Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Constitution of India — Art. 14 — Invidious discrimination: Entitlement of former CMs of State of U.P. for allotment of government accommodation for their lifetime in terms of S. 4(3) of U.P. Ministers (Salaries, Allowances and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1981 (as amended by U.P. Act 22 of 2016), violates doctrine of equality and is ultra vires the Constitution. Natural resources, public lands and public goods like government bungalows/official residence are public property and “Doctrine of Equality” which emerges from concepts of justice, fairness must guide State in distribution/allocation of same. Chief Minister, once he demits office is on a par with common citizen, though by virtue of office held, he/she may be entitled to security and other protocols. S. 4(3) of 1981 Act which creates a separate class of citizens for conferment of benefit by way of distribution of public property on basis of previous public office held by them, fails test of reasonable classification violating Art. 14 and is ultra vires the Constitution. Furthremore, U.P. Ex-Chief Ministers Residence Allotment Rules, 1997 were struck down by Supreme Court in Lok Prahari, (2016) 8 SCC 389 on ground that provision for accommodation for ex-CMs as made in the Rules was in direct conflict with S. 4 of 1981 Act. Insertion of S. 4(3), as substantive provision in statute, which sought to bring in same effect as 1997 Rules without curing defect as pointed out, is an invalid attempt to overreach judgment in Lok Prahari case. [Lok Prahari v. State of U.P., (2018) 6 SCC 1]

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Maintainability of writ petition: In this case, second writ petition was filed after disposal of earlier one as withdrawn. Earlier petition was withdrawn only on account of pendency of appeal. Second writ petition challenging subsequent order passed in appeal, hence held, was maintainable. [Vinod v. District Selection Committee, (2018) 6 SCC 68]

Constitution of India — Art. 32 — Misuse of PIL — Casting aspersions on District Judiciary, High Court Judges, misrepresentation of facts, baseless allegations: In a case death of Special Judge conducting alleged Fake Encounter Death case (Sohrabuddin case), there was non-registration of FIR as inquest report and other materials indicated natural death. Discreet inquiry conducted by Commissioner, State Intelligence Department (SID) also concluding similarly. No complaint was lodged by any relative of said Special Judge in local police station about any suspicion regarding cause of death. Prayer for registration of FIR and court monitored investigation rejected. [Tehseen Poonawalla v. Union of India, (2018) 6 SCC 72]

Constitution of India — Arts. 226 and 32 — Scope of issuance of writ of quo warranto — Principles reiterated: As long as caste and income certificate is valid and in force, a writ of quo warranto cannot be issued on basis of assumptions, inferences and suspicions regarding fact of fulfilment of eligibility criteria. [Bharati Reddy v. State of Karnataka, (2018) 6 SCC 162]

Contract and Specific Relief — Performance of Contract — Time of Performance — Time of the Essence — Termination/Discharge/Compensation/Penalty for delayed performance: Government entered into power purchase agreement (PPA) with respondent contractor (successful bidder). Respondent got a term loan of Rs 267.37 crores and spent huge amounts to purchase 253 acres of land. Respondent completed project after a delay of only 16 days (claimed by respondent) disputed by appellant authorities. As per appellants 16 days’ delay was beyond extra time of 9 months permissible under PPA. Delay was due to resistance faced by project team like physical attacks at allotted site during land procurement. Said circumstance of delay though not force majeure, are unavoidable circumstances. In case of delay, Arts. 2.5 and 2.6 of agreement provide for penalty. By interim order, High Court direction for encashment of bank guarantee had been stayed subject to condition of restitution depending on outcome of case. Penalty of stated amount directed to be paid. Termination of contract, not proper. [M.P. Power Management Co. Ltd. v. Renew Clean Energy (P) Ltd., (2018) 6 SCC 157]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 340 and 195(1)(b)(i) — Perjury: As case of deliberate falsehood, not made out, initiation of prosecution for perjury in such case, not justified. Proceedings initiated under S. 340 CrPC r/w S. 195(1)(b)(i) CrPC, closed. [Chintamani Malviya v. High Court of M.P., (2018) 6 SCC 151]

Electricity Act, 2003 — Ss. 84(1) & (2) and Ss. 77, 85(2), (3), (5) & (6), 86(1)(f), 86, 112 and 113 and Statement of Objects and Reasons — State Electricity Commission: It is not mandatory that Chairman of State Commission should be a Judge but it is mandatory that there should be at least one person of law as a Member of the Commission, which requires a person, who is, or has been holding a judicial office or is a person possessing professional qualifications with substantial experience in the practice of law, who has the requisite qualifications to have been appointed as a Judge of the High Court or a District Judge. Consequential directions issued, but to apply prospectively. [State of Gujarat v. Utility Users’ Welfare Assn., (2018) 6 SCC 21]

Income Tax — Income: Amount received by assessee acting as a broker of Bank in trust, to be paid to certain parties on behalf of Bank, not income in the hands of assessee and not taxable. [CIT v. T. Jayachandran, (2018) 6 SCC 189]

Income Tax — Non-Residents/Offshore transactions — Permanent establishment (PE) in India — Relevance of — Arm’s length pricing i.e. where a non-resident compensates a Permanent Establishment (PE) at arm’s length price — Effect of: In this case, following the ruling in E-Funds IT Solution Inc., (2018) 13 SCC 294, held, once arm’s length price procedure has been followed, notice for the reassessment based only on the allegation that the appellant(s) has permanent establishment in India, cannot be sustained. [Honda Motor Co. Ltd. v. CIT, (2018) 6 SCC 70]

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — S. 9-A r/w Sch. IV Cl. 8 — Notice of change in any material terms of service to employee — Principles of Natural Justice — Compliance: Temporary decision to enhance age of superannuation of all Central Public Sector employees from 58 yrs to 60 yrs vide order dt. 19-11-1998 with a view to cut down losses, revoked vide order dt. 17-7-2002 and age of superannuation at 58 yrs restored without granting opportunity of hearing to employees, said order dt. 17-7-2002 was not sustainable. [Paradeep Phosphates Ltd. v. State Of Orissa, (2018) 6 SCC 195]

Labour Law — Workman: Employees working in canteen managed by a another party/contractor, providing canteen services to employees of establishment concerned, are entitled to be treated as employees of appellant with all attendant and monetary benefits on a par with regular employees. [Chennai Port Trust v. Industrial Employees Canteen Workers Welfare Assn., (2018) 6 SCC 202]

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Ss. 54, 7 and 8 — Sale of remaindermen’s interest during lifetime of holders of life estate: On partition between two brothers, certain properties including property in question coming to share of one I. On subsequent partition executed insofar as branch of I was concerned, the properties were equally divided among four sons of I. Having given ¼th share to each son, right of enjoyment of properties was retained by I and his wife M till their lifetime. In 1975, two sons of I i.e. K and S transferred their undivided share in property in question by executing registered sale deeds in favour of appellant herein. I and M died in 1975 and 1984 respectively. On basis of above sale deeds executed by K and S, appellant (in 1985) filed a civil suit seeking declaration that he was entitled to undivided half-share in property in question. Though K did not have any son, S had four sons, who were not made parties to above suit. Appellant later filed another suit seeking injunction against defendants named therein. In that suit, the four sons of S were added as parties. Trial court decreed former suit holding appellant to be entitled to one half-share in suit property and accordingly passed a preliminary decree in that behalf. However, it declining to grant any relief of permanent injunction against defendants, but, first appellate court held that since the four sons of S were not parties to suit for declaration and partition, insofar as branch of S was concerned, sale deed in favour of appellant would be valid only in respect of share of S. Thus, first appellate court held that appellant would be entitled to share of S in his branch (i.e. 1/4 × 1/6 = 1/24) and share of K. Resultantly, share of appellant was computed as 5/24. View taken by first appellate court was confirmed by High Court in second appeals. After going through the entirety of matter and relevant record, the Supreme Court held that assessment made by first appellate court and High Court, insofar as merits of matter was concerned, was proper and hence, no interference was called for. [A. Dharmalingam v. V. Lalithambal, (2018) 6 SCC 65]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Administrative Law — Administrative Action — Administrative or Executive Function — Application/Non-Application of Mind: Bangalore Development Authority (BDA) without applying mind to orders of competent authorities and relevant court orders, declined to correct/restore record-of-rights (RoR) in name of appellant, held, which was unsustainable. [Lakshmamma v. BDA, (2018) 5 SCC 760]

Constitution of India — Art. 136 — Interim relief — P.G. College: In this case involving dispute between Principal and Management, High Court by impugned order restrained appellant from functioning as Principal. Additional interim direction pending disposal, issued. Thus management restrained from filling up post of Principal on a regular basis and High Court directed to dispose of appeal expeditiously before Court closed for summer vacation. [Vandana Tyagi v. Apeejay Saraswati P.G. College for Girls, (2018) 5 SCC 789]

Constitution of India — Art. 136 — Mohandas Gandhi assassination case: Reopening of long concluded matters based on hearsay evidence and new research by petitioner and only being a futile exercise, not maintainable. [Pankaj Kumudchandra Phadnis v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 785]

Constitution of India — Art. 32 — Police — Compensation for death during discharge of duty — Entitlement to: In this case, while chasing miscreants, police personnel were fired upon, as a result of which, one member of the police party, son of the petitioner died. Petitioner sought various reliefs like compensation, protection to family and expeditious trial. As far as criminal case is concerned, law to take its own course and as far as compensation and other reliefs are concerned, petitioner given liberty to approach State Government. [Ganga Malik v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 771]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 482 — Quashment of proceedings by High Court: Assessment made by High Court at a stage when investigation was yet to be completed, completely incorrect and uncalled for. Interference by High Court, not proper. Case restored to its file and investigation to proceed to its logical conclusion. [State of T.N. v. S. Martin, (2018) 5 SCC 718]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 88 — Power to release accused on bond upon his appearance in court, under S. 88 — Nature of: Said power under S. 88 is not mandatory. It is discretionary in nature. Ordinarily word “may” implies discretion of court. If there is a legal right, word “may” would mean a mandatory duty but S. 88 does not confer any right on any person to be released on his furnishing a bond. Purpose and object of S. 88 is to enable court to facilitate appearance of person concerned in court. Thus, said power clearly discretionary. [Pankaj Jain v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 743]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 374 and 386(b) — Appeal against conviction: In this case of death by shooting, High Court acquitted all respondent-accused. Acquittal, held, to be justified. [State of U.P. v. Om Pal, (2018) 5 SCC 805]

Criminal Trial — Acquittal — Generally — Presumption of innocence — When strengthened: Presumption of innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened against acquitted accused by judgment in his favour. [Bannareddy v. State of Karnataka, (2018) 5 SCC 790]

Environment Law — Forests, Wildlife and Zoos — Mining and Industry in Forest Area — Illegal Mining: In this case, E-auction of iron ore was illegally stored and confiscated, by State. High Court mistakenly set aside permission granted by Special Court for such e-auction by State, and directed release of iron-ore to respondent. Said order of the High Court, held to be untenable. Order permitting e-auction passed by Special Court restored and liberty granted to respondent to establish his ownership over iron ore before appropriate court. [State of Karnataka v. Vedanta Ltd., (2018) 5 SCC 722]

Environment Law — Forests, Wildlife and Zoos — Mining and Industry in Forest Area: Due to illegal mining in forests of Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh, PIL regarding illegal extraction of 50.57 metric tonnes of iron ore and its illegal export to foreign companies from port in Karnataka was filed. CBI was directed to register case and conduct investigation. [Samaj Parivartana Samudaya v. State of Karnataka, (2018) 5 SCC 730]

Environment Law — Forests, Wildlife and Zoos — Mining and Industry in Forest Area — Illegal Mining: PIL against illegal mining in forest areas of Karnataka and A.P. and illegal export of iron ore to foreign countries from Belekeri Port in Karnataka. CBI investigation directed in the matter. [Samaj Parivartana Samudaya v. State of Karnataka, (2018) 5 SCC 732]

Limitation Act, 1963 — S. 14 — Purpose stated: S. 14 is intended to provide relief against bar of limitation in cases of where remedy is mistakenly taken recourse to or selection of a wrong forum. [Mohinder Singh v. Paramjit Singh, (2018) 5 SCC 698]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 149 and 166 — Third-party insurance: Insurance Company is liable to satisfy judgments and awards in respect of third-party risks. Principle of pay-and-recover applies even in absence of liability to pay compensation. [Shivawwa v. National India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 5 SCC 762]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 168 — Fatal accident — Compensation and interest — Computation: In this case, High Court had not computed income towards future prospects and reduced interest from 12% to 9%. Claimants of deceased, held, entitled to additional compensation of 25% towards future prospects. Further amount of Rs 70,000 computed under conventional heads. Award of interest at 9% p.a. by the High Court, upheld. Accordingly total compensation re-computed and enhanced to Rs 12.67 lakhs. [Bhartiben Nayabha Ker v. Sidabha Pethabha Manke, (2018) 5 SCC 716]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302/34 — Murder trial — Circumstantial evidence: In this case, prosecution miserably failed to establish chain of events, which points out at guilt of accused. Two complaints (one by brother and other by accused wife, of deceased, respectively) were filed. When accused wife in complaint pointed out that deceased committed suicide by consuming poison, doctor was expected to preserve viscera for chemical analysis, which was not done. Doctor who conducted post-mortem, opined that cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation of throat. Medical evidence in the form of post-mortem report though supports case of prosecution, non-preservation of viscera by doctor, remained fatal to prosecution case. Witnesses specifically supported case of version of accused. There was no apparent injury on dead body of deceased at the time of panchnama. Collective opinion of panch witnesses was that deceased expired due to eating some poisonous substance. There was no direct evidence, as to deceased consuming poison or having been done to death by throttling. Courts below gravely erred in not considering case in accordance with settled principles of law, hence, conviction reversed. [Dev Kanya Tiwari v. State of U.P., (2018) 5 SCC 734]

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 — Ss. 32, 2(c), 2(d), 2(e), 2(i), 2(k), 2(p), 3(2), 4, 5 and 6 — Power to prescribe qualifications: Parliament conferred rule-making authority upon Central Government to specify minimum qualifications. Specification of qualification should be read in purposive sense which will fulfil objectives of law. Rationale behind prescription of training is that training would sensitise concerned person to salutary objectives and purpose of legislation. [Union of India v. Indian Radiological & Imaging Assn., (2018) 5 SCC 773]

Service Law — Post — Equivalence — Post of Field Supervisor — Whether equivalent to post of Teacher: Field Supervisor falling under Category II of Statute 19(1), (2) & (3) of the Orissa University of Agriculture and Technology, 1996 can be treated as Teacher only after he is declared as such by the University with prior approval of Board. [Orissa University of Agriculture & Technology v. Upendra Nath Patra, (2018) 5 SCC 693]

Service Law — Promotion — Retrospective promotion: In service matters, especially with regard to promotion, there is always an urgency and aggrieved must approach court at earliest opportunity or within reasonable time as third-party rights accrue in meantime in favour of promotees. Further, any directions at belated stage to consider employees for retrospective promotion after considerable time is bound to have serious administrative implications apart from financial burden on Government. Furthermore, mere repeated filing of representations would not be sufficient explanation for delay in approaching court. [Union of India v. Chaman Rana, (2018) 5 SCC 798]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Building and Other Construction Workers’ (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 — SOR and Ss. 1(4), 1(5), 2(1)(d), 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 18, 22, 24, 60, 62, Chs. VI and VII — Effective and meaningful implementation of: Directions issued with regard to effective and meaningful implementation of the Building and Other Construction Workers (Regulation of Employment and Conditions of Service) Act, 1996 and the Building and Other Construction Workers’ Welfare Cess Act, 1996. [National Campaign Committee for Central Legislation on Construction Labour (NCC-CL) v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 607]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 7 R. 11, S. 11 and Or. 2 R. 2: Rejection of plaint on grounds of res judicata, which required consideration of pleadings in written statement, is permissible. While considering application for rejection of plaint, averments in plaint must be considered and not what is stated in written statement. [Soumitra Kumar Sen v. Shyamal Kumar Sen, (2018) 5 SCC 644]

Companies Act, 2013 — Ss. 58(2) and (4) — Public limited company — Free transfer of shares — Right of public limited company to refuse registration of transfer of shares on sufficient: Expression “without sufficient cause” does not mean only illegal transfers or transfers impermissible under any law, can be refused. Transfer can be refused on any other sufficient cause. [Mackintosh Burn Ltd. v. Sarkar & Chowdhury Enterprises (P) Ltd., (2018) 5 SCC 575]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 482Quashment of FIR: S. 482 has to be cautiously utilised while quashing FIR. In this case of abetment of suicide, High Court prematurely quashed FIR without proper investigation having been conducted by police. Hence, impugned judgment of High Court set aside with directions to investigating authorities to complete investigation with promptness and to take it to its logical conclusion. [Munshiram v. State of Rajasthan, (2018) 5 SCC 678]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 156(3) vis-à-vis 202(1) and Ch. XII vis-à-vis Ch. XIV and S. 190: Established law is that direction under S. 156(3) does not amount to taking cognizance but there being divergent views of Supreme Court as to applicability of this principle to offences under PC Act: as to whether prior sanction is required or not, before a direction can be issued under S. 156(3) CrPC vis-à-vis PC Act offences, matter referred to larger Bench. [Manju Surana v. Sunil Arora, (2018) 5 SCC 557]

Government Grants, Largesse, Public Property and Public Premises — Relief/Remedies/Moulding Relief, Judicial Review/Public Interest Litigation (PIL) — Writ jurisdiction in respect of public property: Re-auction of leased municipal property directed by High Court without adverting to efficacy of existing lease or the reliefs prayed for in the writ petition, not proper. [State of H.P. v. Ravinder Kumar Sankhayan, (2018) 5 SCC 584]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — S. 80-P r/w S. 80-P(4) coming into effect from 1-4-2007: Review petition challenging order declaring Society giving loans to members as well as general public, non-eligibile to grant of deduction, dismissed being devoid of merits. [Citizen Coop. Society Ltd. v. CIT, (2018) 5 SCC 548]

Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 (10 of 1962) — Ss. 107(1)(i) and (iii) and S. 44(1): Lands which belong to Government or University as specified in the 1961 Act, held, are not within purview of the Act. [University of Mysore v. Rajaiah, (2018) 5 SCC 684]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 173 — Compensation claims under S. 166 — Proper manner of disposal: While dealing with a claim petition in terms of Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, a Tribunal stricto sensu is not bound by the pleadings of the parties; its function being to determine the amount of fair compensation in the event an accident has taken place by reason of negligence of that driver of a motor vehicle. The Tribunal has to take a holistic view of the matter. A strict proof of an accident caused by a particular vehicle in a particular manner may not be possible. The claimants are merely required to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied. The approach of the Tribunal should be holistic analysis of the entire pleadings and evidence by applying the principles of preponderance of probability. [Mangla Ram v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 5 SCC 656]

Mysore Land Reforms Act, 1961 (10 of 1962) — Ss. 14(1), (5) and 111 — Resumption of land from tenant: In this case resumption and taking possession vide compromise was effected by Tribunal instead of through procedure contemplated under S. 14(5). Though procedure for taking possession under S. 14(5), was allegedly not complied with, but properly explained by landlord by drawing attention to compromise decree. Hence, the impugned order holding that procedure contemplated under S. 14(5) was not followed, set aside. [Raghunath Prasad Pande v. State of Karnataka, (2018) 5 SCC 594]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 302 — Murder trial: In this case strained relations between couple and their families, leading to murder of husband and his sister, by his wife and her family members. Evidence of ocular witnesses, father and brother of deceased husband, and daughter of deceased sister of husband, was found consistent and inspired confidence. Evidence established guilt of accused beyond reasonable doubt and corroborates with that of medical evidence and motive of crime was very clear. Hence, there was no error in appreciation of evidence and conviction confirmed. [Ganapathi v. State of T.N., (2018) 5 SCC 549]

Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 — Chs. II to VIII — Sexual offences against children: Directions issued for speedy disposal of cases involving sexual offences against children. [Alakh Alok Srivastava v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 651]

Representation of the People Act, 1951 — Ss. 86, 81, 82 and 117 — Maintainability of election petition: Where Court granted time to cure defects raised by Registry, and such defects were rectified within stipulated time, election petition not barred by limitation under S. 81(1). Correctness of translated copy of vernacular language cannot be decided at threshold level but it is subject of trial. When copies of materials relied upon are reproduced in CD and its transcription is provided, phone (used for conversation) and supply of chip was not necessary. Such step would not impair defence of successful candidate. [Abdulrasakh v. K.P. Mohammed, (2018) 5 SCC 598]

Security Interest (Enforcement) Rules, 2002 — R. 9: In this case the requirement specified under R. 9(4) was to deposit balance 75% purchase price within 15 days of confirmation. It was clarified that day of confirmation was not same as day of auction. Said period of 15 days would start from day of confirmation of sale by secured creditor and it does not start from day of auction. On day of auction authorised officer only accepts or confirms highest bid which is not same as confirmation of sale under R. 9(4). Rr. 9(2), (4), (5) & (6) supports above interpretation. [Rakesh Birani v. Prem Narain Sehgal, (2018) 5 SCC 543]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Constitution of India — Art. 32: In this case, there were 9 FIRs and one criminal complaint case between parties closely related to each other. Parties agreed to settle through mediation. As writ petition was dismissed, interim direction regarding deposit by petitioner into Registry of Court of specified amount, recalled. Resultantly, subsequent orders of refund adjustments, recalled. Resultantly petitioner also entitled to any interest accumulated thereon. [Saraswati Singh v. Shailesh Singh, (2018) 5 SCC 370]

Constitution of India — Art. 32 — Maintainability: In this case, there were 9 FIRs and one criminal complaint case between parties closely related to each other. During present proceedings parties referred to mediation but failed. Parties sought investigation by Special Investigation Team (SIT) and other reliefs relating to investigation. Allegedly a similar writ petition was withdrawn and 10 transfer petitions were dismissed. Hence, petition under Art. 32, held, not maintainable. Remedy of quashing of FIRs or such other relief can be addressed before High Court. [Saraswati Singh v. Shailesh Singh, (2018) 5 SCC 373]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 100 — Second appeal — Substantial question of law: In the suit for partition and separate possession, unregistered partition deed (document) was relied on by defendants. Questions relating to admissibility and contents thereof, held, substantial questions of law. [Uma Pandey v. Munna Pandey, (2018) 5 SCC 376]

Advocates — Right to Practise — Right to practise law in India: Foreign law firms/companies or foreign lawyers cannot practise law in India either on litigation or on non-litigation side. [Bar Council of India v. A.K. Balaji, (2018) 5 SCC 379]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 482, 216, 173, 200 and 202 — Directions issued by High Court in petition filed under S. 482 in interest of justice: In this case of offence of attacking petitioner in courtroom in presence of Presiding Officer by Advocates, while several persons were attacked, charge-sheet was submitted by police against three of them only. Prayers were made before High Court in petition filed under S. 482 pertaining inter alia to inclusion of certain provisions of IPC and other Acts in charge-sheet filed against three persons before trial court, framing of proper charges against one and taking cognizance against another person, discovering all accused. High Court directed that if petitioner raises his grievance before trial Magistrate same shall be considered and decided by it in accordance with law expeditiously. Keeping in view manner in which offence was committed by Advocates who are also part of the system, High Court considered it necessary to issue certain directions regarding petitioner’s security. The Supreme Court held that High Court itself was cognizant of seriousness of allegations against persons involved in crime and made it clear that all contentions could be raised and all aspects will have to be considered by trial court on merits. Observation made by High Court will not come in way in pursuing criminal cases and for taking same to its logical end. [Osama Aziz v. State Of U.P., (2018) 5 SCC 415]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 195(1)(b)(ii) — Applicability of: S. 195(1)(b)(ii) is applicable only in case the offences enumerated therein have been committed with respect to a document after that document has been produced or given in evidence in a proceeding in any court i.e. during the time when that document was in custodia legis, and not prior thereto. [Chandru Gaonkar v. N.M. Dessai, (2018) 5 SCC 422]

Labour Law — Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 — S. 2(e) r/w S. 2-A — Gratuity — Entitlement to: Having regularised services of appellant, State had no justifiable reason to deny benefit of gratuity to appellant which was his statutory right. Question as to from which date services were regularised was of no consequence for calculating total length of service for claiming gratuity once services were regularized. 1972 Act being welfare legislation meant for benefit of employees who serve their employer for long time, duty of State to pay gratuity to employee rather than deny benefit on some technical ground and force employee to approach Court to get his genuine claim. [Netram Sahu v. State of Chhattisgarh, (2018) 5 SCC 430]

Criminal Trial — Witnesses — Interested/Partisan witness — Evidence of interested witness — Admissibility: It is settled law that there cannot be any hard-and-fast rule that evidence of interested witness cannot be taken into consideration and they cannot be termed as witnesses but, the only burden that is cast upon courts in such cases is that courts have to be cautious while evaluating evidence to exclude possibility of false implication. Relationship can never be a factor to affect credibility of witness as it is not possible always to get an independent witness. [Sudhakar v. State, (2018) 5 SCC 435]

Consumer Protection — Services — Housing — Non-delivery of flat/house — Damages for price escalation — Reckoning date: Damages become due from time of breach but on facts, courts can deviate. In case of non-delivery of flat/house, and developer refusing alternative equivalent accommodation and buyer lacking means to purchase substitute from market, it would not be reasonable to assess damages from date of breach because of price escalation. [Fortune Infrastructure v. Trevor D’Lima, (2018) 5 SCC 442]

Trusts and Trustees — Religious and Charitable Endowments and Trusts — Administration of institutions — Claim of transfer to particular place based on station seniority and/or service seniority: Station seniority, held, has to be reckoned with reference to last date of the submission of application and not with reference to date of order of transfer. Eligibility must depend on that date, otherwise it would lead to arbitrary exercise of power. [V. Padmakumar v. S. Chandrasekharan Potty, (2018) 5 SCC 454]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 302 or S. 304 Pt. I [S. 300 Exception 4]: In this case wife was strangulated death by husband. Incident occurred all of a sudden, without any premeditation. Accused did not take undue advantage or acting in cruel or unusual manner. Hence, conviction was rightly altered by High Court from S. 302 to S. 304 Pt. I. [State of M.P. v. Abdul Latif, (2018) 5 SCC 456]

Family and Personal Laws — Family Property, Succession and Inheritance — Will — Suspicious circumstances/Undue influence re making of will/Substance of will if arouses suspicion: In this case estator drew will in his own handwriting, in 1945 in favour of his grandson (respondent-plaintiff). PW 5 grandson-in-law of testator who used to correspond with him and thereby was well acquainted with his handwriting, duly proved said handwriting in will. PW 2 (bank clerk) deposed that respondent secured loan from bank by pledging will in 1964 and since then will kept in bank — PW 2 was cross-examined. On facts, it was held, there were no suspicious circumstances raising doubts about genuineness of will and concurrent findings by court below by reasoned judgments, not disturbed. [Mohan Lal v. Nand Lal, (2018) 5 SCC 459]

Government Contracts and Tenders — Formation of Government Contract — Modes of entering into a Government Contract — Public Auction/Tender: High Court cannot ordinarily interfere with judgment of expert consultant on issues of technical qualifications of a bidder when consultant takes into consideration various factors including basis of non-performance of the bidder. It is not open to Court to independently evaluate technical bids and financial bids of parties as an appellate authority for coming to its conclusion inasmuch as unless thresholds of mala fides, intention to favour someone or bias, arbitrariness, irrationality or perversity are met, where a decision is taken purely on public interest, Court ordinarily should exercise judicial restraint. [Municipal Corpn, Ujjain v. BVG India Ltd., (2018) 5 SCC 462]

Contempt of Court — Art. 129 — Civil Contempt — Contempt of Supreme Court: In this case there were violation of successive orders passed by Supreme Court in Civil Appeal, Contempt Petition and violation of undertakings was given to Supreme Court. In Civil Appeal No. 394 of 2009, while allowing appeal Supreme Court passed an order that Respondent D was to remove entire construction at her own cost and hand over vacant and peaceful possession of land to appellant within 30 days failing which appellant can take assistance of Court to take possession of land and building in which event, D will not be entitled to cost of structure or any other damages. It was held, conduct of Respondent D was contemptuous. She had earlier disobeyed injunction passed by Supreme Court and after filing first Contempt Petition No. 258 of 2010, had demolished construction raised by her and had given a solemn undertaking to Supreme Court that she would not raise any fresh construction nor would she use it for human habitation. Despite earlier order and undertaking, she had not only raised fresh construction but obviously used it for human habitation. Since D got off very lightly in earlier contempt proceedings, she feels that she can take law into her own hands. Reply filed by her virtually aggravates contempt, where she stated that she had not raised any construction in violation to orders of Supreme Court, is obviously false and even her counsel could not enlighten as to how construction, evident from photographs, which are not even denied, does not violate orders of Supreme Court. Not only that, with regard to signboard outside property informing general public that airconditioned and non-airconditioned rooms are were available for rent, explanation given is totally false No material was been placed on record to support averments made by D. Concluding that D had wilfully and knowingly disobeyed the interim order of Supreme Court. Not only that, she had also violated her solemn undertaking given to Supreme Court and the order passed by Supreme Court in earlier contempt proceedings. Therefore, she was held to be guilty of civil contempt. [Dwarika Prasad v. State of U.P., (2018) 5 SCC 491]

Constitution of India — Arts. 21 and 32 — Concept of fair trial, discussed — Transfer of trial when warranted, stated: Court should balance rights of accused and victims and thereafter weigh on scale of fair trial whether shifting is necessary or not. [Mohd. Akhtar v. State of J&K, (2018) 5 SCC 497]

Infrastructure Laws — Maritime Laws — Maritime claim: Maritime claim for charter hire dues i.e. a right in rem to proceed against the ship/cargo is not maintainable against a vessel/ship owned by a person not responsible for payment of such dues. [Sunil B. Naik v. Geowave Commander, (2018) 5 SCC 505]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 9 — Abuse of process of court — Suppression of material facts: In this case, appellant-plaintiff filed suit for specific performance of contract against D-1 on basis of a power of attorney by suppressing material facts that title and possession regarding said suit land already stood adjudicated in favour of another person D-2 and not D-1, hence, High Court order setting aside decree of specific performance, affirmed. [Baxis Singh v. Sukhdev Singh], (2018) 5 SCC 338]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 9 — Civil suit — Maintainability: Dispute principally as to succession to property, turning on question of legitimacy/legal status of parties concerned as legal heirs of deceased person concerned, could only be resolved vide a civil suit. [R. Kasthuri v. M. Kasthuri, (2018) 5 SCC 353]

Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (COFEPOSA) — S. 3(1)(ii) — Preventive detention order under: COFEPOSA does not require detaining authority to specify period for which a detenu is required to be detained, hence, order of detention, not rendered invalid/illegal in absence of such specification. [State of T.N. v. Kamala], (2018) 5 SCC 322]

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Exercise of power by High Court — Approach: considerations therein: In this case, Division Bench by impugned judgment without considering background of case and reasons which weighed with Single Judge while passing order, modified interim order passed by Single Judge directing payment of salary considering long service of 30 yrs rendered by appellant, to effect that status quo prevailing on date of filing of writ petition to be maintained i.e. non-payment of salary to appellant on account of impugned orders, which was not proper. [Aparbal Yadav v. State of U.P., (2018) 5 SCC 363]

Constitution of India — Art. 32 — PIL — Maintainability: Petitioner’s main prayer seeking: (a) direction for CBI investigation into allegations of reported cases of oil adulteration by mafias, and (b) mandamus directing direct transfer of cash subsidy to intended beneficiaries of kerosene oil, in lieu of kerosene itself, on basis of Aadhaar card or through PDS or other credible mechanism. Petition disposed of with certain directions and clarifications. Initial inquiry conducted by petitioner revealing some truth in allegations. Petitioner was given liberty to approach oil companies with material for redressal of his grievance as per law. However, it was clarified that no opinion was expressed on merits of claim. [Seema Upadhyay v. Union of India, (2018) 5 SCC 325]

Constitution of India — Arts. 21 and 32 — Abduction, rape and murder of 8 yr old minor girl by juvenile accused: In this case there was apprehension of no fair trial as members of Bar were protesting against prosecution of the accused, and their implication/prosecution sought to be given communal overtones. Chargesheet was filed and there was possibility of filing of supplementary charge-sheet. Prayer for transfer of case from a court in J&K to a court in Chandigarh kept open and notice issued. Prayer for providing security to victims’ family members, her counsel and another person assisting them, was acceptable to State Government and accordingly directed. Prayer for strengthening of security in juvenile home, where juvenile accused lodged, accepted and accordingly directed, but with clarification that this shall be done keeping in view care and protection of children. [Mohd. Akhtar v. State of J&K, (2018) 5 SCC 336]

Criminal Trial — Investigation — Videography: In the light of importance of capturing crucial evidence in credible manner, suggestions made by MHA considering report and suggestion of Committee for a centrally driven action plan and phased manner of implementation, accepted and consequential directions issued in the matter. [Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 5 SCC 311]

Election — Local Government/Bodies/Municipalities/Panchayats/Autonomous and Other Bodies — Conduct of Election: Incidents of violence were allegedly taking place when candidates went to obtain and file nomination papers. In such situations statute empowered the Election Commissioner to pass appropriate orders. Hence, parties were given liberty to approach State Election Commission and Election Commission was directed to dispose of their grievance as per law. [Bharatiya Janata Party v. State of W.B., (2018) 5 SCC 365]

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Ss. 24 and 13 — Interim maintenance under S. 24 — Effect of maintenance already granted under S. 125 CrPC: Maintenance granted by Family Court under S. 24, 1955 Act would supersede maintenance granted under S. 125 CrPC. [Sanjay Kumar Sinha v. Asha Kumari, (2018) 5 SCC 333]

Supreme Court Rules, 2013 — Or. VI Rr. 1, 2 and 4: Constitution of Benches of Supreme Court is exclusively in domain of prerogative powers of Chief Justice. [Asok Pande v. Supreme Court of India, (2018) 5 SCC 341]

Tenancy and Land Laws — Judicial Interference/Validity — Necessary/Proper parties: In this case, appellant’s land purportedly stood vested in Government. Government executed deeds and transferred said land to tenants R-1 and R-2 as per statutory objective of W.B. Land Reforms Act. Earlier writ petition and resultant transferred proceedings before Land Tribunal concerning challenge to such vesting, allowed in appellant’s favour but in said writ petition and proceedings before Tribunal, R-1 and R-2 not made parties and not heard. High Court by impugned order allowed subsequent writ petition of R-1 and R-2 and remanded matter to Tribunal for giving them opportunity of hearing. Said order of high Court not interfered with. [Ashim Ranjan Das v. Shibu Bodhak, (2018) 5 SCC 356]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Election — Democracy and General Principles — Criminalisation of politics/Electoral Reform: Information regarding sources of income of electoral candidates/legislators and their associates would help voter to make informed choice and hence, is part of his fundamental right. Disclosure of movable and immovable assets is already a requirement under Form 26 as subs. w.e.f. 1-8-2012. Non-disclosure of assets and sources of income of candidates/legislators and their associates constitutes corrupt practice amounting to undue influence since it is attempt to suppress, misguide and keep people in the dark. In case of undue accretion of assets of legislators/politicians and their associates/dependants without bearing any relationship to their known sources of income, the only logical inference is that there is some abuse of legislator’s constitutional office. Such abnormal growth of assets not always because of illegal activity but could also be due to improper activities like (i) availing huge amounts of loan for allegedly commercial purposes from public financial institution which become nonperforming assets (NPAs) and despite which they secure huge loan amounts again; and (ii) securing contracts of high monetary value from Government or corporations controlled by Government. It is necessary to of curb such activities. [Lok Prahari v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 699]

Banking Regulation Act, 1949 — S. 21-A — Debts due to banks by agriculturists — Law applicable — Validity and extent of applicability of S. 21-A of 1949 Act vis-à-v-is State Debt Relief Acts: S. 21-A is valid as in pith and substance, S. 21-A relatable to Sch. VII List I Entry 45 of the Constitution. However, insofar as S. 21-A of 1949 Act incidentally encroaches upon relief of agricultural indebtedness, which is covered in Sch. VII List II Entry 30 of the Constitution, it will not operate to the extent that State Debt Relief Acts cover relief of agriculturists from debts due to banks. S. 21-A will not operate in States where there is a State Debt Relief Act which deals with relief of agricultural indebtedness and where State Debt Relief Act covers debts due to “banks”, as defined in those Acts. In States where State Debt Relief Act does not apply to banks at all, S. 21-A will apply in such States. In States where State Debt Relief Act applies only to certain specified banks, S. 21-A will apply only in respect of loans made to agriculturists where such loans are given by banks other than banks specified or covered by State Debt Relief Act concerned, as the case may be. [Jayant Verma v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 743]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 89 — Reference of dispute for arbitration: When there was no arbitration agreement between the parties, reference of dispute for arbitration in the absence of a written memo/joint application is not permissible, even when the counsel of the parties consent to the same. For reference of the parties to arbitration, oral consent given by the counsel without a written memo of instructions does not fulfil the requirement under S. 89 CPC. [Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2018) 4 SCC 793]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Contract and Specific Relief — Formation Defects — Fraud and misrepresentation — Matters required to be established: In this case, appellant-plaintiff filed suit for partition and separate possession against her uncle R-2-D-2 and his son respondent-D-1. She contended that suit properties originally belonged to her grandfather and after death of her grandfather, her father and her uncle (R-2-D-2) succeeded. After death of her father, she is entitled for her half-share. This suit was opposed on ground that father of appellant-plaintiff had already sold his share to respondent-D-1. In rejoinder, appellant-plaintiff contended that sale deed executed by her father was obtained by fraud and misrepresentation. Trial court decreed suit. In appeal, first appellate court dismissed suit. High Court upheld dismissal of suit. While determining the validity of the order of High Court, the Supreme Court held that DW 3, Sub-Registrar who registered sale deed executed by father of appellant-plaintiff, deposed that sale deed was executed only after contents were read over to him. PW 2 and PW 3 never stated in their deposition that father of appellant-plaintiff was not in good state of mind at the time of execution of sale deed. Although it was contended that father of appellant-plaintiff was not keeping well, no medical records were submitted to establish it. In absence of any proof, it cannot be said that sale deed executed by father of appellant-plaintiff was obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. Hence, High Court justified in dismissing appeal. [Krishna Devi v. Keshri Nandan, (2018) 4 SCC 481]

Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 — Ss. 10 and 11-A — Reference — Termination of workman — Termination by way of punishment — Interference with: Where termination is by way of punishment, preliminary issue to be determined is validity of domestic enquiry. Where domestic enquiry is found legal and proper, next issue would be adjudging proportionality of punishment imposed. Further held, where domestic enquiry is found illegal and improper, issue which need determination is whether employer can be allowed to prove misconduct/charge before Labour Court on merits by adducing independent evidence. [Kurukshetra University v. Prithvi Singh, (2018) 4 SCC 483]

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Ss. 8(c), 20(b)(ii)(C), 28/23 and 67 — Search and seizure: In this case there was alleged recovery of contraband from suitcase. Statement of official witness, found impaired due to infirmities, not safe to rely upon and pass conviction order. Statements of independent panch witnesses, depicted a different picture than one portrayed by official witness, as to recovery and seizure. As recovery of narcotic substance was not proved beyond reasonable doubt, reversal of conviction by High Court was confirmed. [Union Of India v. Leen Martin, (2018) 4 SCC 490]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — Ss. 12-A and 12-AA — Cancellation/withdrawal/recall of registration certificates once granted by Commissioner: There was no express provision in Income Tax Act vesting Commissioner with power to cancel registration certificate granted by him under S. 12-A. Commissioner had no express power of cancellation of registration certificate once granted by him under S. 12-A till 1-1-2004. By enactment of S. 12-AA(3), this power is expressly conferred on Commissioner with effect from 1-10-2004, and hence such power of cancellation/withdrawal/recall could be exercised after 1-10-2004. This enactment is not retrospective in nature. Order passed under S. 12-A is quasi-judicial order. Functions exercisable under S. 12-A are neither legislative nor executive but they are essentially quasi-judicial in nature. Therefore, it could have been withdrawn/recalled only when there was express power vested with concerned authority. Order by Commissioner under S. 12-A does not fall in category of ‘orders’ mentioned under S. 21 of General Clauses Act. Expression ‘order’ mentioned under S. 21 of General Clauses Act must be in nature of ‘notification’, ‘rule’ and ‘bye-laws’, etc. Order which can be modified or rescinded under S. 21 of General Clauses Act has to be either legislative or executive in nature. As order passed under S. 12-A is quasi-judicial in nature, S. 21 of General Clauses Act has no application. [Industrial Infrastructure Development Corpn. (Gwalior) M.P. Ltd. v. CIT, (2018) 4 SCC 494]

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 — Ss. 13 and 13-B r/w Art. 142 of Constitution — Powers under Art. 142 to do complete justice — Invocation of — Settlement of matrimonial dispute through Supreme Court Mediation Centre: FIR lodged by wife quashed and marriage dissolved on consent in terms of settlement. [Sneha Parikh v. Manit Kumar, (2018) 4 SCC 501]

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Remand of matter — When not justified: Matter remitted by Supreme Court to High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. [IEL Supervisors’ Assn. v. Duncans Industries Ltd., (2018) 4 SCC 505]

Election — Election petition/trial — Statutory requirements as to filing of election petition: Under the Rule concerned i.e. R. 3(5)(d) of Rajasthan Municipalities Election Petition Rules, 2009, filing of treasury challan with deposit of requisite amount in treasury at the time of presentation of election petition is mandatory. In absence thereof, election petition is liable to be dismissed in terms of R. 7(3) of aforesaid 2009 Rules. Filing of treasury challan subsequent to presentation of election petition on grant of permission by Election Tribunal to deposit the amount in treasury, would be of no consequence in absence of any rule in this regard. Such permission to deposit, if any, might be sought prior to presentation of election petition. Thus, where the election petition was presented without a treasury challan (though later, deposit was made pursuant to permission granted by Election Tribunal), the same was liable to be rejected in terms of the above stated law. [Sitaram v. Radhey Shyam Vishnav, (2018) 4 SCC 507]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 125 — Maintenance — Grant of: Grant of Maintenance was set aside by High Court, on ground that appellant failed to prove that she was wife of respondent. Claim of appellant was that respondent had fathered three children with her, which was denied by respondent. Parties were directed by Supreme Court to go for DNA test. As DNA test report established that respondent was father of three children born to appellant, hence, impugned order of High Court, was set aside and order in favour of appellant under S. 125 CrPC, granting maintenance @ Rs 4000 p.m. from the month of September 2013, restored. [Pratima Das v. Subudh Das, (2018) 4 SCC 528]

Right to Information Act, 2005 — Ss. 3, 4, 6, 8, 9 and 11 r/w Third Recital of Preamble — Exemption from giving information: While balancing right to information, public interest including efficient working of Government, optimum use of fiscal resources and preservation of confidentiality of sensitive information has to be balanced and can be guiding factor to deal with given situation dehors Ss. 8, 9 and 11. [UPSE v. Angesh Kumar, (2018) 4 SCC 530]

Kerala Education Act, 1958 (6 of 1959) — S. 15 — Taking over of schools in public interest and in interest of education: Notification under S. 15 issued after closure of schools but satisfaction under S. 15(1) which was made prior to closure, valid. Submission that schools having already been closed and that too as per directions of Court and having attained finality in Supreme Court, State Government could not have issued belated notification under S. 15, not tenable. [A.A. Padmanbhan v. State of Kerala, (2018) 4 SCC 537]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 100 — Second appeal: Once High Court is satisfied after hearing appellant or his counsel that appeal involved substantial question of law, it has to formulate same under S. 100(4). Once, substantial question of law is framed, direction for issuance of notice to respondent of memo of appeal along with substantial question of law is passed. Jurisdiction of High Court is confined only to substantial question of law framed by it under S. 100(4). Respondent can raise objections under S. 100(5) that appeal did not involve any substantial question of law. S. 100(5) gives respondent right to know on which substantial question of law, second appeal had been admitted. As substantial question of law framed behind back of respondent, S. 100(5) enables him to raise such objection. As per proviso to S. 100(5), High Court can hear second appeal on any other substantial question of law not framed earlier under S. 100(4). However, while exercising such power, High Court is required to assign reasons for framing additional substantial questions of law at the time of hearing second appeal. Further held, while hearing second appeal, respondent required to oppose only substantial question of law so framed under S. 100(4) and not beyond that. If substantial question of law itself is not framed under S. 100(4), then there remains nothing to oppose for respondent. Further, High Court also loses its jurisdiction to decide second appeal finally. It is framing of substantial question of law which empowers High Court to finally decide appeal. If High Court is satisfied that appeal does not involve any substantial question of law, it can be dismissed in limine without even issuing notice to respondents. While dismissing appeal for want of substantial questions of law, High Court is required to assign its reasons. Whether respondent appeared at the time of final hearing or not is of no significance. High Court has to proceed in accordance with procedure prescribed under S. 100 for disposing second appeal either in limine or at final hearing. [Surat Singh v. Siri Bhagwan, (2018) 4 SCC 562]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 163-A — Permanent total disability — Compensation — Computation of Income — Loss of future prospects — Self-employed carpenter: Claim of appellant carpenter that his earnings were Rs 6000 p.m. cannot be discarded or cannot be regarded as being unreasonable or contrary to a realistic assessment of situation on date of accident. Following five-Judge Bench in Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, held that benefit of future prospects should not be confined only to those who have a permanent job and would extend to self-employed individuals. In case of a self-employed person, an addition of 40% of established income should be made where age of victim at time of the accident was below 40 yrs. Hence, in this case, appellant be entitled to an enhancement of Rs 2400 towards loss of future prospects. [Jagdish v. Mohan, (2018) 4 SCC 571]

Constitution of India — Arts. 139-A, 136 and 226 — Transfer of writ proceedings to Supreme Court: In this case transfer petitions were dismissed on the ground that issue involved were pending consideration in a civil appeal in Supreme Court. Decision of Supreme Court can be brought to notice of High Court once civil appeal decided by Supreme Court and parties in meantime can request High Court to defer proceedings in pending writ petitions. [Commr. of Service Tax (Appeals 1) v. Sri Selvaganapathy & Co., (2018) 4 SCC 578]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 154, 200 and 482 — Second FIR and Counter-complaint — Maintainability of — Second FIR — When can be lodged: In this case two FIRs were filed in relation to same offence and against same accused but second FIR was not filed by same person, who filed first FIR . Moreover, second FIR contained a different version of events than contained in first FIR. While determining that whether subsequent FIR is liable to be quashed or not, the Supreme Court held that High Court committed jurisdictional error in quashing subsequent FIR/charge-sheet under S. 482 CrPC, without adverting to law on subject. Impugned order was set aside and case was restored to its file for being tried on merits, in accordance with law. [P. Sreekumar v. State of Kerala, (2018) 4 SCC 579]

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Writ appeal — Proper mode of Disposal: For proper disposal of writ appeal Court has to deal with issues raised by parties and pass reasoned order. [Sivakami v. State of T.N., (2018) 4 SCC 587]

Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 — Ss. 2(o), 42, 48, 49, 51 and 60 — Demurrage/storage charges in respect of goods not cleared by the consignee — Who is liable to pay i.e. a consignor, steamer agent or consignee: In view of the inconsistencies in the decisions in K.P.V. Sheik Mohamed Rowther & Co. (Rowther-I), 1963 Supp (2) SCR 915; K.P.V. Sheikh Mohd. Rowther & Co. (P) Ltd. (Rowther-II), (1997) 10 SCC 285; Sriyanesh Knitters, (1999) 7 SCC 359; Forbes Forbes Campbell & Co. Ltd. (Forbes-II), (2015) 1 SCC 228 and Rasiklal Kantilal & Co., (2017) 11 SCC 1, matter referred to a larger Bench. [Cochin Port Trust v. Arebee Star Maritime Agencies (P) Ltd., (2018) 4 SCC 592]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 12 R. 6 — Judgment on admission — When proper: In this case, Defendant 2 (Bank) in written statement not specifically denied undertaking to honour cheques issued by Defendant 1 but deliberately attempted to frustrate legal right of plaintiff by producing only a xerox copy and not original undertaking. Trial court in said suit for recovery allowed Or. 12 R. 6 application of plaintiff. The said order was affirmed by the Supreme Court. [Indian Bank v. S.N. Engineers & Suppliers, (2018) 4 SCC 606]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 205, 317 and 482 — Personal appearance of accused — When can be exempted — Case under S. 498-A IPC and S. 4, Dowry Prohibition Act: When sufficient grounds made out for granting exemption from personal appearance of accused persons in trial, Judicial Magistrate committed error in not adverting to such grounds and rejected application filed under S. 205 CrPC, on unfounded reasons. Challenge to sais order, before High Court, under S. 482 CrPC, was also incorrectly rejected, on some different reasonings and High Court took entirely new grounds for dismissing application filed under S. 482 CrPC without adverting to grounds which were taken by Magistrate for declining prayer. Orders of High Court and Judicial Magistrate, set aside and personal appearance of accused, exempted. [Rameshwar Yadav v. State of Bihar, (2018) 4 SCC 608]

Family and Personal Laws — Muslim Law — Burial Norms and Rights: As disputed land was used for Muslim graveyard from time immemorial, High Court declaring that Muslim community entitled to said burial ground of 2.49 acres, not disturbed. [Sattar V. High School Boarding Committee, (2018) 4 SCC 613]

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Condonation of delay — Adoption of liberal approach in respect of, when warranted: A defective review petition was filed in High Court but petitioners concerned failed to cure those defects despite several opportunities granted to them in that regard. Review petition was consequently dismissed by Registrar of High Court. Application was filed before High Court for setting aside the order of Registrar and restoring the review petition, which was dismissed on ground of delay. While hearing the petition challenging the said order, the Supreme Court noted that keeping in view the observations made by Supreme Court in Sangram Singh, AIR 1955 SC 425 and having regard to the nature of controversy involved herein, held, High Court should have condoned the delay taking a liberal view in the matter. Interest of justice demanded one more opportunity to be given to the review petitioners (appellants herein) to cure the defects. [Pralhad Shankarrao Tajale v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 4 SCC 615]

Constitution of India — Art. 233 — Appointment to Higher Judicial Service — Appointment to post of District Judge — Eligibility: Matter referred to larger Bench on issues: (i) whether eligibility is to be adjudged only at time of appointment or at time of application or both; and (ii) whether in computing period of 7 yrs of practice for being eligible for appointment as District Judge, period during which candidate has held judicial office to be included and interpretation of Art. 233 of the Constitution. [Dheeraj Mor v. High Court of Delhi, (2018) 4 SCC 619]

Constitution of India — Arts. 233 and 309 — Appointment to posts of Higher Judicial Service — Rr. 31(3) and 33(iii) of Rajasthan Judicial Service Rules, 2010 — Validity: For appointment to posts of District Judges in State of Rajasthan, Rules were framed by certain States including State of Rajasthan and State of Gujarat in exercise of their powers under Art. 309 of the Constitution that in computing period of 7 yrs of practice by candidate for appointment to post of District Judge, period during which candidate was holding judicial office would also be computed. Interim orders were passed by Supreme Court in two writ petitions pertaining to appointment to Higher Judicial Service wherein benefit similar to one extended by State of Gujarat was claimed. In this case, it was prayed to pass similar orders while declaring impugned Rules requiring a candidate to have not less than 7 yrs of practice for being eligible for appointment to post of District Judge in State of Rajasthan. The Supreme Court held that impugned Rules are in consonance with Art. 233 of the Constitution. However, considering that validity of Rules framed by State of Gujarat had not been tested so far and to avoid proliferation of litigation, matter referred to larger Bench. [Sukhda Pritam v. High Court of Rajasthan, (2018) 4 SCC 627]

Rent Control and Eviction — Allotment/Deemed Vacancy/Vacancy/Release of Building — Review power under S. 16(5)(a), U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 — When can be exercised: If District Magistrate returns a wrong finding regarding vacancy, it is always open to him to review same. Question of allotment or release under S. 16(1)(a) or (b) can arise only if there is a vacancy. Once finding that there is no vacancy, same certainly open to be reviewed under S. 16(5)(a), 1972 Act. Thus District Magistrate was justified in exercising review jurisdiction. [Rajendra Kumar Verma v. Additional District Magistrate (Civil Supplies), (2018) 4 SCC 630]

Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (32 of 2004) — Ss. 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(b) — Rate of tax on goods used in the execution of works contract prior to 1-4-2006 i.e. prior to insertion of cl. (c) in S. 4(1) prescribing a uniform rate of tax on such goods — Determination of: The expression “other goods” means those goods which are not governed by S. 4(1)(a) and where goods are specifically covered by any of the entries of the Second, Third and Fourth Schedules, such goods would be covered by the specific entry relating to those goods. Thus, recourse to the residual provisions of S. 4(1)(b) would be available only in respect of “other goods” i.e. goods which did not fall within the purview of S. 4(1)(a). Further, though it was permissible for the State Legislatures to prescribe a uniform rate of tax for all goods involved in the execution of works contracts, the KVAT Act, 2003 did not provide a uniform rate of tax prior to 1-4-2006. Therefore, tax prior to 1-4-2006 was to be levied as per the rate applicable on the value of each class of goods involved in the execution of works contract. [State of Karnataka v. Durga Projects Inc., (2018) 4 SCC 633]

Constitution of India — Pt. III — Linking of Aadhaar with bank account, mobile number and social welfare schemes: Last date for linking of Aadhaar with bank account, mobile number and social welfare schemes, having been extended in earlier order to 31-3-2018, further extended till matter finally heard and decided by Court. Further, said interim order would also govern Passports (First Amendment) Rules, 2018. [K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 651]

Constitution of India — Arts. 145(3) and 136 — Ram Janmabhoomi/Babri Masjid suits — Issue as to whether matter should be referred to Constitution Bench: Directions regarding completion of procedural formalities with regard to addition, deletion, substitution of parties and submission of documents and translated copies of documents, issued. [M. Siddiq v. Mahant Suresh Das, (2018) 4 SCC 655]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 41 Rr. 27 and 2 — Admission of additional evidence by appellate court — Procedure to be adopted subsequent to: Though Or. 41 R. 27 CPC is silent as to the procedure to be adopted by appellate court after admission of additional evidence, however, in view of provisions contained in Or. 41 R. 2 CPC, when appellate court admits additional evidence, it is necessary for said court to grant an opportunity to other party to lead evidence in rebuttal thereof. [Akhilesh Singh v. Lal Babu Singh, (2018) 4 SCC 659]

Service Tax (Determination of Value) Rules, 2006 — R. 5 — Validity of: As per the charging section i.e. S. 66 of Finance Act, 1994, service tax is to be charged only on the value of taxable services. Further, as per S. 67 of Finance Act, 1994, for valuation of taxable services, the authorities are to find what is the gross amount charged for providing “such” taxable services. Thus, any other amount which is calculated not for providing such taxable service cannot be a part of that valuation. Further, rules cannot go beyond the statute i.e. a rule which comes in conflict with the main enactment has to give way to the provisions of the Act. Therefore, service tax is to be paid only on the services actually provided by the service provider i.e. R. 5 is ultra vires the provisions of Ss. 66 and 67 of Finance Act, 1994. [Union of India v. Intercontinental Consultants & Technocrats Private Ltd., (2018) 4 SCC 669]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — S. 7(5) r/w S. 11 — Intention to incorporate arbitration clause from another agreement — When cannot be inferred: In this case agreement between appellant and respondent did not contain any arbitration clause, however, Cl. 2 of agreement provided that conditions relating to works and quality specified in agreement between Construction Contractor and employer would be binding on subcontractor/appellant and cl. 9.10 provided that terms and conditions of agreement between Contractor and employer will be applicable for items not mentioned in agreement clauses. Hence, following the ruling in M.R. Engineers and Contractors (P) Ltd., (2009) 7 SCC 696, wherein it was inter alia, held, that where a contract between the parties provides that execution or performance of that contract shall be in terms of another contract (which contains terms and conditions relating to performance and a provision for settlement of disputes by arbitration), then, terms of referred contract in regard to execution/performance alone will apply, and not arbitration agreement in referred contract, unless there is special reference to arbitration clause also, held, that arbitration clause was not intended to be made as a part of contract between appellant and respondent. Thus, appellant’s petition under S. 11 rightly dismissed by High Court. [Elite Engg. and Construction (Hyd.) (P) Ltd. v. Techtrans Construction India (P) Ltd., (2018) 4 SCC 281]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 43 R. 1(r) and Or. 39 R. 1 — Interference in interim order/Interlocutory Orders/Injunction/Stay: When main appeal itself is pending for consideration before High Court and order being interim in nature, interference with interim order must be declined. Expeditious disposal of first appeal on merits, emphasized. [B. Muthukrishnan v. S.T. Reddiar Educational & Charitable Trust, (2018) 4 SCC 298]

Competition Act, 2002 — Ss. 4(2)(c) Expln. (a), 2(b), (f)(ii) & (m): Abuse of dominant position by cable operators’ group by unlawful premature termination of agreement with broadcaster of a TV channel resulting in denial to broadcaster of market access, is violative of S. 4(2)(c). Words “in any manner” in S. 4(2)(c) are of wide import and should be given natural meaning. Once dominant position of the group made out on facts, question whether broadcaster is in competition with the group irrelevant for purpose of application of S. 4(2)(c). [CCI v. Fast Way Transmission (P) Ltd., (2018) 4 SCC 316]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 439 — Bail: Grant of bail by High Court, in a case of murder, being on a very little reference to/or discussion on merits of bail applications. Reason for release mainly one, which reason can, on a fair reading, be understood or misunderstood almost as a mitigating circumstance or a kind of a justification for murder. High Court’s order(s) set aside and bail applications restored to file of High Court, for hearing matter(s) afresh, after giving liberty to parties to file additional affidavits. [Mubin Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 4 SCC 312]

Family and Personal Laws — Guardians and Wards — Custody of Child/Minor — Jurisdiction/Judicial Interference/Parens Patriae Jurisdiction/Conflict of Laws/Private International Law: Principle of comity of courts or forum conveniens cannot alone determine threshold bar of jurisdiction. In these matters, paramount consideration is always best interest of child. This cannot be subject-matter of final determination in proceedings under Or. 7 R. 11 CPC. [Jasmeet Kaur v. Navtej Singh, (2018) 4 SCC 295]

Mines and Minerals (Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 — Ss. 8(2), (3), 10-B and 11 — Mining leases declared to be illegal in Goa Foundation, (2014) 6 SCC 590 — Grant of second renewal — Impermissibility of: State of Goa should have granted fresh mining leases instead of granting a second renewal. Such second renewal, held, illegal in view of Goa Foundation, (2014) 6 SCC 590. Second renewal of mining leases set aside and consequential directions also issued. [Goa Foundation v. Sesa Sterlite Ltd., (2018) 4 SCC 218]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 467, 468 and 471 r/w S. 120-B — Bail — Grant of — Reasons for: Appellant-accused was facing trial under Ss. 467, 468 and 471 r/w S. 120-B IPC. His period of custody was more than one year. High Court rejected his bail application mainly on basis of FSL Report. Though case is pending for a long time, trial has not yet commenced. Evidently, co-accused was granted bail. In aforesaid circumstances, held, it is just and proper to release appellant on bail. Hence, appellant directed to be released on bail on certain conditions. [Vijay Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, (2018) 4 SCC 315]

Public Accountability, Vigilance and Prevention of Corruption — Government Contracts and Tenders — Purchase of helicopters by State Governments — Unsubstantiated and baseless allegations: In this case involving purchase of Agusta Westland helicopter by the State of Chhattisgarh, where allegations of kickbacks and deposit in foreign accounts, specific allegation of deposit in account of Chief Minister’s son were imposed. Prayer for direction for investigation into allegations, was rejected as there was nothing on record to show that said purchases could have been made at a lesser price. CAG did not attribute any extraneous consideration in deal concerned. It was clarified that Government was entitled to make choice in purchase of helicopters which were purchased after evaluation of global tenders. Son of the Chief Minister was not personally a party. Disclosure in Panama Papers is a matter which is still under investigation. Hence, petition filed by Swaraj Abhiyan seeking probe into the alleged anomalies in the purchase of Agusta Westland helicopter by the State of Chhattisgarh, dismissed. [Swaraj Abhiyan v. Union of India, (2018) 4 SCC 300]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Ss. 36, 32 and 42 — Execution/enforcement of arbitral award — Court through which may be effected: Execution/enforcement of award can be done/filed anywhere in country where such decree can be executed and there is no requirement for obtaining a transfer of decree from court which has jurisdiction over arbitral proceedings/award/within whose jurisdiction award is passed. [Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. Abdul Samad, (2018) 3 SCC 622]

Electricity Act, 2003 — Ss. 127, 126 and 135 — Need to adhere to statutory dispute resolution mechanism/scheme: Once proceedings are initiated under Ss. 126 and/or 135, they must be brought logical conclusion in accordance with law after hearing consumer/concerned person as per statutory scheme. [Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Appellate Authority, (2018) 3 SCC 608]

Insurance — Life Insurance — Contract of life insurance: Acceptance of premium, amounts to waiving precondition of medical examination of insured. Such acceptance of premium results in concluded contract. Subsequent repudiation of policy amounts to deficiency in service. [D. Srinivas v. SBI Life Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 3 SCC 653]

Labour Law — Regularisation — Questions of fact — Proper forum: As several questions of fact arose in present case and MoU between employer and employee provided for arbitration, therefore, matter referred to Arbitral Tribunal for adjudication of factual disputes. [Ennore Port Trust v. V. Manoharan, (2018) 3 SCC 612]

Madhya Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994 — Rr. 63, 64 and 65 — Decision regarding modification of time schedule of vehicle route: In this case State Transport Authority took decision by signing of two members when all three members as required for quorum were present during hearing where all parties heard. It was held that as quorum for meeting was satisfied, signing of decision by majority of members (that is by two out of three members), was valid. In present case, normal rule of decision by majority should be followed as no exception is provided in statute. R. 65(4) providing for decision by special majority is not applicable because it is with regard to decision by circulation by votes. Present case is not a case of decision by circulation. [State of M.P. v. Mahendra Gupta, (2018) 3 SCC 635]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 168 — Compensation — Total permanent disability — Functional disability — Need to assess: Appellant 26 yrs old at time of accident, riding pillion on a motorcycle, dashed against by a lorry, sustained a fracture in his spinal cord, right leg and right hip bone, losing sensation or movement in his legs. Tribunal determined compensation at Rs 9,72,000; but thereafter on medical opinion of about 70% disability, reduced it to net amount at Rs 6,80,400 and after addition of medical and other expenses, awarded a total compensation of Rs 11,27,359 together with interest of 12% p.a. High Court in appeal reduced interest component from 12% p.a. to 7.5% p.a.. It was held by the Supreme Court that as a result of multiple fractures sustained by him, appellant has lost complete sensation below abdomen. Evidently he cannot work anymore as load man. In these circumstances, assessment of disability at 70% is incorrect. On a realistic view, nature of disability must be regarded as being complete. There was no reason or justification for deduction of Rs 2,91,600 by Tribunal (Rs 9,72,000 minus Rs 6,80,400). Amount so deducted restored and rounded off to Rs 3,00,000, enhancing compensation granted by Tribunal by this amount. Moreover, appellant is entitled to interest at 9% p.a. from date of claim petition on total amount of compensation (instead and in substitution of 7.5% p.a. awarded by High Court). [S. Thangaraj v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 3 SCC 605]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166, 168 and 173 — Enhancement of compensation — Difference claimed only 4% or 5%: Court normally does not interfere where variation in compensation is within permissible limits. [New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Vinish Jain, (2018) 3 SCC 619]

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 — S. 24 — Interpretation of word “paid” in S. 24(2): As there is divergence in opinion of co-equal Benches, proceedings in all affected cases stayed until question is settled by larger Bench. [State of Haryana v. G.D. Goenka Tourism Corpn. Ltd., (2018) 3 SCC 585]

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Settlement Act, 2013 — S. 24(2) — Lapsing of acquisition proceedings under, in case of nonpayment of compensation within prescribed period — Conduct of landowners concerned in regard to non-payment — Relevance of: Said provision under S. 24(2) of 2013 Act extends protection only to such landowners who are deprived of the compensation and not to those who deliberately do not collect the compensation and avoid to receive the same by their wilful act(s). Failure to deposit compensation in court under S. 31 of LA Act, 1894 in latter case would attract only payment of interest as envisaged under S. 34 of said LA Act. In such latter case, provisions of S. 24 of 2013 Act cannot be invoked seeking lapse of acquisition proceedings. [Mahavir v. Union of India, (2018) 3 SCC 588]

Sales Tax and VAT — Refund: When payment of sales tax has been done on provisional price, in case of subsequent reduction in provisional price, assessee is entitled to refund of tax paid on excess amount, with interest. [Universal Cylinders Ltd. v. CCT, (2018) 3 SCC 648]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 — S. 2(l), as existing prior to 1-4-2008 — Circular No. 97/8/2007-ST dt. 23-8-2007 issued by the Central Board of Excise and Customs (CBEC) — CENVAT credit in respect of service tax paid on transportation of goods from factory of manufacturer to the place of purchaser — Availment of: Following Vasavadatta Cements Ltd., (2018) 3 SCC 769, and in the absence of any challenge by Revenue to the satisfaction of the three conditions laid down in Circular dt. 23-8-2007 by the assessee, namely, (i) the ownership of goods and the property in the goods remains with the seller of the goods till the delivery of the goods in acceptable condition to the purchaser at his doorstep; (ii) seller bears the risk of or loss or damage to the goods during transit to the destination; and (iii) freight charges are integral part of the price of the goods, held, the service used by the manufacturer for clearance of final products “from the place of removal” i.e. factory premises of the assessee, to the warehouse or customer’s place, etc. was exigible for CENVAT credit. [CCE v. Andhra Sugars Ltd.,  (2018) 3 SCC 223]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 438 — Anticipatory bail — Alleged abetment of suicide: Deceased a Civil Engineer and working as a civil contractor, and accused were other contractors charged under Ss. 306/34 for abetting his suicide. All five accused were implicated in alleged suicide note by deceased. High Court denied protection under S. 438 CrPC. While issuing notice by order dt. 12-1-2018 Supreme Court noted that appellant-accused had already taken voluntary retirement in 2011 and suicide is of 2017. Before High Court also accused had pleaded that none of them was engaged as a contractor by municipal corpn. concerned since 2011. On request counsel for State on instruction submits that investigation is in progress and same is yet to be completed. It was held, it is a case where appellant needs to be given protection on condition that he would cooperate with investigation. In case appellant is arrested he shall be released on bail on his executing bond of Rs 25,000 with two sureties of like amount, subject to conditions under S. 438(2) CrPC and appellant directed to cooperate with investigation. [Bhausaheb v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 3 SCC 221]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 439 — Grant of bail — Foreign citizen: No special consideration can be given to accused in granting bail simply because he is a foreigner. [Lachhman Dass v. Resham Chand Kaler,  (2018) 3 SCC 187]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 482 and 320 — Quashing of criminal proceedings — Exercise of power by High Court — Quashing of proceedings based on compromise/settlement between parties: The principles on this point relevant to this case are, that where offences are predominantly of civil character, particularly arising out of commercial transactions, dispute should be quashed when parties have resolved their dispute. Further, timing of settlement would be crucial for exercise of power or declining to exercise power. Where settlement is arrived at between parties immediately after commission of offence and matter is still under investigation, High Court may be liberal in accepting settlement to quash proceedings/investigation as investigation is in its early stage and charge-sheet has not been filed. Where charges are framed and recording of evidence is yet to commence or is at early stage, proceedings can be quashed after prima facie assessment of circumstances/materials. Where trial is at fag end, High Court should refrain from exercising its power as trial court would be in position to decide matter on merits. Where accused already convicted and appeal against conviction is pending, mere settlement or compromise between victim and accused is not ground to accept the same resulting in acquittal of offender. [Anita Maria Dias v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 3 SCC 290]

Employees’ Compensation Act, 1923 — S. 30 — Improper disposal of appeal — Remand — When warranted: Judgment of High Court setting aside order of Employees’ Compensation Commissioner awarding Rs 8,70,576 compensation for injuries sustained by appellant claimant without hearing him, not sustainable. Matter remitted to High Court to decide appeal filed by Insurance Company afresh, after granting opportunity of hearing to appellant claimant. [Mohd. Anwar v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 3 SCC 300]

Family and Personal Laws — Family Property, Succession and Inheritance — Will — Subsequent will/Revocation/Alteration/Codicil: First will, a registered deed, executed in favour of minor daughter and minor son from first wife of testator, but kept in possession of the son U (Defendant 1). Subsequent alleged will in favour of defendant unregistered and having no mention of earlier registered document and its revocation. Minor on attaining majority filed suit for declaration of ownership of property on strength of earlier will but having no access to it produced certified copy thereof and proved the same in terms of S. 68 of Evidence Act. It was held on facts that earlier will is genuine. Hence, plaintiff entitled to declaration of her ownership over bequeathed property. [H.V. Nirmala v. R. Sharmila, (2018) 3 SCC 303]

Income Tax Rules, 1962 (as amended by the Noti. dt. 24-3-2008) — R. 8-D — Prospective operation of: S. 14-A was first inserted by the Finance Act, 2001 with retrospective effect from 1-4-1962 and sub-sections (2) & (3) were later inserted w.e.f. 1-4-2007 for the purposes of computing the expenditure incurred in relation to income which did not form part of the total income. R. 8-D was inserted by an amendment to the Rules by Noti. dt. 24-3-2008 to give effect to the provisions of sub-sections (2) & (3) of S. 14-A and provided for the method for determining amount of expenditure in relation to income not includible in total income. Applying the principles of statutory interpretation for interpreting retrospectivity of a fiscal statute, looking into the nature and purpose of subsections (2) & (3) of S. 14-A as well as purpose and intent of R. 8-D coupled with the Explanatory Notes in the Finance Bill, 2006 and the Departmental understanding as reflected by Circular dt. 28-12-2006, held, R. 8-D is intended to operate prospectively i.e. for Assessment Year 2007-2008 and onwards. [CIT v. Essar Teleholdings Ltd., (2018) 3 SCC 253]

Infrastructure Laws — Water and Water Resources — Canals, Dams and Irrigation — Flood/Inundation Management and Safety Measures — Apprehended cataclysm and unforeseen calamity to human life and property due to bursting of Mullaperiyar Dam: As far as safety measures of Mullaperiyar Dam are concerned, directions issued by Supreme Court in State of T.N., (2014) 12 SCC 696 would be binding and provisions of 2005 Act implemented. Further held, greater degree of disaster management and better preparedness to face any kind of disaster caused by dam is to be ensured since life without basic needs and liberty replete with fear is meaningless. Hence, it is the duty of States concerned to create sense of confidence in people and to ensure that adequate measures have been taken so that safety of citizens is not compromised at any level. Directions issued for constitution of different Sub-Committees by the Central Government, States of T.N. and Kerala to exclusively monitor measures for ensuring high level preparedness to face any disaster, which would be in addition to existing Committees. [Russel Joy v. Union of India, (2018) 3 SCC 179]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Ss. 23, 11 and 18 — Fair market rate of acquired land prevalent on date of acquisition — Determination of: There are several factors which govern determination of fair market rate of acquired land. Said market rate therefore cannot be decided in isolation on basis of only one factor. These factors are required to be proved with sufficient evidence. It must appear that courts have made sincere endeavour to determine fair market rate of acquired land taking into account all relevant aspects of the case. In this regard, duty of landowners and State is to adduce proper and sufficient evidence to enable courts to arrive at a reasonable and fair market rate of acquired land prevalent on date of acquisition. [Surender Singh v. State of Haryana, (2018) 3 SCC 278]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — S. 149(2) — Third-party insurance — Defences available to insurance company — Burden of proof: Following Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297, reiterated that insurance company is entitled to take a defence that offending vehicle was driven by an unauthorised person or that person driving vehicle did not have a valid driving licence. Onus would shift on insurance company only after owner of offending vehicle pleads and proves basic facts within his knowledge that driver of offending vehicle was authorised by him to drive vehicle and was having a valid driving licence at relevant time. [Pappu v. Vinod Kumar Lamba, (2018) 3 SCC 208]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 168 — Fatal accident — Compensation — Computation of — Multiplier — Age of deceased or claimant parents — Future prospects: Deceased, 29 yrs old was serving as an Assistant Teacher in a school run by a Trust on a temporary basis who would have been made permanent and would have been entitled to 6th Pay Commission wages of at least Rs 40,000 p.m. Adopting a multiplier of I7, Tribunal awarded compensation of Rs 61,20,000 and added Rs 35,000 under conventional heads with interest @ 9% p.a. However High Court having regard to age of father at 65 yrs and mother 50 yrs, concluded that a multiplier of 7 should be adopted. The Supreme Court held that in terms of judgment of five-Judge Bench in Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680 and in Sarla Verma, (2009) 6 SCC 121, correct multiplier to be applied in present case would be 17, having regard to age of deceased at 29 yrs. For future prospects, adding 50%, and making a deduction of 50% towards personal expenses (deceased being a bachelor), total compensation quantified at Rs 61,20,000. After making additions on account of conventional heads, total compensation at Rs 61,90,000 carrying interest @ 9% p.a. from date of filing of claim petition awarded. Apportionment to be carried out in terms of award of Tribunal. [Ramrao Lala Borse v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 3 SCC 204]

Municipalities — Municipal taxes — External development charges — Liability to pay: Liability to pay the same is on house construction society, colonisers or individual persons. Central Government entities/PSUs like National Fertilizers Ltd. and Gas Authority of India Ltd., (respondentplaintiffs) who were allotted plots and constructed dwelling units for stay of their employees as distinguished from sale or letting out on rent, held, are not liable to pay said charges. [Municipal Council, Raghogarh v. National Fertilizers Ltd., (2018) 3 SCC 200]

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — S. 138 — Sentence and compensation: Waiver of imprisonment in lieu of payment of additional compensation, permissible under exceptional circumstances. [Priyanka Nagpal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2018) 3 SCC 249]

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 — S. 138: Conviction under S. 138, confirmed, however, accused permitted to pay additional compensation amount to complainant, in lieu of simple imprisonment awarded. [P. Ramadas v. State of Kerala, (2018) 3 SCC 287]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 201 — Charge under — When can be independently laid and conviction maintained: Charge under S. 201 can be independently laid and conviction maintained also, in case prosecution is able to establish that an offence was committed, person charged with offence had knowledge or reason to believe that offence was committed, said person has caused disappearance of evidence and such act of disappearance was done with intention of screening offender from legal punishment. Mere suspicion is not sufficient, it must be proved that accused knew or had a reason to believe that offence was committed and yet he caused evidence to disappear so as to screen offender. Offender may be either himself or any other person. [Dinesh Kumar Kalidas Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 313]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 304 Pt. I and 307: There were serious burn injuries caused to a number of women, leading to death of two due to burning cow dung cakes which were hurled by accused at them. High Court reversed conviction of accused under Ss. 304 Pt. I and 307. No enmity was found present between accused and victims and no intention of accused to kill a particular person was also established. Material contradictions in statements of eyewitnesses, present. No explanation was given of huge delay in recording statements of witnesses. Inordinate delay in lodging FIR, also not explained. It was held that guilt of accused was not established beyond reasonable doubt, hence, acquittal by High Court, confirmed. [State of M.P. v. Nande, (2018) 3 SCC 196]

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection ) Act, 1994 — Ss. 22 and 18 — Advertisements relating to pre-conception and pre-natal determination of sex and sex selection: Earlier directions issued regarding prohibition of advertisements relating to pre-conception and pre-natal determination of sex and sex selection, summarised and further directions issued with special reference to search criteria “medical tourism in India” and “gender determination”. [Sabu Mathew George v. Union of India, (2018) 3 SCC 229]

Service Law — Appointment — Contractual appointment — Non-renewal of contract — Absence of any right accruing in favour of contractual employee: Services of petitioner appointed as Technical Assistant (ENT) on contract basis without following any prescribed procedure or adherence to rules, though initially for three months but subsequently renewed, were terminated/not renewed after six months. The Supreme Court held, contractual employee has no right to have his/her contract renewed in absence of any statutory or other right in his favour. At best, petitioner can only claim that due consideration for extending his contract may be granted, which was actually done in instant case, but decision not to continue him was taken. Besides, since petitioner’s appointment was not made in accordance with any regular procedure or by following necessary rules, no right accrued in his favour for regularisation of his services. Furthermore, fact that some persons were appointed as ENT in the year 2016 would have no bearing on events of 2010 when decision to discontinue petitioner was taken since change in circumstance would confer no benefit on him. [Yogesh Mahajan v. AIIMS, (2018) 3 SCC 218]

Service Law — Appointment — Eligibility conditions/criteria: For post of Hindi Language Assistant, carving out specific category in Recruitment Rules postulating additional requirement is permissible. [State of Karnataka v. Shankar Baburao Kangralkar, (2018) 3 SCC 296]

Service Law — Retirement/Superannuation — Voluntary retirement — Housing accommodation — SAIL Scheme for Leasing of Houses to Employees, 2002 — Long term (33 yrs) lease of the houses to serving employees opting for VRS: There was claim of respondent ex-employees of Rourkela Steel Plant (RSP), a unit of appellant SAIL (who were already in occupation of official quarters on licence basis for 22 months), to their inclusion within said 2002 Scheme. Scheme remained valid for 3 months only. No vested right was conferred on ex-employees under Scheme. State Government had leased entire land to RSP for use of steel plant and ancillary purposes. In view of subsequent plan of RSP of expansion of its production capacity by plant modernisation which would require additional accommodation for various government agencies within township, any long lease of quarters by RSP would not be feasible. In such circumstances, held, appellant cannot be compelled to grant longterm lease of official quarters in RSP township to respondents. However, respondents (writ petitioners before High Court), 53 in number, directed to be allowed to remain in occupation of the quarters for a period of 33 months from date of decision of this appeal. [SAIL v. Choudhary Tilotama Das, (2018) 3 SCC 308]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Companies Act, 2013 — Ss. 421(3) and 433 — Limitation for appeal to Appellate Tribunal: Limitation period of 45 days in S. 421(3) plus additional 45 days grace period in its proviso, held, are peremptory and mandatory in nature. No further time can be granted beyond this total period. [Bengal Chemists & Druggists Assn. v. Kalyan Chowdhury, (2018) 3 SCC 41]

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Existence of alternative statutory remedies (under SARFAESI Act in present matter) — Power to exercise writ jurisdiction in case of: Discretionary jurisdiction under Art. 226 is not absolute but has to be exercised judiciously in given facts of a case and in accordance with law. Normally a writ petition under Art. 226 ought not to be entertained if alternative statutory remedies are available, except in cases falling within the well-defined exceptions as observed by Supreme Court in Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603. [State Bank of Travancore v. Mathew K.C., (2018) 3 SCC 85]

Constitution of India — Arts. 21 and 136 — Right to bail — Factors and considerations for grant or refusal of bail: Need of humane approach while dealing with applications for remanding matter to police or judicial custody, stressed. There is overcrowding in jails due to non-adherence to basic principles of criminal jurisprudence regarding grant of bail and presumption of innocence. Even if grant or refusal of bail is entirely upon discretion of Judge, it must be exercised in a judicious manner and in a humane way as such remanding hampers dignity of accused howsoever poor he might be. [ Dataram Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 22]

Contract and Specific Relief — Termination/Discharge of Contract — Termination/Repudiation for Breach of Contract: Once it is established that the party was justified in terminating the contract on account of fundamental breach thereof, then the said innocent party is entitled to claim damages for the entire contract i.e. for the part which is performed and also for the part of the contract which it was prevented from performing. [Maharashtra State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v.  Datar Switchgear Ltd., (2018) 3 SCC 133]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 154 — FIR: Value to be attached to FIR depends upon facts and circumstances of each case. When a person gives a statement to police officer basing on it, FIR is registered. Capacity of reproducing things differs from person to person. Some people may have ability to reproduce things as it is, some may lack the ability to do so. Sometimes in the state of shock, they may miss the important details, because people tend to react differently when they come across a violent act. Merely because names of accused are not stated and their names are not specified in FIR, that may not be a ground to doubt contents of FIR and the case of prosecution cannot be thrown out on such count. [Latesh v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 3 SCC 66]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 438 — Anticipatory bail — Denial of by High Court — Grant of the same by Supreme Court on terms — When warranted: Supreme Court on 15-9-2017, ordered petitioner to take steps to implead de facto complainant with notice to State as well as de facto complainant and in case petitioner is arrested, he was to be released on bail on furnishing a self-bond, subject to conditions that he shall cooperate with investigation and also to deposit Rs 10 lakhs before Supreme Court within six weeks. Registry was directed to keep amount in an interest-bearing fixed deposit in a nationalised bank, initially for a period of six months, to be renewed from time to time. On submission of de facto complainant, that he has no objection if protection under S. 438(2) CrPC is granted to appellant, in case he is permitted to withdraw amount deposited before Supreme Court and does not want to prosecute appellant, and counsel for appellant not having any objection with regard thereto. Without going into various other disputes, de facto complainant permitted to withdraw amount deposited before Supreme Court pursuant to order dt. 15-9-2017, along with interest accrued. In case of arrest, appellant be released on bail by investigating officer on his executing a bond of Rs 25,000 with two sureties of like amount, subject to other conditions under S. 438(2) CrPC and appellant to cooperate with investigation. [Bikash Manna v. State of W.B., (2018) 3 SCC 47]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 482 — Inherent power of High Court under — Proper mode of exercise of: On a petition filed under S. 482 CrPC for quashing of FIR/investigation into case under Ss. 406, 420, 465, 467, 468, 471 & 120-B IPC and Ss. 3(1)(iv) and (v), Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, order passed by High Court in, not adverting to merits of case within guidelines laid down by Supreme Court in Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335. Hence, held, High Court’s order, set aside and matter remitted back to High Court to decide the lis afresh, within parameters of S. 482 CrPC, in view of law laid down in Bhajan Lal case. Liberty is granted to appellants to move an application for stay of investigation, if so advised. [Dinesh Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 114]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Ss. 482, 157 and 154 — Inherent powers of High Court under S. 482 — Exercise of, in context of challenge to FIR — How to be dealt with — Principles summarized: In order to examine as to whether factual contents of FIR disclose any prima facie cognizable offences or not, High Court cannot act like an investigating agency and nor can exercise powers like an appellate court. Question is required to be examined, keeping in view, contents of FIR and prima facie material, if any, requiring no proof. At such stage, High Court cannot appreciate evidence nor can it draw its own inferences from contents of FIR and material relied on. It is more so, when the material relied on is disputed. In such a situation, it becomes the job of investigating authority at such stage, to probe and then of the court to examine questions once the charge-sheet is filed along with such material as to how far and to what extent reliance can be placed on such material. Once the court finds that FIR does disclose prima facie commission of any cognizable offence, it should stay its hand and allow investigating machinery to step in to initiate the probe to unearth crime in accordance with the procedure prescribed in CrPC. [Dineshbhai Chandubhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 3 SCC 104]

Employees Compensation Act, 1923 — S. 30 — Appeal — Scope of interference — Need for substantial question of law and proper consideration of findings of Commissioner: Commissioner held that appellant driver lost two toes of his left leg and that there were also burn injuries due to accident and awarded compensation of Rs 2,79,367 with interest @ 12% p.a. from expiry of one month from date of accident till realization. On appreciation of evidence High Court reduced compensation to a meagre sum of Rs 83,664 without discussion as to basis thereof while endorsing findings of fact as recorded by Commissioner, regarding injuries. But, according to High Court, it was not possible that claimant has lost earning capacity by 100%. The Supreme Court held that High Court has not referred to any discussion while reducing compensation to 1/3rd of what has been awarded by Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation. Appeal before High Court against an award of Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation is only on a substantial question of law. No substantial question of law was raised by Insurance Company either. Impugned order set aside and that of Commissioner, Workmen’s Compensation restored. [Osmanali Chous v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 3 SCC 49]

Family and Personal Laws — Family Arrangement/Settlement/Partition — Partition — When possible — Need for joint ownership of property concerned: Absolute owner cannot purport to transfer his absolute interest vide “partition”. Such “partition” has to be construed either as a gift deed or family settlement, for which necessary formalities, conditions or rules laid down for donation inter vivos or gift so as to enforce said document have to be complied with. [Theiry Santhanamal v. Viswanathan, (2018) 3 SCC 117]

Government Contracts and Tenders — Formation of Government Contract — Modes of entering into a Government Contract — Public Auction/Tender — E-Auction — e-Tender system: Bidder had not completed e-Tender system requirements. As a result, data submitted by bidder was lost on portal. This was not due to any technical glitch, but due to defective submission of proposal. Such actions of bidder, held, render bid invalid. Retrieval of lost data submitted by bidder and reconsideration of such data would amount to granting second opportunity to such bidder, which is impermissible. [Mhada v. Shapoorji Pallonji & Co. (P) Ltd., (2018) 3 SCC 13]

Income Tax Act, 1961 — S. 2(22)(e) (as amended in 1988) — Amendment brought about to the definition of “dividend” — Effect of: Matter regarding determination of meaning of the expression “shareholder” post amendment, if restricted only to a person who is a beneficial owner of the shares, referred to larger Bench. [National Travel Services v. CIT, (2018) 3 SCC 95]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Ss. 11, 12 and 18(2) (as amended in State of U.P.) — Proper application for reference: In this case, the appellants had accepted the compensation under protest on the point of sufficiency of the compensation and made a specific request for reference under S. 18 on 24-7-1999, which indisputably was within the six month period of limitation. It is also seen from the communication from the Land Acquisition Officer to the appellants dt. 25-9-1999, on which date the time under S. 18 had not expired, that certified copy of the award had not been furnished to the appellants. However, a photocopy of the award was given, which the appellants were not inclined to acknowledge. Thus it was held, this is a case where the request under Section 18 of the Act made on 24-7-1999 should be treated as a proper application. Moreover, before rejection, the grounds had also been furnished after receipt of the certified copy of the award. [Shahid Jamal v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 52]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Ss. 28, 34, 28-A and 18 — Non-award of interest under Ss. 28 or 34 — Appropriate remedy: Said dispute, held, can be raised only by taking recourse to Art. 226 of the Constitution. Reference under S. 18 or S. 28-A is not an alternative remedy available for non-award of interest under S. 28 or S. 34. [Union of India v. Pushpavathi, (2018) 3 SCC 28]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 168 — Compensation — Computation of — Multiplier: Deceased aged 23 yrs, parents being in age group of 40 to 45 yrs, High Court applied multiplier 15, taking age of parents into consideration. Following Sarla Verma, (2009) 6 SCC 121, Munna Lal Jain, (2015) 6 SCC 347, and five-Judge Bench judgment in Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, it was reiterated, that legal position is that multiplier should depend on age of deceased and not on age of dependants. Hence, appellants were justified in insisting on applying multiplier 18. [Sube Singh v. Shyam Singh, (2018) 3 SCC 18]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 168 — Fatal accident — Compensation — Computation of income — Proof of: For deceased bachelor, aged 20 yrs, proceeding on a motorcycle dashed against by a truck leaving him in grievous injuries upon which he died on spot. Tribunal held driver of truck, and insurer jointly and severally liable together with owner, but refused to accept certificates for months of August, September and October 2008 produced by appellant father as proof of monthly earning of Rs 15,000, and adopted an income of Rs 6000 p.m. and for being a bachelor, deducted Rs 3000 p.m. towards personal expenses. It was held that Tribunal has given cogent reasons for declining to accept income certificates and no witnesses were examined on behalf of companies which were alleged to have issued certificates. Evidently there was a failure to establish that deceased, who was a student pursuing his C.A. was in receipt of a monthly income of Rs 15,000. Hence, assessment of income by Tribunal cannot be faulted. [Nagar Mal v. Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd., (2018) 3 SCC 130]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 2(30), 50, 166, 168, 173, 146(1) and 196 — Motor accident — Liability of “owner” of offending vehicle: Having regard to definition of “owner” under S. 2(30) of MV Act, 1988, held, the person in whose name motor vehicle stands registered (i.e. whose name is reflected in records of Registering Authority) would be treated as “owner” of vehicle for purposes of MV Act. Only where a person is a minor, the guardian of that minor would be treated as owner, and where a motor vehicle is subject to an agreement of hire purchase, lease or hypothecation or is under requisition, the person in possession of vehicle under that agreement or under requisition is treated as owner. [Naveen Kumar v. Vijay Kumar, (2018) 3 SCC 1]

Service Law — Recruitment Process — Eligibility criteria/conditions — Post of Psychologist — Advertisement inter alia stating “Graduation in Psychology/LT/BT/BEd in subject of Psychology” as eligibility criterion — Interpretation of: Use of stroke between graduate and LT/BT/BEd indicates that all were alternate qualifications and cannot be read to mean graduate in Psychology with LT/BT/BEd as done by High Court. Besides, from advertisement it is apparent that appointing authority was well aware of meaning of stroke (‘/’) which was used when either of qualifications were required while word “with” was used when both qualifications were required.  Further held, words “in Psychology subject” used as prefix clearly mean that all alternative qualifications were required to have Psychology subject i.e. “Graduation with Psychology/LT/BT/BEd in subject of Psychology”, and as such form one class. Furthermore, in terms of applicable 1991 Rules also qualification for post of Psychologist was MA in Psychology and LT/BT/BEd were not essential qualifications. Thus, non-possession of LT/BT/BEd did not disqualify appellant from being appointed as Psychologist since being postgraduate in Psychology he fulfilled statutory qualifications as well as eligibility criteria stipulated in advertisement. Thus, he could not be denied appointment on ground that he did not possess LT/BT/BEd qualifications. Respondents directed to issue appointment letter to appellant within stipulated time. [Ashish Kumar v. State of U.P., (2018) 3 SCC 55]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Advocates — Bar Councils and Associations — State Bar Councils — Free and fair elections: Order for constitution of Committee by Bar Council of India (BCI) to oversee elections to State Bar Council of Tamil Nadu and Puducherry, not interfered with. Said Committee consisted of retired Chief Justices/Judges of various High Courts. [Ajayinder Sangwan v. Bar Council of Delhi, (2018) 2 SCC 770]

Advocates — Bar Councils and Associations — State Bar Councils — Free and fair elections — Schedule for elections — Compliance with directions of Court: BCCI having finalized schedule for election in respective State Bar Councils (as on date of present order, that is, 5-2-2018), contempt petition against BCI, dismissed. [Ajayinder Sangwan v. K.K. Mohan, (2018) 2 SCC 774]

Advocates — Bar Councils and Associations — State Bar Councils — Free and fair elections — Directions: Elections directed to be held on basis of provisional electoral rolls pending verification of Law degrees. All advocates who submitted applications along with Law degrees for verification be enrolled and shown in electoral list. Of course degrees already verified and found false and fake would be excluded from electoral list. Clarified that said electoral list and result of election would be subject to final decision of Court. Universities directed to expeditiously verify said degrees. Appropriate action would be taken against false and fake degrees after verification. Order in Ajayinder Sangwan, (2018) 2 SCC 780, modified accordingly. [Ajayinder Sangwan v. Bar Council of Delhi, (2018) 2 SCC 776]

Advocates — Election to Bar Councils — Verification of members of Bar Council and/or Bar Association: State Bar Council requested permission for conducting immediate elections as term had expired long back while BCI emphasised need of verification of candidates to eliminate fake lawyers to ensure that deserving practising advocates were elected. To do complete justice following directions issued: (i) BCI and State Bar Councils to grant time to advocates to cure defective applications and submit verified degrees within stipulated time whereafter State Bar Councils to publish final electoral rolls; (ii) BCI to declare election schedule in respective State Bar Councils thereafter. [Ajayinder Sangwan v. Bar Council of Delhi, (2018) 2 SCC 780]

CENVAT Credit Rules, 2004 — S. 2(l), as effective from 1-3-2008 — Availing of CENVAT credit in respect of service tax paid on transportation of goods from factory to the place of purchaser — Impermissibility of: Post amendment, “input services” include those services which are used by the manufacturer, in or in relation to the manufacture of final products and clearance of final products “up to the place of removal”. Thus, it is only “up to the place of removal” that service is treated as input service. Therefore, the benefit which was admissible even beyond the place of removal now gets terminated at the place of removal and doors to the CENVAT credit of input tax paid gets closed at that place. [CCE v. Ultra Tech Cement Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 721]

Evidence Act, 1872 — Ss. 3 to 9, 65-A, 65-B and 62 — Electronic evidence — Standard of proof, authenticity and admissibility — Law summarized: Ss. 65-A and 65-B of the Evidence Act, 1872, cannot be held to be a complete code on the subject. Threshold admissibility of electronic evidence cannot be ruled out on any technicality if same is relevant. Its authenticity and procedure for its admissibility may depend on fact situation such as whether person producing such evidence is in a position to furnish certificate under S. 65-B(4). If party producing electronic evidence is not in possession of device from which electronic document was produced, then such party, held, cannot be required to produce certificate under S. 65-B(4) of the Evidence Act. Requirement of certificate under S. 65-B(4) being procedural, can be relaxed by court wherever interest of justice so justifies. Thus, requirement of certificate under S. 65-B(4) is not always mandatory. [Shafhi Mohammad v. State of H.P., (2018) 2 SCC 801]

Karnataka Value Added Tax Act, 2003 (32 of 2004) — Ss. 2(36), 2(34) and 2(35) — Computation of taxable turnover — Deductions — Entitlement to: Giving benefit of discount at a point of time subsequent to original sale/purchase, held, is a regular trade practice and therefore qualifies for deduction. All regular trade discounts are allowable as permissible deductions if proper proof is shown. Assessee must establish from accounts that the discount relates specifically to sales with reference to which it is allowed. Therefore, R. 3(2)(c) proviso has to be read down to make it workable so that object of providing deductions on account of trade discount is not defeated. Therefore, language of R. 3(2)(c) proviso cannot be construed to mean that discount would be inadmissible as a deduction unless tax invoice pertaining to the goods originally issued shows said discount. [Maya Appliances (P) Ltd. v. CCT, (2018) 2 SCC 756]

Kerala Cooperative Societies Act, 1969 (21 of 1969) — Ss. 2(i), 69 and 70 (as amended by Amending Act 1 of 2000 w.e.f. 2-1-2003) r/w S. 10, Industrial Disputes Act, 1947: Jurisdiction of Labour Court under ID Act to decide service disputes between cooperative society’s employee and employer, not barred by Ss. 69 and 70. KCS Act as well as ID Act both possess concurrent jurisdiction to decide any service dispute arising between cooperative society’s employee and his/her employer (cooperative society). Further held, it is choice of employee concerned to choose any one forum out of two forums available under two Acts to get service dispute decided which is however, subject to satisfying test laid down under ID Act that employee concerned is a “workman”, dispute raised is “industrial dispute” and cooperative society (employer) is “industry” as defined under ID Act. [K.A. Annamma v. Cochin Coop. Hospital Society Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 729]

Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 (37 of 1966) — Ss. 49, 50, 126 and 127 — Areas reserved for acquisition — Delay in acquisition procedure — Right of dereservation — Procedure of dereservation: In this case, purchase notice under S. 49 had been given earlier and was confirmed by authorities but no purchase notice under S. 127 had been given after lapse of 10 yrs from date of publication of plan, hence, exercising jurisdiction under Art. 142 of the Constitution to do complete justice, it was declared and held that reservation of appellant’s land had lapsed. However, it was clarified that in all future cases, a second purchase notice must be served under S. 127 after lapse of 10 yrs (even if it has been served under S. 49 earlier) in order that lapsing can take place under S. 127. [Chhabildas v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 2 SCC 784]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166 and 168 — Fatal accident — Compensation — Future prospects: In this case, 42 yrs old self-employed deceased was in business of cable networks. Tribunal awarded Rs 30,26,810 with interest at 9% p.a. factoring in a 30% towards loss of future prospects. The Supreme Court held that following principle laid down in judgment of Five-Judge Bench in Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, for deceased who was self-employed, future prospects cannot be denied and since deceased was 42 yrs of age, an addition of 25% on ground of future prospects would be warranted instead of 30% computed by Tribunal. Tribunal’s calculation of annual income based on income tax returns for 2010-2011, 2011-2012 and 2012-2013 being Rs 1,81,500, adding a component of 25% for future prospects to get Rs 2,26,875 and deducting one-fourth towards personal expenses, loss of dependency per annum works out to Rs 1,70,156. Applying multiplier of 14, total loss of dependency at Rs 23,82,187 then adding Rs 3,14,335 towards medical expenses. An addition of Rs 70,000 in terms of Pranay Sethi case for conventional heads of loss of estate (Rs 15,000), loss of consortium (Rs 40,000) and funeral expenses (Rs 15,000). Total compensation quantified at Rs 27,66,522 with interest @ 9% p.a. from date of filing of claim petition. Apportionment directed to be carried out in terms of award of Tribunal. [Reliance General Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shalu Sharma, (2018) 2 SCC 753]

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 — Ss. 166, 168 and 173 — Compensation: Adding future prospects to established income of deceased while determining compensation, must be done in all cases as per ruling of five-Judge Bench in Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680. [Munusamy v. T.N. STC (Villupuram) Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 765]

Rent Control and Eviction — Revision — Jurisdiction as to — Nature and scope — Power to interfere with finding of fact: Appellant herein i.e. owner of shops in question filed eviction petitions relating to said shops against respondent tenants herein under Rent Act concerned on ground that those shops were in dilapidated condition and could not be repaired/reconstructed without evicting tenants. Rent Controller, after going through reports and evidence of expert witnesses produced by both sides, dismissed said petitions opining that appellant was not able to prove that shops were in dilapidated condition. Said finding was affirmed by Appellate Authority. It was held by the Supreme Court that the view taken by courts below was a plausible view which could not be said to be perverse. Hence, High Court in exercise of its limited revisional jurisdiction rightly declined to interfere with such view of courts below. Contention of appellant that Appellate Authority and High Court failed to consider certain subsequent event alleged by him before those courts to fortify his case as to dilapidated condition of shops, held, not tenable as there was nothing on record to show that such contention was raised before said courts. [Surinder v. Nand Lal, (2018) 2 SCC 717]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Arbitration Act, 1940 — Ss. 31(4), 30 and 33 r/w Ss. 14(2) and 2(c) — Filing award to make it rule of court and to entertain objections to award — Proper court for: Supreme Court may make a reference to an arbitrator on consent but to hold it as a legal principle that it can also entertain objections as the original court will invite a fundamental fallacy pertaining to jurisdiction. When an arbitrator is not appointed under the Act and the matter is challenged before the High Court or, for that matter, the Supreme Court and, eventually, an arbitrator is appointed and some directions are issued, it will be inappropriate and inapposite to say that the superior court has the jurisdiction to deal with the objections filed under Ss. 30 and 33. [State of Jharkhand v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 602]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 5 Rr. 20(1) & (1-A) and 17 — Service of summons — Substituted service: Substituted service under Or. 5 R. 20 of CPC is an exception to normal mode of service. For ordering substituted service under said provision, court is required to be satisfied that: (i) there is reason to believe that defendant is keeping out of the way for purpose of avoiding service, or (ii) for any other reason, the summons cannot be served in ordinary way. Thus, while making that order, court must apply its mind to requirements under Or. 5 R. 20 of CPC and indicate in its order due consideration of provisions contained in Or. 5 R. 20. [Neerja Realtors (P) Ltd. v. Janglu, (2018) 2 SCC 649]

Constitution of India — Art. 51-A(a) and Preamble — Duty to show respect to national symbols i.e. National Flag and National Anthem: When National Anthem is played or sung, due respect as salutation to motherland should be shown by standing up and proper decorum should be maintained, except where a person is differently abled. It is now not mandatory to play National Anthem before starting of film but if National Anthem is played in cinema halls prior to showing of films, it is mandatory for audience to stand up in respect. However, if National Anthem is played as part of storyline of a feature film or newsreel or documentary, audience need not stand up. [Shyam Narayan Chouksey v. Union of India, (2018) 2 SCC 574]

Constitution of India — Arts. 51-A(g), 51-A(h), 14, 21, 29, 48 and Sch. VII List III Entry 17: Issue in these petitions is that whether Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 2017, which received Presidential assent on 31-1-2017, is valid and enjoys constitutional protection? Whether defects pointed out in earlier judgments in A. Nagaraja, (2014) 7 SCC 547 and Animal Welfare Board, (2017) 2 SCC 144, can be said to have been removed? In an earlier judgment and review petition filed thereagainst Jallikattu festival was banned as unconstitutional. Hence, matter referred to Constitution Bench. [Animal Welfare Board of India v. Union of India, (2018) 2 SCC 645]

Consumer Protection Act, 1986 — Ss. 12, 13, 14, 22 and 22-C — Request for hearing before Circuit Bench of National Commission — Proper disposal of: Appellants received notice from National Commission and, thereafter, reply was sent on 25-7-2014 praying that matter may be heard in Camp Sitting of National Commission at Bengaluru. Ex parte order passed by National Commission in present cases, based on compromise made by appellant with another consumer, not proper. Copies of orders passed on record does not show that appellants were ever informed that their request for having matter heard at Bengaluru was either accepted or rejected. Therefore, National Commission erred in not issuing fresh notice to appellants. Order of National Commission set aside and matter remitted to it for hearing same on merits. [Mangalam Homes & Resorts (P) Ltd. v. Joy Kaliyavumkal, (2018) 2 SCC 636]

Education Law — Allotment of seats/Counselling for reserved category students/Vacancies/Dereservation — Admission to medical courses: Meritorious Reserved Candidate (MRC) who is treated as general category candidate, may opt for reserved category seat to gain admission in college of his preference. However, for computing percentage of reservation such MRC will be deemed to have been admitted as open category candidate i.e. there is no migration in reserved category. Consequently, one reserved category candidate would be adjusted against the one general category seat vacated by such MRC in lieu of one reserved category seat taken up by MRC. Thus, reservations will not exceed 50%. [Tripurari Sharan v. Ranjit Kumar Yadav, (2018) 2 SCC 656]

Education Law — Medical and Dental Colleges — Affiliation/Recognition — Renewal of — 4th Renewal (fifth batch of MBBS course) for academic year 2017-2018: As there was deficiency of faculty and residence exceeding 5% during surprise inspection, order of Central Government rejecting renewal for academic year 2017-2018, not interfered with. Bank guarantee deposited should be used while considering renewal for next academic year. [IQ City Foundation v. Union of India, (2018) 2 SCC 593]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Ss. 8 and 9 — Demand notice through Advocate — Validity of: Had the legislature wished to restrict the demand notice being sent by the operational creditor himself, the expression used would perhaps have been “issued” and not “delivered” and that delivery, therefore, would postulate that such notice could be made by an authorised agent. Further, the requirement of appending signatures of persons “authorised to act” on behalf of the operational creditor in the demand notice as well as the application under S. 9 of 2016 Code in terms of Form 3 and 5 of Rules also reflects similar understanding of the draftsman of the Adjudicatory Authority Rules. Also, on a conjoint reading of S. 30 of the Advocates Act, 1961 dealing with the fundamental right under Art. 19(1)(g) of the Constitution to practice one’s profession and Ss. 8 and 9 of 2016 Code together with the Adjudicatory Authority Rules and Forms, such notice sent on behalf of an operational creditor by Advocate, held, is valid. [Macquarie Bank Ltd. v. Shilpi Cable Technologies Ltd., (2018) 2 SCC 674]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Ss. 16, 17, 23 and 48 — Incapacity of State to entertain claim for reconveyance of acquired land on any ground whatsoever to original owner after it has vested in State: Reiterating and following V. Chandrasekaran, (2012) 12 SCC 133 and Natural Resources Allocation, In re, (2012) 10 SCC 1, it was held, High Court was justified in holding that regrant of land is not permissible. It is a different matter if there is policy for rehabilitation for persons displaced by land acquisition, in case such persons are rendered landless. If land acquired for public purpose is no longer needed for such purpose, State can transfer such land but such disposal is regulated by doctrine of public trust. Thus, apart from appellants having not been found entitled to regrant of acquired land, regrant policy itself is against Art. 14 of the Constitution. Disposal of property vested in State can only be in manner consistent with Art. 14 of Constitution of India. [Mansukhbhai Dhamjibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 2 SCC 642]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Ss. 23, 18 and 54 — Compensation — Computation of — Land with fruit trees: According to respondent owner, 396 fruit trees were standing on acquired land they were of orange 28, peach 76, mausambi 135 and mango 157. Collector awarded total compensation of Rs 37,321.12 including 30% solatium and 12% increase in respect of such fruit trees. Expert examined by Respondent owner, reported total value of all trees as Rs 6,35,114.70 with certain other factors such as distance of land from town, etc., also found fruit trees to be of “B” category. Respondent in his deposition stated about 250 fruit trees including amrood, orange and mango, all about 4 to 5 yrs old. Patwari examined on behalf of appellant State deposed that in 1985-1986, wheat and other crops were sown and subsequently word orchard added in land without any order from competent authority. Valuation of expert examined by State is far less than valuation provided by expert on behalf of respondents and he also stated that there was no irrigation facilities and further deposed that there could be 90 fruit trees in one killa (equal to one acre). The Supreme Court held that if, only 90 fruits trees can be planted in one killa (one acre), there could not be 250 trees or 396 trees in 7 kanals and 2 marlas of land (which is less than one acre). It is clear that High Court has overlooked certain material aspects of evidence before coming to conclusion and needs to consider entire material in proper perspective afresh. Hence, matter remitted to High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. [State of Punjab v. Thuru Ram, (2018) 2 SCC 639]

Rent Control and Eviction — Revision — Revisional jurisdiction of High Court under S. 25 of Provincial Small Cause Courts Act, 1887: Though jurisdiction of High Court under S. 25 is wider than revisional jurisdiction under S. 115 CPC but pure finding of fact based on appreciation of evidence cannot be interfered with in exercise of jurisdiction under S. 25 unless such findings are perverse or based on no material or have been arrived at by taking into consideration inadmissible evidence or without considering relevant evidence. [Trilok Singh Chauhan v. Ram Lal, (2018) 2 SCC 566]

Service Law — Pay — Pay scale — Revised pay scale — Interest: Direction to pay revised pay scale along with 12% interest, not proper. [State of U.P. v. Israr Ahmad, (2018) 2 SCC 672]

Trusts and Trustees — Religious and Charitable Endowments and Trusts — Temple — Private or public — Determination of: As extract of entry in Register of Endowments of Government, prepared by following prescribed procedure, produced on behalf of respondent Department, significant for holding suit temple as public temple, more so in view of rebuttable presumption under S. 114 Ill. (e) of Evidence Act but in view of oral evidence adduced by parties being equally balanced; persistent stand of appellants, countering respondents’ claim, that their father (deceased) had not endowed suit premises to render suit temple as public temple and that they had not received any notice from Endowments Department in connection therewith and attending facts and circumstances, held, parties should be granted an opportunity to adduce all evidence for final and conclusive decision. Accordingly, appellants directed to file representation before authority concerned in support of their claim that suit temple and its premises are their private property. [Vijendra Kumar v. A.P. Charitable & Religious Institutions & Endowment Dept., (2018) 2 SCC 555]

U.P. Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1953 (5 of 1954) — Ss. 9-A, 11, 45 and 48 — Ascertainment of possession: Authorities could not have made entries in favour of appellant objectors without giving public notice and without giving notice to legal heirs of deceased. Hence, High Court was justified in holding that revenue authorities ascertained possession without giving public notice. However, High Court could not have issued directions to authorities to remove names of both parties. Therefore, matter remanded to revenue authorities to ascertain possession of suit lands after hearing both parties. [Jagtar Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, (2018) 2 SCC 647]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 41 Rr. 23, 23-A & 25 and Or. 5 — Remand for fresh trial on merits: As there was legal infirmity in not serving notice on all defendants, order of remand was justified. [Jayaprakash v. T.S. David, (2018) 2 SCC 294]

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Or. 6 R. 17 and Or. 7 R. 14 — Applications for amendment of pleadings and for production of documents — When may be allowed: In respect of application under Or. 6 R. 17, held, (i) when suit is still at initial stage that is when trial has not yet begun; (ii) where proposed amendment would not change nature of cause of action; (iii) where applications are not filed at belated stage; under these circumstances, courts should be liberal in allowing proposed amendment. Concerning Or. 7 R. 14 application, held, application for production of document(s) can be considered (i) when trial is at initial stage, and trial is yet to begin; and (ii) when application not filed at belated stage. [N.C. Bansal v. U.P. Financial Corpn., (2018) 2 SCC 347]

Constitution of India — Art. 226 — Habeas corpus — Custody of child — Inter-country dispute: Manner in which habeas corpus jurisdiction is to be exercised i.e. when question is one of immediate restoration of custody/ repatriation of child, as distinguished from wardship jurisdiction in which question is one of entitlement in law to custody of child, discussed. India is a non-signatory to international convention viz. Civil Aspects of International Civil Abduction. Welfare of child is predominant criterion. If considerable time has elapsed between removal of child from native country by any parent and steps taken for repatriation by writ petitioner parent, court would prefer an elaborate enquiry into all relevant aspects bearing on the child. Immediate restoration of child is called for only on an unmistakable discernment of the possibility of immediate and irremediable harm to it and not otherwise. Unless continuance of the child in the country to which it has been removed, is unquestionably harmful, when judged on the touchstone of overall perspectives, perceptions and practicabilities, it ought not to be dislodged and extricated from the environment and setting to which it had got adjusted for its well-being. [Prateek Gupta v. Shilpi Gupta, (2018) 2 SCC 309]

Consumer Protection — Consumer Forums — Generally — Inadequacy of Members/Presiding Officers, Resources and Infrastructure: As there is poor organisational set-up, grossly inadequate infrastructure, absence of adequate trained manpower, lack of transparency in selection process, absence of criteria of selection process, anomalous situation arising from service conditions of members of Consumer For a, directions were issued to frame rules by order dt. 21-11-2016 in All U.P. Consumer Protection Bar Assn., (2017) 1 SCC 444, to Union Government, State Governments and to National Commission as provided in Consumer Protection Act, 1986, reiterated. Further directions issued on 7-3-2017 after perusal of proposed Rules and Regulations, reiterated. However, in view of need for certain modifications in Rules and Regulations, which require further debate and deliberation, time granted and other directions also issued. [State of U.P. v. All U.P. Consumer Protection Bar Assn., (2018) 2 SCC 225]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 102(1): “Any property” includes any bank account creating suspicion about commission of an offence. Investigating officer (IO) in course of investigation has power to seize or prohibit operation of bank account of any person which may be found under circumstances creating suspicion of commission of any offence. Bank account need not be only of accused but can be any account creating suspicion about commission of offence. Even if name of a body/person with which accused concerned has an association (a trust in present case), is not included as accused in FIR but during investigation IO believes that persons named as accused are actively associated with that trust, and, that circumstances emerging from transaction(s) done by them from bank accounts pertaining to that trust create suspicion of commission of offence, IO can exercise his discretion to issue directions to seize those accounts. [Teesta Atul Setalvad v. State of Gujarat, (2018) 2 SCC 372]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 386 — Powers of appellate court in dealing with appeals: Principles summarised regarding powers of appellate court in dealing with appeals to direct retrial. [Issac v. Ronald Cheriyan, (2018) 2 SCC 278]

Education Law — Professional Colleges/Education — Engineering or Technical Colleges or MBA — AICTE Role and Duties — Technical education: Due to invalidation of degrees in Engineering by Court in Rabi Shankar Patro, (2018) 1 SCC 468, directions issued on clarifications of judgment regarding chance to prove merit to validate it by re-clearing Engineering exams under proper conditions. [Orissa Lift Irrigation Corpn. Ltd. v. Rabi Sankar Patro, (2018) 2 SCC 298]

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — S. 20 — Search and seizure: In this case of alleged recovery of contraband (charas) from gunny bags being carried by respondent-accused, High Court reversed conviction of respondents under S. 20. The Supreme Court held that going by number of discrepancies in prosecution case coupled with contradictory statements by prosecution witnesses, entire prosecution story is vitiated and leads to discrediting its version. Prosecution failed to establish commission of alleged offence by respondents beyond reasonable doubt. Evidence is scanty and lacking support to establish that contraband was really recovered from possession of respondents in the manner alleged by prosecution. The law, the court should follow, for awarding conviction under provisions of NDPS Act, is, “more stringent the punishment stricter the proof”. In such cases, prosecution evidence has to be examined very zealously so as to exclude every chance of false implication but, herein, prosecution story cannot be believed to award conviction to respondents. Accused deserve benefit of doubt. Therefore, reversal of conviction of respondents by High Court, confirmed. [State of H.P. v. Trilok Chand, (2018) 2 SCC 342]

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — Ss. 54, 35, 20(b)(ii)(C), 42 and 50 — Search and seizure: NDPS Act provides for a reverse burden of proof upon accused, contrary to normal rule of criminal jurisprudence for presumption of innocence unless proved guilty. This however does not dispense with requirement of prosecution to having first establish a prima facie case, only whereafter, burden will shift to accused. Mere registration of a case under NDPS Act will not ipso facto shift burden on to accused from the very inception. Compliance with statutory requirements and procedures shall have to be strict and scrutiny stringent. If there is any iota of doubt, benefit shall have to be given to accused. [Gorakh Nath Prasad v. State of Bihar, (2018) 2 SCC 305]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 306 and 498-A — Bride committed suicide by consuming rat poison: As due to harassment by husband and in-laws for not bringing dowry, bride committed suicide by consuming rat poison. High Court upheld conviction of two appellant-accused (mother-in-law and husband) under Ss. 306 and 498-A. Validity of the conviction and sentence, affirmed. [Anusuiya v. State of M.P., (2018) 2 SCC 272]

Rent Control and Eviction — Eviction Suit/Trial: In eviction suit filed by landlord, only landlord and tenant are necessary parties. Landlord is required to plead and prove only two things (i) existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between parties; and (ii) grounds of eviction mentioned under relevant rent law. When these two things proved, eviction suit succeeds. Title of landlord in eviction suit is not relevant. If landlord fails to prove his title but proves relationship of landlord and tenant, and proves existence of any ground pleaded for eviction then his suit would succeed. On the other hand, if landlord proves his title but fails to prove relationship of landlord and tenant, then his suit would fail. Plaintiff or petitioner in proceedings, being dominus litis, cannot be compelled to implead any third party to proceedings unless that third party proves that he is necessary party and without his presence suit cannot be proceed and nor can be decided effectively. If there are more than one owners to suit premises, then any one of them can file eviction suit against tenant. It is not necessary that all owners should file suit jointly. In eviction suit, question of title or extent of shares of co-owners in suit premises cannot be decided and nor can it be made subject-matter of determination. Eviction proceedings are not concerned with respective rights of co-owners. These proceedings are concerned about eviction of tenant from suit premises. [Kanaklata Das v. Naba Kumar Das, (2018) 2 SCC 352]

Service Law — Recruitment Process — Examination — Re-evaluation — Correctness of answer key — Scope of judicial review: Court can recommend preventive measures such as (i) establishing a system of moderation; (ii) avoid any ambiguity in the questions, including those that might be caused by translation; and (iii) prompt decision be taken to exclude suspect question and no marks be assigned to such question. If a statute, Rule or Regulation permits re-evaluation of an answer sheet or scrutiny of an answer sheet as a matter of right, then it must be permitted. If not, court may also permit it only if it is demonstrated very clearly, without any inferential process of reasoning or by a process of rationalisation and only in rare or exceptional cases that a material error has been committed. Onus is on candidate to demonstrate such clear and material incorrectness of answer key. Court should be extremely reluctant to substitute its own views against views of experts. Court should never take upon itself task to re-evaluate the answer sheets. Importantly, sympathy or compassion does not play any role in the matter of directing or not directing re-evaluation of an answer sheet. If an error is committed by the examination authority, the complete body of candidates suffers. The entire examination process does not deserve to be derailed only because some candidates are disappointed or dissatisfied or perceive some injustice having been caused to them by an erroneous question or an erroneous answer. All candidates suffer equally, though some might suffer more but that cannot be helped since mathematical precision is not always possible. There must be finality to results of public examination. Litigation cannot not go on for years. [Ran Vijay Singh v. State of U.P., (2018) 2 SCC 357]

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — S. 21 — Compensation in lieu of specific performance: Vendee under agreement to sell entitled to compensation in lieu of specific performance, where agreement to sell of immovable property becoming incapable of being performed due to acquisition of that property by Government under LA Act, 1894 paid by State for acquisition. [Urmila Devi v. Mandir Shree Chamunda Devi, (2018) 2 SCC 284]

Town Planning — Slum Rehabilitation/Development — Slum rehabilitation scheme: Due to inordinate delay in completion of Scheme, despite change of developer by SRA, change in scheme and building norms, builder gaining advantage of higher Floor Space Index (FSI), replacement of developer directed in terms below. SRA directed to invite, through advertisement, letters of intent from renowned builders/developers, who have capacity and experience to take up such a large project. Manner of advertisement, also stated. SRA also directed to take a bank guarantee of Rs 200 crores from successful builder. Developers/builders should indicate what benefit in kind or portion of their own free sale area they are prepared to part with for society of slumdwellers as slum-dwellers are owners of land. [Susme Builders (P) Ltd. v. Slum Rehabilitation Authority, (2018) 2 SCC 230]

Cases ReportedSupreme Court Cases

Armed Forces — Promotion — Criteria/Eligibility — Change in policy — Applicability of changed policy: Benefit of gallantry awards was given to respondent for two Selection Boards when Policy in force had no restriction on number of times such benefit could be given but later Policies restricted benefit of gallantry awards to two Selection Boards, by the time respondent officer concerned came to be considered for third promotion, also, one of the earlier posts to which respondent had been promoted becoming a non-selection post, hence, as Respondent, already having been granted benefit of gallantry awards in two Selection Boards, as per the extant Policy could not be granted benefit for the third time. [Union of India v. Chander Ballabh Sharma, (2016) 4 SCC 555]

Constitution of India — Art. 14 — Allocation of property/natural resources/trade outlets: Proper mode of allocation of property/natural resources/trade outlets, is by public auction properly conducted. In this case, allotment of shed concerned for factory purposes was set aside by High Court on grounds that said allotment was made (i) without any public auction or inviting tenders, and (ii) without granting any opportunity of hearing or issuing any show-cause notice to R-1 writ petitioner in compliance with directions issued by High Court in an earlier writ petition, which was filed by appellant and decided by quashing the allotment of shed concerned made in favour of R-1. Held, that allotment in favour of appellant was made after issuing requisite notices to R-1 and affording adequate opportunity to it. Hence, view taken by High Court that no opportunity was given to R-1, was wrong. However, observation made by High Court that the allotment order was issued without any public auction or inviting tenders and as such the same was unsustainable, held, was absolutely correct. Thus, authorities directed to conduct public auction or invite tenders for allotment of shed concerned at present market value. [Metal Seams Co. of India (P) Ltd. v. Avadh Delicacies, (2016) 4 SCC 564]

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — S. 154 — Delay in lodging/filing FIR — Explanation by prosecution for — Need of: Delay in setting law into motion by lodging of complaint and registration of FIR is normally viewed by courts with suspicion because there is possibility of concoction and embellishment of the occurrence. So it becomes necessary for prosecution to satisfactorily explain the delay. Object of insisting upon a prompt lodging of report, is to obtain early information not only regarding assailants but also about part played by accused, nature of incident and names of witnesses. [Gajanan Dashrath Kharate v. State of Maharashtra, (2016) 4 SCC 604]

Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 1984 — Regns. 12, 13 and 14 — Revocation of licence: Tribunal can dislodge or confirm or modify order of competent authority in appeal. However, when a jurisdiction is exercised, it has to be exercised in accordance with law, regard being had to the factual matrix of the case. Enquiry officer had held that misconduct alleged against respondent that it had allowed unauthorised persons to handle shipping bills stood proved, and accordingly had opined that articles of charge under Regns. 12, 13(b), 13(d), 20(1)(c), 13(n) of Customs House Agents Licensing Regulations, 2004 were established. Enquiry report which formed plinth of order of Commissioner demonstrated that by virtue of transfer of licence in contravention of Regulations, on many an occasion, immense financial loss has been caused to Revenue. Hence, in the present case, discretion exercised by the Tribunal showing leniency and holding that revocation for a period of three years from the date of suspension of licence would be sufficient, held to be inappropriate. [Commr. of Customs v. K.M. Ganatra & Co., (2016) 4 SCC 687]

Employees’ State Insurance Act, 1948 — S. 2(9) — “Employee” — Scope: Definition of “employee” is very wide and includes persons employed for wages in factory or establishment, on any work of, or incidental or preliminary to or connected with work. Thus, casual employees engaged on race days for issue of tickets in Racecourse/Turf Club and employed for part of wage period, are “employees” coming within preview of ESI Act. [Royal Western India Turf Club Ltd. v. Employees’ State Insurance Corpn., (2016) 4 SCC 521]

Excise — Valuation — Receipt of advance payments from buyer — Effect of, on determination of transaction value of goods: Onus is on Revenue to establish by adducing cogent material evidence that advances obtained from a buyer had really been instrumental in depression of sale price. Furthermore, inclusion of notional interest in the assessable value will depend upon the facts of each case. [CCE v. Hindustan National Glass & Industries Ltd., (2016) 4 SCC 675]

Family and Personal Laws — Muslim Law — Gift — Hiba-bil-musha: A hiba of an undivided share in property which is capable of division is invalid. Exceptions to the rule are: where the gift is made by one co-heir to the other; where the gift is of share in a zamindari or taluka; where gift is of a share in freehold property in a large commercial town, and where gift is of share in a land company. While gift of immovable property is not complete unless the donor parts with the possession and donee enters into possession but if the property is in occupation of tenants, gift can be completed by delivery of title deed or by request to tenants to attorn to the donee or by mutation. Gift of property which is capable of division is irregular but can be perfected and rendered valid by subsequent partition or delivery. [Khursida Begum v. Mohd. Farooq, (2016) 4 SCC 549]

Infrastructure Laws — Energy and Power — Electricity — Unauthorised use: As per Cl. 16.5 of Tariff Noti. dt. 21-6-1993, if during any month in a financial year the actual maximum demand of a consumer exceeded 110 per cent of the contract demand then the highest demand so recorded had to be treated as the contract demand for that financial year and the minimum base charges, both in respect of maximum demand and energy charge had to be paid on that basis. Respondent unit had entered into an agreement with appellant Board for a contract demand of 500 kVA and as per reading recorded by maximum demand indicator (MDI) meter, for six months during April 1999 to March 2000 the maximum demand of respondent had increased beyond the contracted load of 500 kVA which was more than 110% of the contract load, thus, the connected load exceeded 500 kVA. Hence, the denial of benefit of exemption from payment of minimum guarantee charges to respondent unit by appellant Board, was proper. Amount demanded from respondent by appellant Board for the year 1999-2000 as per the tariff notification concerned, was legal and valid. [Bihar SEB v. Bhola Ram Steel (P) Ltd., (2016) 4 SCC 680]

Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Ss. 25 and 23 — Effect of amendment by Act 68 of 1984 w.e.f. 24-9-1984 — S. 4 Notification issued on 19-9-1983: Prior to Amendment Act 68 of 1984, amount of compensation that could be awarded by court was limited to amount claimed by applicant but now S. 25 as amended coming into effect on 24-9-1984 stipulates that amount of compensation awarded by court is not to be lower than amount awarded by Collector under S. 11. Cap on maximum having been expressly omitted, and cap that is put is only on minimum, it is clear that amount of compensation that a court can award is no longer restricted to amount claimed by applicant. Duty of court is to award just and fair compensation taking into consideration true market value and other relevant factors, irrespective of claim made by owner. [Ashok Kumar v. State of Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 544]

Mines and Minerals — Minor minerals: New procedure of grant of mining leases only by e-tendering in State of U.P. as per Government of U.P. Order dt. 31-5-2012 confirmed by High Court in Nar Narain Mishra, 2013 SCC OnLine All 13919, hence, impugned order of High Court quashing mining lease of appellants granted in violation of said new policy, affirmed. [Sulekhan Singh & Co. v. State of U.P., (2016) 4 SCC 663]

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 — S. 18 — Recovery of 1 kg of opium: As the search of appellant was conducted in presence of and under the instructions of a gazetted officer, it was not SI alone who was involved in the investigation, hence, there was no reason to differ from the view taken by High Court that appellant was guilty under S. 18 for being in possession of 1 kg of opium. [Surender v. State of Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 617]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 193 — Perjury: Merely because an expert has tendered an opinion while also furnishing the basis of the opinion and that too without being conclusive and definite, it cannot be said that he has committed perjury so as to help somebody. And, mere rejection of the expert evidence by itself may not also warrant initiation of proceedings under Section 340 CrPC. [Prem Sagar Manocha v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2016) 4 SCC 571]

Penal Code, 1860 — S. 302 — Murder of wife by strangulation: Conviction for murder of wife by strangulation, restored, on the basis of circumstantial evidence, as motive, and strangulation by medical evidence, established.  [State of A.P. v. Patchimala Vigneswarudu, (2016) 4 SCC 611]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 120-B and 302/149 and Ss. 143, 147, 148, 341 and 109: Proof of conspiracy is strictly conditional upon there being reasonable grounds to believe that two or more persons had conspired together to commit an offence. There was no cogent or positive evidence to prove conspiracy to murder in present case and no evidence was produced to link recovery of mobile phone to any accused. Besides, not identifying actual number of assailants was a major lacuna hitting root of prosecution case and material alterations were discernible in testimonies of all witnesses. Hence, acquittal confirmed. [B. Virupakshaiah v. State of Karnataka, (2016) 4 SCC 595]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 301 and 300 Firstly [S. 302 or S. 304 Pt. I] — Transfer of malice: Conviction and sentence passed by trial court under S. 302 IPC, restored as High Court in converting conviction from S. 302 to S. 304 Pt. I has failed to take into consideration doctrine of transfer of malice as provided in S. 301 IPC. Intention on the part of respondent-accused in causing bodily injury as is likely to cause death was not a disputed fact. It cannot be believed that respondent did not know about likelihood of causing death, though, he may not know as to whom he is causing bodily harm, but his act clearly attracts ingredients of S. 300 IPC. [State of Rajasthan v. Ram Kailash, (2016) 4 SCC 590]

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302 and 323 r/w S. 34 — Murder — Dying declaration — Reliability: A valid dying declaration may be made without obtaining a certificate of fitness of declarant by a medical officer. [Gulzari Lal v. State of Haryana, (2016) 4 SCC 583]

Punjab Utilisation of Land and Allotment of Plots and Improvement Trust Rules, 1975 — R. 7(ii): “Local displaced person” is a person who is owner of a property for a continuous period of two years immediately before first publication of Scheme by Trust under S. 36 of Punjab Town Improvement Act, 1922 and whose land is acquired by Trust for execution of a scheme. It cannot be held that once landowner is allotted lands as per Rules as a local displaced person, thereafter even if more of his property is acquired at a subsequent stage or at a different place, he will not be a local displaced person. Local displaced person has to be understood with reference to acquisition concerned. [Jaidev Inder Singh v. Amritsar Improvement Trust, (2016) 4 SCC 599]

Service Law — Appointment — Judicial review/Validity of appointment: As R-1, in-service candidate who challenged appointment of appellant, direct recruit, to post of clerk on ground that single post of clerk ought to be filled by promotion in terms of Regulations (i) is retiring during pendency of proceedings; (ii) there is no in-service candidate other than respondent claiming candidature for said post; (iii) appellant working continuously on said post for last 36 years and duly qualified; (iv) no prejudice caused to anyone in case appellant allowed to continue on the post, hence, it is directed that appellant be allowed to continue on post of clerk until his retirement. Further directed that on appellant demitting office, post in question be filled by promoting suitable in-service candidate as per rules and in case number of posts have increased then as per applicable norms. [Sanjay Kumar Upadhyay v. Palak Dhari Yadav, (2016) 4 SCC 621]

Tenancy and Land Laws — Ceiling on Land — Determination of excess area — Clerical mistakes in identification of the land concerned: Adherence to statutory mandates and procedures, is mandatory for substitution of plots already notified as ceiling surplus, by other non-notified plots to correct purported clerical mistakes. Non-compliance therewith, would make such corrections illegal. Substituting plots simply by issuing handwritten corrigendum, illegal and impermissible even if it is a correction of clerical mistake. [Vipinchandra Vadilal Bavishi v. State of Gujarat, (2016) 4 SCC 531]

Town Planning — Illegal/Unauthorised Constructions/Development/Encroachment: Eviction notice by Municipality to small shops on the side of road/State Highway leading to Shirdi Shrine in violation of town plan and statutory mandates, affirmed, and Government directed to provide alternative land in the vicinity or in alternative to pay compensation of Rs 20 lakhs and Rs 15 lakhs to big and small shops, respectively. [Sayyed Ratanbhai Sayeed v. Shirdi Nagar Panchayat, (2016) 4 SCC 631]

Law School NewsLive Blogging

The 1st P.A.Inamdar International Moot Court Competition organized by CNLU, Patna in collaboration with MCE Society’s A.K.K.New Law Academy, Pune, witnessed the enthusiastic participation from 33 esteemed law universities across the nation. These teams would be competing in the 3-day long event, starting from the 1st of April till the 3rd of April, which looks to be extremely promising and competitive from the enthusiasm displayed by all the participants and organizers at the inaugural ceremony. This inaugural ceremony was attended by all the students, teaching and non-teaching staff of CNLU, and the participating teams. The draw of lots, determining which team would go up against which teams in the rounds of oral arguments from 10 a.m. on 2nd of April, 2016, followed the inaugural ceremony.

The inaugural ceremony was graced by the august presence of Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Kumar Tripathi, High Court of Judicature of Patna at Patna and Shri P.K.Shahi, Advocate General and former Education Minister of the Govt. of Bihar. The ceremony started with the floral welcome to Shri P.K.Shahi by Ms. Shaista Peerzada, member of MCE Society, and to Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Kumar Tripathi by Mr. Kumar Gaurav, faculty of CNLU. Prof A. Lakshminath, Hon’ble V.C. of CNLU, delivered the welcome address, which was filled with much encouragement for participants and organizers alike. He highlighted the importance of mooting in the path of excelling in the profession of law. Aarush and Mallika, excelled in their task of being the anchors of the ceremony with the much required grace and poise. Ms Nandita S.Jha, the moot co-ordinator who has been extremely instrumental in the organization of the competition, welcomed the teams and shed light on significance of mooting.

We are proud to host the following Teams-

1. Alliance School of Law, Alliance University
2. Amity Law School, Amity University, Lucknow (AUUP)
3. Amity Law School, Noida
4. Army Institute of Law
5. Central University of South Bihar, Gaya
6. Delhi Metropolitan education (GGSIU)
7. DSNLU, Vishakhapatnam
8. Faculty of Law, Allahabad University
9. Faculty of Law, Aligarh Muslim University
10. Faculty of Law, Banaras Hindu University
11. Faculty of Law, Law Centre , Delhi university
12. Faculty of Law, Lucknow University
13. GNLU, Gandhinagar
14. Government Law College, Mumbai
15. ICFAI Dehradun
16. IMS Unison School of Law, Dehradun
17. Indian Institute of Legal Studies Siliguri
18. JEMTEC Schhol of Law, Noida
19. KLE Societies’s Law College, Bangalore
20. M.S. Rammaiyah Law College, Banagalore
21. NEW Law College, BhartiyaVidyapeeth, Pune
22. NLIU Bhopal
23. NUSRL Ranchi
24. R.L.LAW COLLEGE BELGAVI
25. Raffles University, Neemrana (Rajasthan)
26. RGNUL Patiala
27. RMLNLU, Lucknow
28. School of Excellence in Law, Tamil Nadu
29. School of Law KIIT University, Bhubaneswar
30. Seedling School of Law, Jaipur
31. Unity Degree College
32. University Institute of Legal Studies, Chandigarh
33. UPES , Dehradun

We are live now! The teams are battling it out in the Preliminary Rounds.

  • In Court Room No. 4, UILS, Chandigarh met with a rough start where the  judges grilled the first speaker from the petitioners side  on greetings only ,in court room no. 3 during the 1st preliminary round the petitioner’s cited the yogyakarta convention to which Malp is only a signatory and thus the judges refused to hear any further arguments based on the convention, the respondent equated Palshtia with Islam and the judge questioned the knowledge of the counsel about the various religions around the world.The counsel cited a judgement of the Odissa High Court and was arguing on the  facts only which did not go well down with the judges. In court rooom no. 1 during prelium round 1 the second speaker of side petitioner was not aware of doctrine of nexus.
  • In court room no. 1 the rebuttals from one of the sides were based on a arguments which were never raised in the oral submissions the judges looked baffled and the same was pointed out to the team later.
  • According to the blogging team room no. 6 was the most interesting bench of judges who shook the confidence of the counsel pleading before them.They made the counsel on the side petitioner to quote Constitution of India and then grilled them on how in the territory of Malp was the Indian Constitution applicable.initially when the side petitioner brought up the maintainability of the writ , they were asked to prove where the side respondent had challenged the maintainability and if not then why was it being raised .The respondent side in the same room were ignorant about the terms class legislature and intelligible differentia.
  • In court room no 5 the judges came down heavily on the respondent on the deficiency of the MEB and was on the verge of outrightly rejecting the further submissions of the council  calling it an outright violation of minority rights .
  • By the second preliminary round the judges gained momentum which proved to be deadly for the teams .Be it jurisdiction ,LGBT rights or the Naaz foundation case  the teams were grilled and roasted on questions of law and facts.The first speaker from NLIU Bhopal from side respondent could not satisfy the judge’s queries within the prescribed time limit.

BLOGGING TEAM IS HUNGRYYY!!! WE’LL BE BACK AT 3 SHARP (HOPEFULLY) WITH THE BREAKS.

STAY TUNED.

MAY THE FORCE BE WITH YOU!

 HERE IT IS GUYS

HE IS NO LAWYER WHO CANNOT TAKE TWO SIDES!

 HERE ARE THE  TEAMS  QUALIFIED FOR THE QUARTERFINALS:

  1. SCHOOL OF LAW, KIIT UNIVERSITY
  2. IILS ,SILIGURI
  3. RAFFLES UNIVERSITY
  4. UILS , CHANDIGARH
  5. ARMY INSTITUTE  OF LAW , MOHALI
  6. NLIU , BHOPAL
  7. UPES , DEHRADUN
  8. GLC, MUMBAI

HEY GUYS,

TILL THE TEAMS ARE GETTING READY FOR THE QUARTERS WE WOULD LOVE TO ANNOUNCE THE PRIZES:

WINNERS:Rs 15000

RUNNERS UP :Rs 10000

BEST MEMORIAL: Rs 7500

2nd BEST MEMORIAL: Rs 5000

BEST SPEAKER : Rs 7500

2nd BEST SPEAKER : Rs 5000

4.08 pm: In court room no. 4 ground for challenging the circular was being questioned to shake the confidence of the counsel. Counsel made a blunder calling legislature as legislation and thus dug a pit for itself.judges smiling for counsel’s ignorance.

4.12 pm: Judges yet to arrive in the court room 5 LETHARGY PREVAILS!

4.15 pm:In court room no 3, heat rising, judges push the counsel to the backfoot asking them why supreme court and not the high court .counsel trying to plead ignorance,judges not accepting the same. PIL under question .

4.18 pm: In court room no. 6, the judges asking the counsel why it should accept foreign cases.the judge asserts that 3rd gender will only be transgender.

4.18 pm: In court room no. 3 hearing of second counsel  begins.court roo no. 5 stiil waiting for the judge.

4.20 pm: Constitutional morality being questioned by the judges .the answer is satisfactory.

4.22 pm: In court room no. 6 the judge asks how is sexual orientation analogous to the word sex.

4.23 pm: In court room no. 4  to be or not to be is the question.

4.27 pm: Relief for court room no. 5 Finally the judges arrive,browsing through the memos of the counsel.in court room no6. the judges confuse the counsel between ICCPR and ICSCR seems like a turning point in the argument.

4.28 pm: In court room no 6. counsel a little nervous as judges say it is the work of legislature and not judiciary to include sexual orientation into sex.

4.30 pm: Judges comment enough compassion shown by the institution as Mrs x is allowed to continue as a student in court room no. 6

4.31 pm: In court room 4, the judges comment that nothing which is submitted by the counsel is either persuasive or binding.

4.32 pm: In court room no. 5 the judges love their sandwiches grilled, not allowing the counsel to proceed with further issues

4.34 pm: In court room no 6 the judge is questioning the locus standi of the PIL .Principle of natural justice forms one part of the argument by the counsel.

4.35 pm: In court room no. 6 the judges ask how this religion is compared to islam.the judges demand in court room no. 5 if the counsel is aware of the facts .

4.36 pm: Court room no. 3, misleading might be injurious to your case.

4.39 pm: in court room no. 3 the counsel is unaware of the facts of the case.

4.40 pm: In court room no. 5 judges ask the counsel if legal righ is being violated by denying her hostel rights.the judges dont seem to adhere with the idea of justice. BICHARE BACCHE!!

4.44 pm: 1st speaker from NLIU takes the dias to present his arguments.

4.46 pm: In court rooom no. 5, our sponsor is under question- P. A.  Inamdar vs State of Maharashta.judge asks the counsel to present the copy of the judgement.minority colleges have a qualified right to protect their belief judges say.

4.48 pm: In room no. 5 the judges ask the counsel to be Buddha and enlighten the counsel with their immense knowledge.meanwhile who wants grilled counsels ,OH ! i meant sandwiches!!!

4.50 pm: In court room no. 4 , it took time because the person coordinating was lovestruck.

4.59 pm: Judges ask will the people be asked to sit naked later in the examination .

5.00 pm: In court room no. 5 the judges call for FIR and the copy of judgement s of 2008 4 SCC. counsel quoting Jeremey Bentham.

5.01 pm: In court room no 4 the principle of Audi Alterem Partem is violated.

5.04 pm: Counsel fails to distinguish between beef ban and hijab ban thereby inviting wrath of the judges.in court room no. 4 the judges warn the counsel of not to be elective and selective of facts.

5.05 pm: In court room no. 5,the judges seem to not accept the arguments. the counsel may just cry. koi paani pilao use.

5.10 pm: The counsel is ready  to strip down people if it is to curb cheating.SAVE YOURSELF PEOPLE!!!

5.11 pm: Shia Sunni  concept being involved in   room no. 6.

5.15 pm: Counsel exhausted ,asks for water.Judges doubly charged

5.20 pm: AND ITS TIME TO PRAY GUYS!!!

5.21 pm: Our convenor is charged now!

5.29 pm: Our fallen comrade is back in action in room no. 5.

5.30 pm: The timer clearly does not want the moot to continue ,shows the time up placard. This moot is turning to be a daily soap.

5.32 pm: Its been a long time in the mot and the counsel is still proving the maintainability and the locus standi. Counsel confused between the high court and supreme court. GOD SAVE THE JUDGES FROM COUNSEL OR WAIT……VICE VERSA

5.44 pm: The counsel raises the point of nexus. Wanted to hear it from so long.

5.45 pm: The round finally comes to an end!!!

So, after a long scintillating grilling rounds the names of the four ready to eat grilled cheese smoked sandwiches are below

 HERE ARE THE  TEAMS  QUALIFIED FOR THE SEMIFINALS:

  1. SCHOOL OF LAW, KIIT UNIVERSITY
  2. UILS , CHANDIGARH
  3. ARMY INSTITUTE  OF LAW , MOHALI
  4. NLIU , BHOPAL

GOOD MORNING EVERYONE!

We are back! With all the preparations for the semis and final rounds going on, with all the anticipation on the faces of the participants, this day surely is going to be the most competitive one!

We would begin with the live updates as soon as the rounds begin! Stay tuned in to support your teams!

So the proceedings have begun!

11.20 a.m.:In Court Room No. 4, counsel starts by trying to dodge the questions of the judges on Art 25 and presenting a considerable number of commentaries to prove her point on Art 32.

11.21 a.m.:The judges seem to be happy this morning! Thety are patiently listening to the counsel but the counsel’s confidence is a bit shaken when it came to the application of intelligible differentia.

11.22 a.m.: A good day for the petititoners in Court Room 3! The judges are quite satisfied with the arguments! Let’s see how well the counsel manages to tackle the questions of law and facts that are being thrown at by the judges!

11.25 a.m.: Not that a happy day for the counsel in Court Room No. 5 because the judges are posing to be extremely orthodox and making things not-so-easy for the counsel!

Court Room No. 4: TERROR RULES!

11.29 a.m.: Judges is court room no 3 are real patient listeners and have finished listening to the counsel! We hop the co-counsel is also shown equal compassion!

11.35: A real good day for petitioners in Court Room no.3! The co-counsel is also presenting her arguments beautifully without any interruption from the judges.

11.43: An unusual happening in Court Room No. 4! The co-counsel who looked pretty confident while approaching the dais is stating the jurisdiction and facts of the case!

The judges for the semi finals are senior advocates of the Patna High Court, Additional Solicitor General of Patna High Court and District judges of Patna and Vaishali.

11. 53 a.m.: Judges in Court Room No. 4 are very energetic! The counsel is being bombarded with questions from the bench!

12.03 P.M.: Real trouble for petitioners in Court room no. 4! The definition of lesbians given by them did not go very well with the judges! The move which was intended to be smart has actually backfired!

12.05 P.M. Lethargy in the court Room No. 4 has forced us to send our veteran on to it. No grilling , pretty boring.

12.13 P.M. Finally some energy in court room-4. Second counsel hilariously starts pleading.

12.14 P.M. Petitioners summed up their pleading with the prayer but soon it is interrupted; judges just can’t keep it to themselves.

12.19 P.M. Judges put questions over Intelligible diffrentia.  It seems that judges are back in action.

12.21 P.M. The smiles that judges just passed is unnerving cause people are unaware if they went like Okay! you are screwed or Okay! You are taken !!!

12.23 P.M. In court room 3.  Validity of order by the university is put to question.

12.25 P.M. In court room 3 judges ask if there was furtherance of her lesbian character.

12.30 P.M. Counsel brings up matter of personal vendetta! (Okay!! a bit exaggerated!!) Judges reject.

12.31 P.M. In court room 3 judges ask to “enlighten” them on the idea of discrimination.

12.32 P.M. Court room 4 the respondent’s counsel is shocked as the judges out rightly reject the argument. Do you need a doctor for the attack ?!!

12.34 P.M. Court room 3 judges asked why is the counsel advocating only one party as the minority.

12.35 P.M. Judges try  to roast sometimes…..enough grilling has been done!

12.36 P.M. Sur rebuttals going on !

12.37 P.M. These smart phones wont allow our comrades to stay put! Court room 3 a fall back!

12.44P.M. Judges ask the respondents to forget about the petitioner and advocate the minority as a whole!

12.50 P.M. Judges are steaming the counsel for their lapses and forcing them to plead ignorance.

12. 51 P.M. Judges proved that a lawyer with a brief case can rob more than armed robbers.

12. 58  P.M Judges : Its not the counsel’s job to deal with law and order rather counsel should focus on public order which falls under its domain.

1.45 p.m Goodness gracious me! That was some real intense argumentation that took place in Court room No.4!  The proceedings have come to an end now. The judges even refused to patiently listen to teams during rebuttals. However, the teams have successfully managed to keep their calm and finish what they started;But I am being asked to praise the teams as they pleaded long enough to loose cool on us and we do fear beatings.

UNDERSTAND THIS WE ARE VERY DEDICATED LOT BUT WE GO HUNGARY(NOT THE COUNTRY) SOMETIMES NEED OUR BREAK SO WILL SEE U PEOPLE AFTER LUNCH WITH RESULTS.

THE RESULTS ARE HERE, PEOPLE!

The finals would see UILS CHANDIGARH and NLIU BHOPAL battle it out!

STAY TUNED FOR MORE!

3.43 pm

The judges have arrived . the first counsel proceeds with the facts and the arguments and it seems that the temperature is rising.

3.47pm

The judges seem engrossed in the arguments advanced . the judges are grilling them on the cases cited , but the counsel easily escapes . article 13 is being used to defend the argument.

3.49pm

The judges are going through the constitution and the rights of the minorities and clarification of this is being argued.the counsel takes a stand on the test of arbritrariness

3.52pm

Para 18  of the statement of facts clearly states that state of malp acccepts LGBT cited by the counsel.

3.53pm

Misuse of article 31 is being raised and the right to maladministration is being argued upon by the counsel

3.55pm

A case is being cited by the counsel which does not relate to the arguments raised,meanwhile the judges are discussing among  them.now judges look in a mood to grill them bombarding them with questions like how do you compare human dignity with lesbianism.

3.57pm

The counsel pleads the Nalsa judgement but it seems that they are helpless because the judges are unwilling to accept it.

4.00pm

Everybody seems so engrossed in the arguments ,meanwhile the judges ask the counsel to wind up.

4.05pm

The second counsel approaches the dias  .it seems that judges are not pleaased in being addressed as you lordship and hence they have requested the counsel to address the bench with your honour.Laughter prevails in the room.

4.06pm

The concept of burqha is being questioned by the judges.judges seem inquisitive that whether the client will wear the burqha before the doctor.The essential religious practice is in question.At this point the counsel seems to satisfy the inquisitiveness of the judge.

4.13pm

the judges seem to discuss among themselves .

4.15pm

the contention put forth by the counsel relates to the rights of the individual and the society.

Here we are with the results but first something else

The last day of the 1st P.A. Inamdar International Moot Court Competition 2016,  based on rights of minorities as well as rights of LGBT community, started with the semi-final rounds wherein UILS Chandigarh were up against KIIT University parallel to the  AIL, Mohali vs. NLIU Bhopal. The semi-finals were adjudicated by Mr.S.D. Sanjay, Additional General of Patna High Court. Mr. B.N. Pandey, Registrar, vigilance, Patna High Court, Mr. A.K. Upadhayay, Standing Counsel, Patna High Court, Sri Om Prakash, member, Bihar State legal services Authority, Mr. Birendra Kumar, District judge of Patna and Mr. A.K. Jain, District Judge of Vaishali. After a round of intense argumentation, UILS Chandigarh and NLIU Bhopal qualified for the final. The final Round was adjudicated by Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sudhir Singh, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Ajay Kumar Tripathi, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Mr. Hemant Gupta, Hon’ble Mr. Justice Navaniti Prasad Singh, Hon’ble Mr.Justice Ahsanuddin Ammanullah, the Hon’ble judges of Patna High Court. Hon’ble Justice Mr. A K Trivedi and  Hon’ble Justice Mr. R. K. Mishra were also sitting in the audience.

The three daylong event came to an end with the valedictory ceremony which was presided by acting CJ of Patna High Court Hon’ble Mr. Justice Iqbal Ahmed Ansari. The valedictory ceremony started with the presentation of bouquet by miss Juhi Tiwari student of CNLU, and to Dr. Rashid Sheikh by Mr. Ravi Ranjan, Faculty CNLU. Prof. A. Lakshminath, Hon’ble V.C. CNLU, delivered the welcome address and appreciated the efforts of the organizers and healthy competitive spirits of the participants. The anchors of the ceremony, Harshit and Anubhuti gave a briefing of the competition and about Mr. P.A. Inamdar, President of M.C.E. society Pune. The chief guest address was given by Justice Ansari where he stressed upon the need of competitions like this and explained why mooting is an integral part of acquiring legal acumen. The Hon’ble Justice also emphasised on how mooting helps an aspiring advocate to develop his lawyering skills from a very young stage of his career. The much awaited results of the winners were announced by Ms. Nandita S. Jha who had played a pivotal role in organising the event. Registrar of the University Dr. S.P.Singh, proposed the vote of thanks.

Enough already now the cake the winners and not so much a winner (we meant the second and all):

  1. Winners: NLIU Bhopal
  2. Runner up: UILS Chandigarh
  3. Best Memorial: School of Law,KIIT
  4. Second best memorial:NLIU,Bhopal
  5. Best Mooter: Aarushi Pandey,UPES Dehradun
  6. Second Best Mooter: Shrishti Thakral , DSNLU Dehradun.

Like all good things this must end

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we have more we’ll be back with video for the finals though not very good as u know photography in court rooms not allowed so its a sneak peek

just for the record it is not a issue that this fun is over new friends you made will be gone because

ONLY TIME GOODBYE IS PAINFUL WHEN YOU KNOW HELLO IS NEVER COMING AGAIN

NOT A CASE WE TELL YOU LOT TO IT IS YET TO COME

WILL SEE YOU AGAIN

AS FOR OUR VERY OWN MAYURESH SHRIVASTAVA GOOD BYE AND MAY YOU HAVE A EXCELLENT LIFE AHEAD.

WITH THIS THE BLOGGING TEAM SIGNS OFF

(Oyeshee Gupta

Shirish Chandra

Swetank Sharma

Vaibhav Shukla

Himanshu Aggarwal

Aman Naqvi

Rishikesh Kumar

Rishika Sharma

and how can we forget Pratyush Kaushik sir)