Case BriefsHigh Courts

Patna High Court: Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J. allowed the application of the petitioner to set aside the order granting maintenance to his wife when the divorce was granted on account of adultery on the wife’s part.

The petitioner filed an application under Section 19(4) of the Family Courts Act, 1984, against the order dated passed by the Principal Judge, Family Court, Vaishali at Hajipur which directed the petitioner to pay Rs 8,000 per month as maintenance to his wife. The order was delivered ex parte and there was no valid service of notice on the petitioner during the proceeding and, thus, he was unaware of the same. The revision petition was filed within the limitation period.

The impugned order was passed under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which excludes a wife living in adultery from being entitled to receive any maintenance. It was submitted that in Divorce Case filed by the petitioner against the opposite party and one Sunny

Rajak, the Principal Judge, Family Court, Samastipur by judgment dated 11-10-2017, had dissolved the marriage between the petitioner and the opposite party on the ground that she was living in adultery with Sunny Rajak. It was submitted that in the said case, Sunny Rajak had contested the suit whereas the opposite party had chosen not to contest. The learned counsel submitted that once a competent Court had held the opposite party to be living in adultery with Sunny Rajak, Section 125(4) of the Code disentitles her to any maintenance from the petitioner.

The opposite party submitted that they have challenged the decree of divorce which was still pending.

The Court held that the order passed in the Maintenance Case No. 84 of 2016, could not be sustained. Section 125(4) of the Code clearly debars a wife living in adultery from receiving any maintenance from her husband. In the present case, the marriage between the parties was dissolved on the grounds that the opposite party was found to be living in adultery with one Sunny Rajak.  Further, the Court also that mere pendency of an appeal against the order dissolving the marriage, inter alia on the ground of adultery, which till date was neither disposed of nor any interim stay of such order was granted, cannot be a ground to uphold the order impugned.

In view of the above-noted facts, the instant application was allowed and the order in the Maintenance Case was set aside.[Rajesh Rajak v. Rinku Devi, 2019 SCC OnLine Pat 1521, decided on 30-08-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Manoj Misra and Ali Zamin, JJ. granted bail on the ground that the appellant were on bail pending trial and had not misused the liberty of bail. 

A bail application was made against the conviction under Sections 302, 307 read with Section 34 and Section 504 of the Penal Code, 1860. In addition to that accused Nanhe was also convicted under Section 30 Arms Act.

Vinay Kumar Tripathi, Counsel for the appellant contended that four persons were made accused; the deceased suffered a gunshot which was specifically attributed to the other co-accused. No other injury was found on the body of the deceased. As per the prosecution case, the accused/appellant along with the other co-accused came armed with lathi only to settle the score in respect of some past incident regarding straying of accused’s cattle on to the field of the deceased. It was further submitted that the appellants assaulted the deceased with the fists and kicks, which suggested that they did not share common intention with the co-accused Om Prakash Singh, who allegedly fired at the deceased from close range. It was also submitted that the appellants were falsely implicated and the court below had not properly evaluated the evidence on record. It was further submitted that the appellants were on bail pending trial and they have not misused the liberty of bail and in case they are released on bail pending appeal they will not misuse the same.

Counsel for State opposed for the bail but was also not able to prove that apart from gunshot injury any other injury was sustained either by the deceased or the person injured.

The Court opined that hearing of appeal is remote, as more than twenty years’ old appeals are in the queue, keeping in mind the role attributed to the appellants as also the totality of facts and circumstances, without expressing opinion on the merits of the case, we find it a fit case for grant of bail to the appellants during pendency of the appeal. Thus, the bail was granted after imposing restrictions. [Nanhe v. State of U.P., 2019 SCC OnLine All 2430, decided on 01-07-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Punjab and Haryana High Court: Rajbir Sehrawat, J. upheld the decision of the lower court on the set principle of law which was already decided by the court.

A petition was filed to quash the order passed by Additional Session Judge, Faridabad in an appeal against the conviction and sentence in a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instrument Act, 1881 directing the appellant/petitioners to deposit 25 per cent of the amount awarded by the trial Court, during the pendency of the appeal.

Kunal Dawar, Counsel for the petitioner submitted that complaint was made in the year 2017, for which the petitioner was convicted. That during the pendency of the appeal, the appellate court passed the order whereby it was directed to deposit 25 per cent of the amount of the compensation to the appellate court. The counsel for the petitioner submitted that the act was introduced for the first time in the year 2018 and there cannot be any retrospective effect of the same. Thus, the provision contained in newly added Section 148 of the Act cannot be applied to the present appeal, which had arisen from the case where the trial was pending on the date of enforcement of the amended provision. Thus, prayed for the quashing of the order.

The court opined that the point of law which was raised by the petitioner had already been considered and decided by this court in the judgment of Ginni Garments v. Sethi Garments; CRR No. 9872-2018 (O&M), in which it was held that the “procedure for recovery of fine or compensation from appellant in pending appeal already existed in CrPC even before advent of the provision as contained in Section 148 of the Act. Hence, no new aspect of coercive recovery of fine or compensation from the appellant is being freshly created through this amended provision. Rather this provision is beneficial to the convict/appellant because it reduces the liability of the appellant qua immediate deposit of fine or compensation, if not otherwise stayed by Appellate Court.”  Thus the impugned order was upheld in the present petition.[Ebullient Cables (P) Ltd. v. Supertech Machines (P) Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine P&H 1013, decided on 02-07-2019]

Case BriefsTribunals/Commissions/Regulatory Bodies

Securities Appellate Tribunal (SAT), Mumbai: The Coram of Tarun Agarwala, J., (Presiding Officer), Dr C.K.G. Nair (Member) and M.T. Joshi, J., (Member) disposed an application filed for the calculation of rate of interest on a certain principal amount with the direction to the appellant to pay an additional sum of Rs 10 lakhs.

The facts were that in 2004 SEBI raised the demand of Rs 4,64,17,206 towards principal amount and interest under Securities and Exchange Board of India (Interest Regularization Scheme, 2003) as fees under the Brokers Regulations. The said demand was challenged by the appellant before the Tribunal which was allowed in 2005 and SEBI was directed to refund the aforesaid amount which had already been paid by the appellant. The order of the Tribunal was challenged by SEBI before the Supreme Court of India. During the pendency of the appeal, the Supreme Court permitted the appellant to withdraw the amount deposited with this Tribunal. Consequently, the appellant withdrew a sum of Rs 6,20,12,878 towards principal amount and interest accrued thereon. The demand raised by SEBI in 2004 was affirmed and the amount became payable along with interest. SEBI, accordingly called upon the appellant to pay a sum of Rs 11,59,57,867. The contention was whether the appellant should pay a simple interest or compound interest on the principal sum. The Tribunal by an order had held that SEBI was not entitled to charge compound interest and that the appellant was liable to pay simple interest on the amount withdrawn at relevant bank rate/rates prevailing from time to time.

The Tribunal stated that simple interest was required to be calculated which the parties failed to calculate in the correct perspective. Without going into the mechanics of exact calculation, it found appropriate in the interest of justice to direct the appellant to deposit a further sum of additional Rs 10 lakhs. [Prebon Yamane India Ltd. v. SEBI, 2019 SCC OnLine SAT 17, dated 28-03-2019]