Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Sanjeev Sachdeva, J., reiterated that proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and under Section 125 CrPC are independent of each other and have different scope.

The parties, though married, were living separately. The wife had filed an application under Section 125 CrPC wherein she was granted interim maintenance of Rs 1.20 lakhs per month. Subsequently, she filed an application under Section 23 of the DV Act seeking, inter alia, monetary relief under Section 20. However, her application was rejected by the trial court on the ground that she had already been granted maintenance under Section 125 CrPC and all her claims were considered by the family court while granting the same. The wife filed an appeal against the order of the trial court, which was allowed and the Appellate Court remanded the matter back to the trial court for fresh consideration. Aggrieved thereby, the husband filed the present petition.

Senior Advocate Geeta Luthra, appearing for the husband, submitted that the Appellate Court erred in passing the impugned order as maintenance was already granted to the wife. Per contra, it was submitted on behalf of the wife that she suffered domestic violence and was thus entitled to monetary relief. The wife was represented by Madhav Khurana and Trisha Mitta, Advocates.

Noting that the scope of Section 20 of the DV was much wider than that of Section 125 CrPC, the High Court observed: “While Section 125 CrPC talks only of maintenance, Section 20 DV Act stipulates payment of monetary relief to meet the expenses incurred and losses suffered as a result of the domestic violence including but not limited to loss of earning, medical expenses, loss caused due to destruction, damage or removal of any property from the control of aggrieved person.”

It was categorically stated: “an order under Section 20 DV Act is not restricted by an order under Section 125 CrPC.” As such, the trial court was held to have erred in not appreciating the distinction between the two provisions. In such view of the matter, the High Court did not find infirmity in the order of the Appellate Court. Resultantly, the petition was dismissed. [Shome Nikhil Danani v. Tanya Banon Danani, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 8016, decided on 11-04-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Sanjeev Sachdeva, J., while dismissing a criminal revision petition, held that the magistrate has a power to pass an order granting interim maintenance under Section 23 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, with effect from the date of filing of the substantive petition under Section 12.

The wife filed a petition under Section 12 against the husband on 10-09-2014. Subsequently, on the wife’s petition under Section 23, by the impugned order the Magistrate awarded interim maintenance of Rs 15,000 for the wife and Rs 15,000 for the minor daughter payable monthly by the husband (appellant). The maintenance was ordered to paid from the date of filing of the substantive petition under Section 12.

Ranjan Bajaj, Advocate for the husband submitted that the trial court was in error in awarding maintenance from the date of filing of petition under Section 12. Per contra, Varun Chawla, Advocate appearing for the wife, supported the impugned order.

The High Court perused the entire record and held that the trial court passed the order of maintenance after proper analysis of all the relevant material. As for the submission of the husband mentioned above, the Court observed, “Section 23 of the DV Act does not provide a substantive right to parties but is a provision which empowers the trial court to pass an order granting interim maintenance in a petition filed under Section 12 of the DV Act. Merely because the trial court has not exercised the power under Section 23 of the DV Act, when a substantive petition under Section 12 of DV Act was filed and chose to pass an order only when a separate application under Section 23 of the DV Act was filed, does not mean that a Magistrate does not have the power to pass an order with effect from the date of filing of the substantive petition under Section 12.” In such view of the matter, the court did not find any merit in the petition which was thus dismissed. [Gaurav Manchanda v. Namrata Singh, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 7353, dated 27-02-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court at Goa: C.V. Bhadang, J., allowed a petition filed by the husband and quashed trial court’s order whereby it had partly allowed the wifes’ application filed under Section 20 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

The wife, along with her minor son, filed a domestic violence petition against the husband. By its order, the trial court partly granted the application in terms of Section 20 directing the husband to pay a monthly maintenance of Rs 5,000. Subsequently, the wife appealed to the additional sessions judge who partly allowed the appeal by enhancing the maintenance to Rs 7,000. Aggrieved, thereby the husband filed the revision petition.

Agha Iftikhar, Advocate for the husband submitted that there was no finding of any act of domestic violence being committed by the petitioner against the wife. It was further submitted that such a finding was a sine qua non for the trial court to grant any relief under the Act. On the other hand, A.D. Bhobe, Advocate appearing for the wife fairly did not dispute the above-said submission.

The High Court took note of the submissions made by the husband that he shall continue to pay Rs 5,000 per month for a limited period for the wife and minor son. Resultantly, the Court allowed the petition and quashed the impugned order. However, it was left open for the wife to take recourse to any other remedy as may be available under law. The husband was directed to pay a monthly sum of Rs 5,000 for a period of six months. [Vijayanand Dattaram Naik v. Vishranti Vijayanand Naik, 2019 SCC OnLine Bom 314, dated 13-02-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: A Division Bench comprising of Vipin Sanghi and P.S. Teji, JJ. dismissed the petition filed by the wife against the order of Additional Sessions Judge rejecting her challenge to the maintainability of the appeal filed by the husband under Section 29 of Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act.

Interim maintenance was awarded to the wife by the trial court under Section 23, DV Act. The husband preferred an appeal against the order under Section 29. The wife challenged the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that the appellant was required to deposit the complete amount of compensation awarded before he could file an appeal. However, the Additional Sessions Judge rejected the challenge. Matter reached the High Court, and the learned Single Judge referred the same to be considered by a larger bench, as there were two conflicting judgments of coordinate benches. The question before the Court was whether statutory remedy of appeal under Section 29 could be made subject to pre-deposit of entire amount of interim maintenance fixed by Magistrate under Section 23?

The Court, after perusing the concerned sections, was of the view that neither the language used by the legislature in Section 399 read with Section 401 CrPC nor in Section 29 of DV Act even remotely suggest that the legislature intended to impose preconditions to the available remedies. Further, any such precondition will fall foul of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was held that there cannot be an absolute rider that the entire maintenance amount, as granted by the trial Court, should be deposited prior to the entertainment of the statutory remedy, because it would leave the remedy of statutory revision/appeal illusory. The reference was answered in above terms and the matter was directed to be listed before the Single Judge for further proceedings. [Sabina Sahdev v. Vidur Sahdev, 2018 SCC OnLine Del 9747, dated 09-07-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Bharati H. Dangre, J., has held that the Muslim Personal Law can in no way curtail the protection granted under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act 2005, from being available to a Muslim woman.

Brief facts of the case were that the respondent-wife had filed a petition for divorce against the husband under Section 2(viii)(a) and (d) of the Dissolution of Muslim Marriages Act, 1939, on grounds of cruelty. She also filed an application under the Domestic Violence Act for maintenance. The petitioner-husband filed objection to the application contending that he had already given talaq to the respondent after she filed the petition for divorce. He contended that the talaq was given by him in pursuance of the desire of the petitioner to get a divorce, as was evident by the petition filed by her; the said talaq should be considered as ‘khula’ (divorce by consent) and therefore according to the Muslim Personal Law that govern the parties, the respondent was not entitled to any maintenance as asked for by her.

The High Court observed that in the present case, the pronouncement of talaq was disputed by the wife and the husband will have to prove the said factum of talaq. As till the time the talaq was not proved, the respondent continued to be legally wedded wife of the petitioner and in that contingency, the question was whether the wife who was in a domestic relationship with the petitioner was entitled to seek relief under the DV Act.

After extensively considering various provisions of the DV Act as well as Acts concerning the rights of women under Muslim Personal Law, Hon’ble Court held that

“perusal of the provisions of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 would reveal that it is an enactment to provide for more effective protection for rights of women, guaranteed under the Indian Constitution, who are the victims of the violence … The definition and connotation of “Domestic Violence” under Section 3 of the enactment do not indicate any intention either express or implied to exclude Muslim women. Section 36 of the said enactment provides that the provisions of the Act shall be in addition to and not in derogation of the provisions of any other law for the time being in force.”

The Court held that the provisions of the Muslim Personal Law can in no way curtail the protection provided under Domestic Violence Act. As a result, the impugned order of the Family Court whereby the petitioner was ordered to pay maintenance under the provisions of the DV Act was upheld and the petition dismissed. [Ali Abbas Daruwala v. Shehnaz Daruwala,2018 SCC OnLine Bom 1195, dated 04-05-2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Anuja Prabhudessai, J., decided a writ petition, wherein it was held that Section 28 (2) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 allows the court to permit evidence by way of an affidavit in an application under Section 12 of the Act.

A short question arose in the petition; whether in an application under Section 12 of the Act, the applicant could be permitted to file affidavit in evidence? The respondent-wife was married to the petitioner-husband. The matrimonial dispute resulted in filing of a divorce petition by the petitioner. The respondent also filed an application under Section 12 of the DV Act. In the course of proceedings, the petitioner contended that the proceedings under the Act were to be dealt with in the manner prescribed under Section 125 CrPC and therefore, the respondent could not be allowed to file affidavit in evidence. He sought a direction to call the respondent in the witness box to adduce evidence.

The High Court perused the Act as well as various decisions of High Courts and the Supreme Court and observed that a cumulative reading of Section 28(1) read with Rule 6(5) indicates that in deciding the application under Section 12, the Court has to follow the procedure prescribed under Section 126 of CrPC and thus, record evidence in presence of the parties. It is however to be noted that Section 28(2) clearly provides that “Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the Court from laying down its own procedure for disposal of an application under Section 12 or under Section 23(2)”. The opening words of Section 28(2) viz. “Nothing in sub-section (1) shall prevent the Court” clearly indicate that notwithstanding the procedure prescribed in Section 28(1) read with Rule 6(5), the Court is empowered to lay down its own procedure in deciding the application under Section 12 or 23(2) of the DV Act. The DV Act is a beneficial piece of social welfare legislation aimed at providing to the victims of domestic violence speedy relief, which are civil in nature. Having regard to the object and scope of the Act, this provision cannot be given a narrow interpretation which will have an effect of rendering it redundant, surplus or otiose.

Holding that the court in its discretion can allow evidence on affidavit and permit cross-examination to test veracity of the evidence, the petition was dismissed. [Aniket Subhash Tupe v. Piyusha Aniket Tupe, 2018 SCC OnLine Bom 601, decided on 22.3.2018]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Bombay High Court: A Single Judge Bench comprising of Dr. Shalini Phansalkar-Joshi, J. heard a case involving counter-petitions filed by both the parties to the matrimonial proceedings. The issue before the Court was “whether the order of maintenance passed in the proceedings filed under Section 125 of CrPC is to be followed, or, whether the order passed in the proceedings filed under Domestic Violence Act, is to be followed?”

The wife had filed a petition for maintenance under Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in 2010, under which the husband had been directed to pay Rs 6000 to wife and Rs. 4000 to the minor daughter from the date of the order dated 2016. The wife had also subsequently filed a petition under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, under which the husband had been directed to pay an interim maintenance of Rs. 8000 to the wife and Rs. 5000 to the daughter. Taking into account this interim maintenance, the Family Court, Mumbai had awarded maintenance of Rs. 6000 to the wife and Rs. 4000 to the daughter in 2016 without making it clear whether the amount of Rs 10,000 had to be paid in addition to the interim maintenance amount or instead of the interim amount.

Relying upon Section 20(1)(d) of the Domestic Violence Act, the Court came to the conclusion that “the power to award maintenance under DV Act is in addition to an order of maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC or any other law for the time being in force”. Also, Section 36 of the aforementioned Act clarifies that the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act are to be in addition to and not in derogation of provisions of any other existing law. Therefore, it was held that since both the orders had been passed by two different forums in two different proceedings, both the orders were binding on the husband and on the wife. [Prakash Babulal Dangi v. State of Maharashtra,  2017 SCC OnLine Bom 8897, order dated 10.10.2017]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Karnataka High Court: While passing the order in a criminal revision petition, a Single Judge Bench comprising of Rathnakala, J. held that the obligation of the husband to maintain the wife continues throughout the matrimonial life and the husband cannot get away with an excuse that for many years no request was made by the wife for the maintenance amount.

In the present case, the wife filed a petition under S. 12 of the Act for various relief. The learned Magistrate ordered maintenance and compensation in favor of the wife which was modified by the lower appellate court. The husband-revision petitioner, challenged the maintainability of the petition filed by the wife under S. 12 of the Act for maintenance and compensation. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that there was no cause to file the petition since there was no harassment/ill treatment or domestic violence as defined under S. 3 of the Act.

The Court, rejecting the contention of the petitioner held that domestic violence under S. 3 of the Act, includes economic abuse also. The omission of the husband in neglecting to maintain the aggrieved wife falls within the description of S. 3 of the Act. The husband was living with another woman, which was another form of domestic violence, emotional. It was held that the petitioner was guilty of offence of domestic violence under the Act and could not escape liability. [Kasturi v. Subhas, Criminal Revision Petition No. 539/2017, dated August 3, 2017]