evict the tenant only by taking recourse to the rent legislation that too, by filing the petition for eviction under the Rent Act before the Rent Controller/Tribunal constituted under the said Acts. [Rajender Bansal v. Bhuru, 2016 SCC OnLine SC 1151, decided on 18.10.2016]