Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: The Division Bench of Dhirubhai Naranbhai Patel, CJ and C. Hari Shankar, J. has issued a notice to Department of Financial Service in the Ministry of Finance on writ petition filed by Juhie (India) Private Limited.

As per the petition, Juhie (India) Private Limited (Petitioner Company) was working with a blemishless record for over two decades. It was aggrieved by order of Appellate Authority (Ministry of Finance) under Section 45-IA (7) of the Reserve Bank of India Act, 1934 wherein Appellate Authority vide the impugned order was pleased to remand the matter back to the Reserve Bank of India for reviewing the cancellation order regarding the cancellation of Certificate of Registration of the petitioner company, but interestingly the appellate authority did not set aside or stay the impugned cancellation order while remanding it back to the Reserve Bank of India (Respondent 1), which is completely against the settled proposition of law while remanding a matter back the Appellate Authority should set aside or stay the impugned order under-challenged and remit the matter back for de novo consideration on merits iron the issues framed by it, else purpose of remand gets frustrated/negated.

Further, it has been submitted that the petitioner company in the present case stands at the same footing as that of the petitioner in the Kerala High Court case, Rise Capital Operative Finance Private Ltd. v. RBI, WP(C) No. 2763 of 2019. Therefore, the same relief may be extended in the present matter.

The reasoning for the above is that, petitioner company despite fulfilling all the statutory conditions as per law, is not able to operate for the past one year and appellate authority without any due application of mind remanded back for the de novo consideration without setting aside the impugned order.

It has been stated in the petition that, the impugned order suffers from irrationality, illegality, perversity and Wednesbury principle of reasonability as it failed to take note of the stated position of law.

Cancellation order cancelling the COR of petitioner is arbitrary and against the principles of natural justice and fair play but also contrary to proviso to Sections 45-IA (3) and 45-IA (6) of RBI Act.

On facts it is required to point out that the petitioner company had requisite NOF of more than Rs 100 lakhs as on 31-03-2016 but it fell short of Rs 200 lakhs, rather the NOF was Rs 123.39 lakhs and the reason for not attaining the said NOF limit was because the petitioner company could not convert its loans from directors/shareholders into equity capital fro increasing the NOF. Statutory auditors certificate sated 31-03-2018 shows the NOF to be Rs 211.36 lakhs.

Hence on the date of show cause notice dated 02-05-2018, petitioner company had already fulfilled the requisite criteria of NOF.

Thus, on consideration of the facts and law and consequent infringement of fundamental rights under Articles 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of  India coupled with perverse order of appellate authority dated 08-08-2019 is a reason for the present writ petition which warrants consideration on merit and law.

Held

High Court has directed the matter to be taken up on 23-10-2019. [Juhie (India) (P) Ltd. v. RBI, WP (C) 9702 of 2019, decided on 06-09-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Rekha Dikshit, J. while disposing of this petition directed the lower court to consider the bail application (if moved by the petitioners) in the light of the judgment passed by the seven Judges’ Bench of this Court in Amarawati v. State of U.P., 2004 SCC OnLine All 1112, as approved by the Supreme Court in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P., (2009) 4 SCC 437.

In the instant case, the petition was filed to quash the summoning order by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Raebareli in Complaint Case No. 73 of 2018 of Mahavir v. Devendra Bahadur Singh.

Counsel for the Petitioners, Vinod Kumar Pandey submitted that the petitioners have not committed any offence and have been falsely implicated and moreover there are no independent witnesses to support the case at hand. It was further submitted that the petitioners were willing to surrender and asked for protection.

Counsel for the Respondent, the AGA submitted that the summoning order was passed on the basis of the evidence recorded under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court after analyzing the submissions of the parties cited some relevant cases helpful in understanding the matter at hand.

In Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of W.B., (1973) 3 SCC 753, it was held that Section 203 CrPC does not entail that a regular trial for adjudging the truth or otherwise by the accusation made against the accused should take place at this stage.

In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose, 1964 (1) SCR 693 was held that at the stage of enquiry under Section 202 CrPC, the test was whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there was sufficient ground for conviction.

In Nagwwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa, Konjalgi, 1976 (1) ACC 225 (S.C.) while considering the scope of enquiry under Section 202 CrPC, the Supreme Court held that the order of issuing process can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value makes absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused.

In S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 241, the Supreme Court held that when the Magistrate has to pass an order under Section 203 CrPC searching sufficient ground to convict is not necessary.

The Court observed that in the instant case, the Magistrate after considering the evidence recorded under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC, concluded that the applicants have, prima facie, committed offence and in these circumstances, it cannot be held that the Magistrate has committed any illegality or impropriety in passing the impugned order.

The Court held that there is no substantial ground to justify interference by this Court under Section 482 CrPC Though, the applicants have a right to be discharged under Sections 239,227,228 and 245 CrPC. [Devendra Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P., 2019 SCC OnLine All 2743, decided on 25-07-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Uttaranchal High Court: Alok Singh, J. dismissed a writ petition filed by Sahak Nagar Adhikari, who was Public Information Officer under Right to Information Act, 2005.

The petitioner contended that, a show cause notice was issued upon him which sought an explanation as to why a penalty should not be imposed upon him for providing delayed information. He gave a brief reply of the said notice and administered information to the said officer. Thereafter, State Information Commissioner adjudged the matter and imposed a penalty of Rs 25,000 for delayed reply to the notice. He was aggrieved by the said order of the officer and therefore sought justice from the Court.

Mr Parikshit Saini, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that impugned order of the Information Officer was arbitrary and patently illegal, hence, was not maintainable. He argued that impugned order was ‘unreasonable’ and ‘non-speaking’, the officer failed to justify the penalty as he gave a brief reply as to why the delay was caused by him for discharging his duties. He relied on the judgment of Supreme Court, in Narendra Kumar v. CIC, 2014 (2) UD 72 where it was observed, “State Public Information Officer has decided any complaint or appeal without any reasonable cause, refused to receive an application for information or has not furnished information within the time etc., in that event penalty can be imposed. In the further opinion of this Court, if there was reasonable cause for furnishing the delayed information then Chief Information Commissioner should not impose penalty merely because there was some delay in supplying the information.”

The Court observed that judgment in case Narendra Kumar was not applicable in the aforementioned case, as in the referred case information was not supplied in time because of natural disaster but in the case of petitioner there was delay of one year in supply of the information whereas Act, 2005 mandates to provide information within thirty days. Cause shown by the petitioner for delay in supplying the information was the excessive workload. The Court stated that, petitioner has not explained his excessive work; this was no ground for the delay in providing the information. One year delay in providing information under the Right to Information Act was too high.

It further held that Commissioner has assigned the reason for the penalty. “Providing information after one year that too on filing of appeal in the State Information Commission amounts to denial of information.” Court found no illegality or perversity in the impugned order and directed the petitioner to pay the aforementioned penalty.[Chandrakant Bhatt v. Uttarakhand Information Commission, 2019 SCC OnLine Utt 356, decided on 10-05-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Patna High Court: The Bench of Ashutosh Kumar, J. allowed a civil writ petition filed by a work-charged employee and directed the concerned authority to consider his representation for regularization of service afresh after consideration of all facts.

Petitioner who was appointed against a vacant post as a work-charged employee in the year 1984 had approached this Court earlier vide CWJC No. 16872 of 2010 seeking his adjustment in government service on the ground that respondent authorities had adjusted some of the employees engaged as work-charged employee prior to 1985 and even persons who were late entrants in the service were regularized. A Bench of this Court vide order dated 19-06-2018 passed in CWJC No. 16872 of 2010, directed him to make a representation before the concerned authority.

Petitioner’s case was that his representation was considered only for literal compliance of the aforesaid order, but the same was rejected by the Chief Engineer-cum-Special Secretary, Government of Bihar, Patna, without assigning any reason for rejecting his representation. The said order of rejection was challenged vide the instant petition.

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Mr Dilip Kumar, submitted that the necessary information for disposal of petitioner’s representation was not furnished by the Superintending Engineer, but still, the order rejecting petitioner’s representation was passed. Further, the impugned order recorded that only the work-charged employees appointed prior to 1990, and who served for five years continuously and for 240 days each year were to be regularized. However, the said order did not take into account the fact that the petitioner was appointed prior to the cut-off date and had worked for 240 days in one year, which took care of the aforesaid requirement. Thus, the impugned order was not sustainable in the eyes of law.

The Court set aside the impugned order holding that petitioner’s representation had been disposed of on half-baked facts. Petitioner was directed to make a fresh representation before the concerned respondent, who after referring to and verifying all facts, was directed to pass a reasoned order in accordance with the law.[Suresh Prasad v. State of Bihar, 2019 SCC OnLine Pat 507, Order dated 15-04-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: A Bench of G.S. Sistani and Jyoti Singh, JJ., dismissed an appeal filed by the appellant-wife against the order of the family court rejecting her application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the ex-parte decree of divorce passed in favour of her husband.

The parties married each-other in the year 1989. They were living separately since 2004. The husband filed a petition before the family court for grant of divorce under Sections 13(1)  (i-a) and (i-b) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. A notice was issued to the wife, who despite the service of the same, decided not to appear in the matter. On 03-05-2008, the family court passed an ex-parte divorce decree in favour of the husband. The said order was challenged by the wife by filing an application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC for setting aside the ex-parte decree which was rejected by the family court. Aggrieved thus, the wife filed the present appeal.

Mitthan Lal, Advocate for the wife submitted that the husband played fraud on the court by producing a false report. As per him, the service report shows that the wife was not found at the given address and the summons were not delivered. Per contra, Prerna, Advocate appearing for the husband supported the impugned order.

The High Court noted that the wife’s application under Order 9 Rule 13 CPC was dismissed on the ground that it was not accompanied by an application seeking condonation of delay of 4 years and 5 months. Relying on the Supreme Court decision in Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar(2005) 1 SCC 787, the Court observed that, “apart from questioning the correctness or otherwise of an order posting the case for ex parte hearing, the defendant has to show sufficient and cogent reasons for not being able to attend the hearing of the suit on the relevant date. Reading of the application under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC along with the impugned order would show that the appellant/wife has failed to give any satisfactory explanation for delay in filing the application under Order IX Rule 13 of CPC nor there was any application seeking condonation of delay of more than 4 years and 5 months. Thus, the Family Court has correctly dismissed the application under Order IX Rule 13 of the CPC.” In such view of the matter, it was held that the family court correctly rejected the wife’s application. Therefore, the appeal was dismissed. [RRD v. RS, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7446, decided on 20-02-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: This petition had been filed before a Single Judge Bench comprising of Vivek Kumar Birla, J., in order to quash the impugned order passed by District Magistrate.

Facts of the case were that petitioner had been accused of encroaching upon the land of Gaon Sabha which was recorded as navin parti in the Revenue Code due to which damages were imposed upon petitioner under Section 67 of the U.P. Revenue Code, 2006. Petitioner aggrieved by the above filed an appeal before District Magistrate which was dismissed. This petition was filed against the above-impugned orders.

Petitioner contended that the impugned orders were arbitrary and illegal as petitioner’s ground was not considered. The orders also did not consider the claim filed in the appeal under Section 67-A. Whereas the respondent argued that the land in question was recorded as navin parti and it was not allotted to the petitioner.

The High Court while perusing impugned order found that notice was duly issued to petitioner whereby in reply he claimed that the land in question belonged to him but according to Code there is no allotment of land to petitioner and he is not eligible for the same. Court while perusing appellate order found that no documents to show allotment of land to petitioner were brought also petitioner was not eligible for allotment of land under Section 64 of the code. Court observed that not even this court had been presented with evidence to that effect. Court found no legal infirmity in the impugned order. Therefore, petition was dismissed due to lack of merit. [Satyadev Tripathi v. State of U.P.,2018 SCC OnLine All 1813, order dated 03-10-2018]