Case BriefsHigh Courts

Delhi High Court: Brijesh Sethi, J., while stating that,

“Rape not only causes serious injury to a woman’s body, her honour and dignity and even if such an offence is settled by the offender and victim, this offence being not private in nature but has a serious impact on the society and, therefore, cannot be quashed.”;

dismissed the petition filed with respect to the quashing of FIR and the proceedings emanating therefrom.

The present petition was filed for quashing of FIR under Sections 376 and 380 of the Penal Code, 1860 and the consequential proceedings emanating therefrom.

Background of facts

Petition pleaded that respondent 2 had met the petitioner on account of a professional assignment and thereafter they kept meeting each other regularly and got romantically involved. Respondent 2 entered into a live-in relationship with the petitioner. 

An altercation took place between the petitioner and respondent 2 and the petitioner left respondent 2. Respondent 2 filed a complaint thereafter against the petitioner which culminated into the aforesaid FIR. 

The fact to be noted is that, during the course of the trial, the marriage of the petitioner and respondent 2 was solemnized. However, on account of some differences and misunderstandings, the trial proceedings continued. Upon the intervention of friends the dispute between both resolved by way of the settlement deed. 

Further, respondent 2 gave her ‘No Objection’ affidavit for quashing of the aforesaid FIR and all proceedings emanating therefrom. 

Conclusion

High Court on perusal of the facts and circumstances noted that the FIR under Sections 376 and 380 IPC was registered on the basis of the statement made by complainant/respondent 2 wherein she mentioned about her emotional, physical, mental and sexual abuses at the hands of the petitioner.

Further, the question that arose for consideration was whether the fact that the parties got married and had settled the dispute should be a reason good enough to quash the FIR registered under Section 376 and 380 IPC and consequential proceedings emanating therefrom.

In the Supreme Court decision of Parbathhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, 2017 SCC Online SC 1189, it was held that scope of power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC to quash the criminal proceedings on the basis of settlement in a heinous or serious offence is limited.

In Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab, Criminal Appeal No. 686/2014, the Supreme Court held that in respect of offences against society, it is the duty of the state to punish the offender. In consequence, deterrence provides a rationale for punishing the offender. Hence, even when there is a settlement, the view of the offender and victim will not prevail since it is in the interest of the society that the offender should be punished to deter others from committing a similar crime.

Even in the Supreme Court decision of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 Court held that the settlement in cases where nature of offence is heinous /serious like murder, rape and dacoity, the criminal proceedings cannot be quashed even if they are settled by the accused and the victim, by invoking the jurisdiction of High Court under Section 482 CrPC.

In the present case, it is the case of the respondent 2 that she was deceived by petitioner and sexual relations were established on the pretext of false promise of marriage and she was, thus, subjected to emotional, physical, mental and sexual abuse and therefore applying the ratio laid down in the above-cited cases, offence committed by petitioner clearly falls under the category of heinous and serious one.

Thus, in Court’s opinion, the FIR and proceedings emanating therefrom cannot be quashed. [Ananda D.V. v. State, 2019 SCC OnLine Del 11163, decided on 14-11-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Ram Krishna Gautam, J., dismissed this Application moved under Section 482 CrPC for being devoid of merits.

Counsel for the applicant, Nabi Ullah argued that a certain amount of money was advanced to the complainants and when demanded back false accusations were leveled against him and subsequently got lodged under Sections 354, 323 and 504 of the Penal Code. Moreover, there was no injury nor any such occurrence ever occurred. Thus, this Application, under Section 482 CrPC, a prayer for the exercise of inherent power by this Court for setting aside summoning order as well as an entire criminal proceeding of complaint case, was made by the applicants.

AGA, representing the State of U.P., had opposed this Application. It was submitted that the complaint was made right as the offences occurred. There is no precedent of having a medico-legal report because the ingredient of physical assault with the complainant was there, and a complaint can be made without there being any medico-legal report.

After analyzing the submission of the parties, the Court observed that previous proceedings filed by the accused persons reveals that there were intimate relation between the parties, but because of demanding back of money, advanced, this case came to be filed. Meaning thereby, both sides were acquainted with each other, but merely taking the ground of demanding back of money advanced, the applicants cannot seek the indulgence of this Court, for the exercise of inherent power, under Section 482 of CrPC. Moreover, it is not expected from this Court to meticulously analyze evidences at this juncture, rather it is a question to be decided at the time of trial by the Trial court.

Meaning thereby this inherent power is with High Court (i) to make such order as may be necessary to give effect to any other order under this Code (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any Court (iii) or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. 

The Court observed the views in certain judgments of the Supreme Court. In State of A.P. v. Gaurishetty Mahesh, JT 2010 (6) SC 588 – While exercising jurisdiction under section 482 of the Code, the High Court would not ordinarily embark upon an enquiry whether the evidence in question is reliable or not or whether on a reasonable apprehension of it accusation would not be sustained. That is the function of the trial Judge/Court.

In Popular Muthiah v. State, (2006) 7 SCC 296 Supreme Court had observed that “High Court can exercise jurisdiction suo motu in the interest of justice. It can do so while exercising other jurisdictions such as appellate or revisional jurisdiction. No formal application for invoking inherent jurisdiction is necessary. Inherent jurisdiction can be exercised in respect of substantive as well as procedural matters. It can as well be exercised in respect of incidental or supplemental power irrespective of nature of proceedings”. [Santosh v. State of U.P., Application U/S 482 No.  31442 of 2019, decided on 21-10-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Applicant filed an application under Section 482 of Criminal Procedure Code which was contemplated by Dinesh Kumar Singh, J. where the prayer was to quash the Charges under certain Sections of Penal Code, 1860.

The applicant was charged under Sections 366, 376, 328, 506, 406 of IPC, in which the Chief Judicial Magistrate had taken cognizance. Santosh Yadav, counsel for the applicant argued that the accused was falsely implicated by the respondent-complainant who was the mother of the victim, the main reason cited by the counsel behind such baseless complaint was alleged desire to the victim to marry applicant. The counsel submitted the statements of the complainant and highlighted that she had stated that ‘she suspected the involvement of accused in the instant case.’ Another issue highlighted was alleged kidnapping by the accused-applicant, it was submitted that the victim was never abducted as she herself went to the police station to register the complaint. The attention of the Court was also drawn towards the other statement of the victim, recorded under Section 161 of CrPC. where the allegation of rape had been made upon the accused applicant who after committing rape had given assurance to marry her and subsequently when she asked to marry he committed assault and refused to marry.  In addition to these aforementioned evidences the applicant submitted an injury report, where it was stated that no marks to injury were found on the victim. Lastly, it was submitted by the learned counsel for the applicant that many facts were ignored by the Investigating Officer and the charge-sheet had been submitted in a routine manner, which was nothing but an abuse of the process of Court and in the interest of justice, the charge sheet deserved to be quashed.

Bhaiya Ghanshyam Singh, Advocate General for the state, had vehemently opposed the prayer for quashing of the charge- sheet and had stated that the evidence which was collected by the Investigating Officer cannot be looked into in this Application under Section 482 CrPC as the same will be required during the trial. It was submitted that High Court had no jurisdiction to appreciate the evidence of the proceedings under Section 482 of CrPC. “because whether there are contradictions or/and inconsistencies in the statements of the witnesses is essentially an issue relating to appreciation of evidence and the same can be gone into by the Judicial Magistrate during trial when the entire evidence is adduced by the parties.”

The Court held that the Investigating Officer had recorded the statements of as many as five witnesses have submitted the charge-sheet. It further opined that “the truthfulness of the statements of the witnesses cannot be scrutinized in Application under Section 482 CrPC” The Court relied upon the Judgment in Anurag Singh v. Chhatisgarh, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 509, where the Supreme Court had held that ‘position of law, was apparent that whether accused wanted to marry the victim right from very beginning or not and whether consent given by victim for sexual intercourse was a free-consent or not, was a subject matter of evidence, which is only possible to be decided after trial.’

Hence, the prayer for quashing the FIR was refused and the application was dismissed.[Kamal Pal v. State of U.P., 2019 SCC OnLine All 3539, decided on 25-09-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Rekha Dikshit, J. while disposing of this petition granted petitioners time to surrender and apply for bail so that the same shall be considered and disposed of expeditiously in accordance with law and in terms of law laid down in the case of Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P., (2009) 4 SCC 437.

This petition was filed with a prayer to quash the impugned charge sheet of 28-12-2018, under Sections 147, 323, 504, 506, 427,452, 354-B and 120-B Penal Code, 1860 including the entire proceeding.

Prashant Shukla and Aditya Kumar Maurya, Counsels for the petitioners submitted that FIR was lodged on false and fabricated facts and that the petitioners have falsely been implicated in this case. It was further submitted that petitioners are ready to surrender before the court below with some protection granted to them.

The Additional Government Advocate opposed this petition.

In regard to the particulars of the petition and submission of the parties, the Court observed that the power under Section 482 CrPC is not to be exercised in routine manners so as to cut short the entire process of trial before the Courts below, but it is for limited purposes. It could be either exercised to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. The power cannot be placed in straight jacket formula.

If an FIR or complaint discloses any offence at all or it is frivolous, collusive or oppressive from the face of it, the Court may exercise its inherent power under Section 482 CrPC but it should be exercised sparingly. Some cases were referred to in support of the above: State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, Popular Muthiah v. State, (2006) 7 SCC 296, Hamida v. Rashid, (2008) 1 SCC 474, and a few others.

However, the Court observed that Police has found a prima facie case against accused and submitted the charge-sheet in the Court below and after an investigation found a prima facie case of commission of a cognizable offence by the accused which should be tried in a Court of Law. At this particular stage, there is no occasion to look into the question, whether the charge ultimately can be substantiated or not since that would be a subject matter of trial. No substantial ground was made out which may justify interference by this Court under Section 482 CrPC.[Mahboob Khan v. State of U.P., 2019 SCC OnLine All 3196, decided on 30-08-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Himachal Pradesh High Court: Chander Bhusan Barowalia, J. entertained a writ petition filed under Section 482 of CrPC for quashing FIR registered under Sections 376,366 and 506 of IPC.

The facts of the case were that the petitioner had a relationship with a woman who was already married to one Roshan Lal. It was the story of the petitioner that the woman had a strained relationship with her husband and she was about to get divorced and then get married to the petitioner. Subsequently to execute their plan they left their native place and the woman admitted that she did not want to return as there was a threat to her life as her husband and relatives warned her of dire consequences. The woman had in favour of petitioner filed an affidavit where she swore that she willfully left the company of her husband and went along with the petitioner. Meanwhile, the husband- complainant filed a missing report. When the woman returned, FIR was filed against the petitioner where the woman accused him of rape and kidnapping along with other charges.

The petitioner contended that the parties have compromised the matter and an affidavit was filed for the same. The petitioner further submitted that the woman had mentioned in the affidavit that the FIR was filed under coercion from her husband and she was forced to do it. Hence, the petitioner requested that the husband himself had compromised the matter and did not want to pursue the case further, thus, he sought to quash FIR. Learned counsel for the petitioner had argued that as the parties had compromised the matter, no purpose was served by keeping the proceedings against the petitioner.

On the other hand, the counsel for the State argued that since the offence was not compoundable in nature, the petition should not be dismissed.

The Court noted that the Supreme Court in B.S. Joshi v. State of Haryana, (2003) 4 SCC 675, had held that, “if for the purpose of securing the ends of justice, quashing of FIR becomes necessary, Section 320 would not be a bar to the exercise of power of quashing. It is well settled that the powers under section 482 have no limits. Of course, where there is more power, it becomes necessary to exercise utmost care and caution while invoking such powers.” A similar case where the Supreme Court had observed thatultimate object of justice is to find out the truth and punish the guilty and protect the innocent. The tendency of implicating the husband and all his immediate relations is also not uncommon. At times, even after the conclusion of the criminal trial, it is difficult to ascertain the real truth. Experience reveals that long and protracted criminal trials lead to rancour, acrimony and bitterness in the relationship amongst the parties. The criminal trials lead to immense sufferings for all concerned.”

Hence, the Court took into consideration the case laws already decided by the Supreme Court on similar law points and found the case fit for exercising power under Section 482 CrPC. Thus, FIR was quashed and the petition was disposed of.[Sunny v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2019 SCC OnLine HP 1350, decided on 27-08-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Himachal Pradesh High Court: Vivek Singh Thakur, J. contemplated a petition filed under Section 482 of CrPC, where the petitioner arrived at a compromise with the respondent for quashing of the FIR filed under Sections 279 and 337 of IPC along with allegations under Motor Vehicle Act, 1988.

Factual matrix of the case was that the complainant-respondent was crossing the road and he was hit by a motorcycle which was driven by the petitioner. The complainant fell unconscious and he did not know the main cause of the accident. He subsequently lodged an FIR on the basis of the information which was supplied by the people present at the site of the accident. The contention of the complainant was that it is not known to him that how the accident had occurred and as to whether petitioner was at fault or not and that after the accident petitioner along with his family had approached him in his village and had taken care of his injuries and further that petitioner was a young graduate engineer and even if had it been fault on his part, he would have forgiven him, as he was feeling guilty for hitting him with his Motor Cycle, therefore, he did not intend to continue criminal proceedings against him and had prayed for compounding the case.

The submissions of the petitioner had also been made he had stated that he was feeling guilty for hitting the complainant and therefore had repentance for the same and had apologized to the complainant, who had agreed to forgive him. He undertook to be more careful in the future. He further deposed that at the time of the accident he was not in possession of documents of the vehicle as well as driving license, but now he possesses the same. He had also stated that he has deposed in the Court out of his free will, consent and without any coercion, pressure or threat.

But the main issue in the instant petition was that the State contended that accused was not entitled to invoke inherent jurisdiction of this Court to exercise its power on the basis of compromise arrived at between the parties with respect to an offence not compoundable under Section 320 CrPC, reliance was placed on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, where the Supreme Court explained the power of the High Courts under Section 482 CrPC. and had held that, “these powers are to be exercised to secure the ends of justice or to prevent abuse of process of any Court and these powers can be exercised to quash criminal proceedings or complaint or FIR in appropriate cases where offender and victim have settled their dispute and for that purpose no definite category of offence can be prescribed.” However, it was also observed that Courts must have due regard to nature and gravity of the crime and criminal proceedings in heinous and serious offences or offence like murder, rape and dacoity, etc. should not be quashed despite victim or victim family have settled the dispute with the offender. Jurisdiction vested in High Court under Section 482 CrPC is held to be exercisable for quashing criminal proceedings in cases having overwhelming and predominately civil flavor particularly offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil partnership, or such like transactions, or even offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc., It was also held that no category or cases for this purpose could be prescribed and each case has to be dealt with on its own merit but it is also clarified that this power does not extend to crimes against society.

The Court observed that though Section 279 is not compoundable under Section 320 of CrPC, however the contentions in Gian Singh’s case where the power of the High Court under Section 482 CrPC was not inhibited by the provisions of Section 320. the Court further observed that the type of offence dealt in the instant petition was not expressly barred or prohibited by the general view for compounding hence, the petition was allowed. [Rohit v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2019 SCC OnLine HP 1333, decided on 22-08-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Sanjay Kumar Singh, J. while allowing the application under Section 482 CrPC observed that even the law provides that it may not be necessary for every criminal offence to mete out punishment, particularly, if the victim wants to bury the hatchet.

In the instant case, applicant 1 is the husband and applicant 2 is the brother-in-law of opposite party 2 (OP). Due to non-fulfilment of dowry demands, OP was tortured, beaten and harassed and thereby made OP lodge an FIR against the applicants, her father-in-law and sister-in-law.

On the request of applicants, time was granted to them to make arrangement of payment to settle the dispute amicably. Afterwards, a joint affidavit was filed by the applicants and OP submitting that they have settled their matrimonial dispute outside the Court and they have no grievance against each other. The settlement was based on certain terms and conditions like OP will receive an amount of Rs 22 lakh from applicant 1 and would not prosecute each other or family members with regard to present matrimonial dispute between them.

After observing the submissions of the parties, the Court looked into some relevant judgments of the Supreme Court where guidelines for quashing of criminal proceedings on the basis of compromise and amicable settlement of the matrimonial dispute between the parties concerned was laid down.

In Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhaji-Rao Chandrojirao Angre, (1988) 1 SCC 692, it was laid down that the inherent power under Section 482 CrPC should be used where special features appear or it is expedient and in the interest of justice to permit a prosecution to continue.

In G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad, (2000) 3 SCC 693, the Supreme Court made some apt observations in relation to matrimonial disputes. Little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly escalate which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved. Instead of fighting out in the Court, the parties should amicably terminate their disputes.

In Swati Verma v. Rajan Verma, (2004) 1 SCC 123 similar to the present case, the Supreme Court had quashed the criminal proceedings under Sections 498A and 406 IPC before the CJM as the divorce litigation between the sparring spouses was decided on the basis of a compromise.

With these cases referred and a few others, the Court observed that If the offender and victim want to move on in matrimonial cases, they may be allowed to compound the offences in terms of the settlement.[Alok Jaiswal v. State of U.P., Application u/s 482 No.  27720 of 2019, decided on 08-08-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Himachal Pradesh High Court: Anoop Chitkara, J. entertained a criminal revision petition filed under Section 482 CrPC for quashing of the order passed by the lower Court.

The factual matrix of the case is that the victim worked as a Junior Engineer and she accused the petitioner who was a Contractor, of unnecessary calling and demanding sexual favors. The victim contended that the petitioner was continuously harassing her for many months. The victim further accused the petitioner of stalking her on social media and sending inappropriate messages. She further alleged that he used to chase her and when she strictly warned him not to indulge in these activities, then, he in connivance with some officials, got committed theft of two measurement books from her office and started blackmailing her. In this regard, he also filed one RTI application and under that pretext, he had stated that he will get everything resolved if she agrees to establish sexual relations with him. FIR was registered under Sections 354-A, 354-D, 379 and 506 IPC, 1860. After investigation, police filed a report under Section 173 CrPC and consequently, accused faced the trial. During the pendency of the trial, the victim through Public Prosecutor filed an application under Section 311 CrPC for placing on record one CD containing some vulgar remarks made by the accused. In the application, it was mentioned that such vulgar remarks had been made in the presence of one individual who was also a Government Contractor. The victim in the application contended that the CD was very material and necessary for the proper adjudication of the trial and similarly examination of the individual witness was also necessary to corroborate the allegation recorded in the CD.

Subsequently, the trial court had ordered the examination of the witness under Section 311 CrPC and also to put the electronic evidence on record about which the victim had already given reference. The petitioner challenged the order. 

The counsel for the petitioner Peeyush Verma, submitted two limbs of arguments, and the first was scope and power under Section 311 CrPC to summon such evidence at a belated stage and the second limb was that the application was simply a tactics played by the victim to drag on the prosecution and delay the outcome of the trial. On the contrary the counsel for the victim had placed reliance on Zahira Habibullah Sheikh v. State of Gujarat, (2006) 3 SCC 374, where it was held that, “The object underlying Section 311 of the Code is that there may not be failure of justice on account of mistake of either party in bringing the valuable evidence on record or leaving ambiguity in the statements of the witnesses examined from either side. The determinative factor is whether it is essential to the just decision of the case.

It was observed by the Court that, powers to summon any witness can be invoked even if the evidence of both the sides were closed so long the Court retains the seasons of the criminal proceedings. Hence, the Section was not only limited for the benefit of the accused, but the Section was also a general provision which applied to all proceedings, enquiries and trials. 

To counter the arguments of the victim the counsel for the petitioner placed reliance upon Section 65 of the Evidence Act, wherein the mandatory requirement of Certificate being annexed with the electronic record was missing. The other contention was that the main allegation of the victim in the complaint was that the accused conducted theft of measurement books, whereas the police did not find any substance in her allegations and cancellation report was filed.

To repeal the above-mentioned contention, the Additional Advocate General, submitted that the aforementioned case the victim had made a false complaint, and then they can always take recourse to Section 182 of the Penal Code. He further contended that this was no ground to deny the leading of the additional evidence which related to vulgar remarks, it was also well noted that bare reading of this application under Section 311 CrPC which led to the passing of the impugned order was cryptic and did not contain the transcript of the CD. 

Court was of the opinion that there was no necessity to refer all the vulgar remarks in such kind of application because the victim had placed on record CD, which can always be played by the Court to decipher the allegations. This was not an order, but allegations of vulgar remarks by a lady and the possibility cannot be ruled out that to save her dignity, she might have restrained from reproducing the text of the audio recording. Even otherwise, in the absence of hearing the CD, no conclusion can be drawn that it did contain obscene language or not. Hence, the Court dismissed the petition as it did not find any merits. [Sham Singh v. State of Himachal Pradesh, 2019 SCC OnLine HP 1242, decided on 09-08-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Kerala High Court: R. Narayana Pishardi, J. allowed a petition seeking the quashing of prosecution proceedings in view of the settlement of the matter between the petitioners and the respondent.

The petitioners and some other persons had trespassed into the second respondent’s property and threatened her and committed theft of some trees from the property. After completing the investigation of the case, a chargesheet was filed against the petitioners for offences punishable under Sections 447 (criminal trespass), 379 (punishment for theft) and 506 (criminal intimidation) read with Section 34 (acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention) of the Penal Code, 1860. The Magistrate took cognizance of the aforesaid offences. The prayer in this petition was to quash the entire proceedings in the case against the petitioners.

The learned counsel for the petitioners, V.G. Arun, produced an affidavit in which the respondent stated that the matter had been compromised with the accused in the presence of mediators and that she did not want to prosecute the case further and that she had no objection to quash further proceedings in the case.

The counsel for the respondent, Dileep D Bhat, did not dispute the genuineness of the said affidavit or the contents therein. The learned Public Prosecutor produced before the Court, a copy of the statement given to the police by the second respondent on 06-12-2017 in which it was mentioned that the person who had really caused trouble to her was no more and that she had got no complaint against the other person.

The Court observed that the offences alleged against the petitioners were not heinous and had no serious impact on society. The Court relied on Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303, to hold that under the given circumstances, though the offences were non-compoundable, prosecution proceedings could be quashed by invoking the power of the Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

In view of the settlement of the matter between the petitioners/accused and the second respondent, the Court allowed the petition and quashed the entire proceedings pending before the lower court.[Stanly v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 1614, decided on 23-05-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Uttaranchal High Court: N.S. Dhanik, J. entertained a Criminal miscellaneous application filed under Section 482 CrPC, where the petitioner had prayed for quashing for the entire proceeding of Session Trial under Sections 504 and 506 of IPC as well as Section 3(1)(X) of ST/SC Act. 

The instant application was filed on the basis of the compromise between the parties, hence, the applicant requested for quashing of the proceedings, summoning and further pending proceedings. 

The complainant through his counsel Deep Prakash Bhatt, submitted that the differences were buried and the dispute was to be amicably settled between the two parties. It was further contended that he was no more interested in prosecution. The counsel relied on the judgment in Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 160, where the Supreme Court held that “The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarized thus: the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code.”  

Learned counsel for the applicant, Pankaj Sharma, submitted that even if the contents of the FIR be conceded to be true, no ingredients of Section 3 (1)(X) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act were prima facie made out against the applicant, in the sense that informant nowhere said that the accused himself was not a member of SC/ST and he used those words intentionally in order to humiliate him (victim) in a place within the public view knowing it that he (victim) belonged to a community of Scheduled Castes or Scheduled Tribes.

Hence the Court observed that both the parties had prayed that since no offence under Section 3(1) (X) of the Act was made out even in the FIR, they were to be permitted to compound the offence. Hence, the Court granted compounding of offence under Sections 504 and 506 of Penal Code, 1860 It was advised to permit the complainant/victim to compound the offences alleged against the applicant in the larger interest of the society.

While dealing with the inherent jurisdiction, timings of settlement play a crucial role. Those cases where the settlement was arrived at immediately after the alleged commission of offence and the matter was still under investigation, the High Court may accept the settlement to quash the criminal proceedings. It was because of the reason that at this stage the investigation was still on and even the charge-sheet had not been filed. Likewise, those cases, where the charge was framed but the evidence was yet to start, the High Court exercised its powers, but after prima facie assessment of the circumstances/material mentioned therein. The Court was of the opinion that matter deserved to be given a quietus as the continuance of proceedings arising out of the first information report in question would be an exercise in futility.[Karnail Singh v. State of Uttarakhand, 2019 SCC OnLine Utt 691, decided on 29-07-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Kerala High Court: R. Narayana Pisharadi, J. allowed a petition filed by bank official praying for quashing proceedings initiated against him for abetting suicide of a student who had applied for an education loan to the bank where he was working, holding that there was no mens rea involved on his part.

In the present case, a student named Sruthi, from a financially backward family approached a bank several times for education loan. The bank rejected her applications for education loan and in despair, she committed suicide. Later, two bank officers (manager and the deputy manager of the bank) had to face prosecution for abetting her suicide by rejecting her application for loan and it was also stated by the father of the deceased that when the deceased was brought to the hospital she told him that she met the petitioner before the accident and the petitioner told her that if her loan was not sanctioned then she had no option other than dying. The brother (respondent) of the deceased gave the first information statement to the police and the case was registered under Section 306 of the Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). After investigation, a final report was filed by the police under Section 306 IPC read with Section 34 of IPC. The concerned Magistrate committed the case to the Court of Session. The petitioner approached this Court to quash all the proceedings in the instant case under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC).

Learned counsels on behalf of the petitioners, S. Sreekumar, P. Paulochan Antony, M.A. Mohammed Siraj, P. Martin Jose, P. Prijith and Thomas P. Kuruvill, submitted that even if allegations raised against the petitioner in the final report were true, no offence was committed under Section 306 IPC as there was no direct nexus between the rejection of the application of loan by the petitioner and the suicide committed by the deceased. There was no proximity of time between the alleged act committed and the act of the victim. Non-sanctioning of education loan by the petitioner to the deceased could not be considered as facilitation of commission of suicide on their part as there was no malicious intention or instigation. Further, according to the copy of norms, loan application had to be disposed of within fifteen days but the deceased committed suicide without even waiting for the fate of her loan application. Lastly, no material was produced by the prosecution to prove that the petitioner told the deceased to commit suicide

Learned counsel on behalf of the respondent S. Manu, and Public Prosecutor M.N. Maya, contented that allegations in the final report along with the materials produced by the prosecution showed that the petitioner had abetted the commission of suicide by the deceased.  

The Court opined that the prosecution had not made any prima facie case against the petitioner for committing an offence punishable under Section 306 IPC and continuance of the proceedings against the petitioners would be an abuse of process of the Court. The Court also observed that even according to the prosecution case, only when the deceased told the first petitioner that in case the loan was not sanctioned she would have no option other than to die, that the first petitioner told her to go and do so. Thus, the remark regarding death was initially made not by the first petitioner, but by the deceased. The fact that the first petitioner had retorted to the deceased in such a manner in such a situation, in a fit of anger or emotion or at the spur of the moment, did not lead to an inference that he had instigated the deceased to commit suicide. Reliance in this regard was placed on Pawan Kumar v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2017) 7 SCC 780. Thus, all proceedings against the petitioners were quashed.[Harikrishnan v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 1767, decided on 10-06-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Punjab and Haryana High Court: Rajbir Sehrawat, J. quashed the FIR after the parties entered into the compromise as same was held to be done with the free consent and without any pressure.

A petition was filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing the FIR and all consequential proceedings as parties have entered into compromise against the offence committed under Section 420 of the Penal Code, 1860.

A report was received from the Judicial Magistrate in which it had been noticed that the matter has been compromised with the intervention of respectable and friends of both the parties, compromise has been affected with their free consent and without any pressure or undue influence from any quarter.

High Court while allowing the petition discussed resolving the civil and criminal dispute by giving absolute freedom to the parties to settle their dispute by compromise with certain legal consequences. The court with regard to the compromised in criminal cases said that In criminal cases as tend to cast their effect and consequences even upon the society at large. Therefore, the law prescribes punishment, severe punishments and extreme punishments, including the death penalty for criminal acts. The criminal law provides for the compromise between the parties under Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which permits compounding even at the appellate and revisional stage but this section relates only to the offences prescribed under the Indian Penal Code. For other offences the power lies with the High Court in order to maintain the sanctity of the procedure prescribed for a criminal trial.

Further, the Court also put forth the case of Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, (2012) 10 SCC 303 in which the Supreme Court had amply clarified the legal position in recognizing the position of compromise. The court in the above mentioned case held that the High Court must consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.”

Thus the Court held that no useful purpose would be served by keeping the proceedings alive. It will be in the interest of justice, if the settlement reached between the parties is accepted.[Harmesh Singh v. State of Punjab, 2019 SCC OnLine P&H 1322, decided on 29-07-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Rekha Dikshit, J. while disposing of this petition directed the lower court to consider the bail application (if moved by the petitioners) in the light of the judgment passed by the seven Judges’ Bench of this Court in Amarawati v. State of U.P., 2004 SCC OnLine All 1112, as approved by the Supreme Court in Lal Kamlendra Pratap Singh v. State of U.P., (2009) 4 SCC 437.

In the instant case, the petition was filed to quash the summoning order by 2nd Additional Sessions Judge/Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, Raebareli in Complaint Case No. 73 of 2018 of Mahavir v. Devendra Bahadur Singh.

Counsel for the Petitioners, Vinod Kumar Pandey submitted that the petitioners have not committed any offence and have been falsely implicated and moreover there are no independent witnesses to support the case at hand. It was further submitted that the petitioners were willing to surrender and asked for protection.

Counsel for the Respondent, the AGA submitted that the summoning order was passed on the basis of the evidence recorded under Sections 200 and 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

The Court after analyzing the submissions of the parties cited some relevant cases helpful in understanding the matter at hand.

In Nirmaljit Singh Hoon v. State of W.B., (1973) 3 SCC 753, it was held that Section 203 CrPC does not entail that a regular trial for adjudging the truth or otherwise by the accusation made against the accused should take place at this stage.

In Chandra Deo Singh v. Prokash Chandra Bose, 1964 (1) SCR 693 was held that at the stage of enquiry under Section 202 CrPC, the test was whether there was sufficient ground for proceeding and not whether there was sufficient ground for conviction.

In Nagwwa v. Veeranna Shivalingappa, Konjalgi, 1976 (1) ACC 225 (S.C.) while considering the scope of enquiry under Section 202 CrPC, the Supreme Court held that the order of issuing process can be quashed where the allegations made in the complaint or the statements of the witnesses recorded in support of the same taken at their face value makes absolutely no case against the accused or the complaint does not disclose the essential ingredients of an offence which is alleged against the accused.

In S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 241, the Supreme Court held that when the Magistrate has to pass an order under Section 203 CrPC searching sufficient ground to convict is not necessary.

The Court observed that in the instant case, the Magistrate after considering the evidence recorded under Sections 200 and 202 CrPC, concluded that the applicants have, prima facie, committed offence and in these circumstances, it cannot be held that the Magistrate has committed any illegality or impropriety in passing the impugned order.

The Court held that there is no substantial ground to justify interference by this Court under Section 482 CrPC Though, the applicants have a right to be discharged under Sections 239,227,228 and 245 CrPC. [Devendra Bahadur Singh v. State of U.P., 2019 SCC OnLine All 2743, decided on 25-07-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Kerala High Court: R. Narayana Pisharadi, J. dismissed a petition seeking to quash a complaint filed under Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

The complainant and the accused were close relatives. The accused had borrowed an amount of Rs 35,00,000 from the complainant. The cheque given by the accused to repay the money was dishonored due to insufficient funds. The complainant received intimation of this on 13-02-2014 and he sent a notice regarding the same to the accused on 15-02-2015 which was received by him on 17-02-2014.

The learned counsel for the petitioner, K.B. Pradeep, submitted that no demand for payment of the amount of the cheque was made by the complainant as per the notice sent by him under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act and therefore, the notice was defective and the proceedings initiated against the petitioner pursuant to such notice could not be sustained.

The counsel representing the complainant, K.K. Dheerendrakrishnan, contended that the requirement under clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act had been complied with.

The High Court observed that a demand for payment of the amount of the cheque by sending a notice in writing was an essential condition for filing such a complaint was a condition precedent for filing a complaint about an offence under Section 138 of the NI Act. The Court relied on K.R. Indira v. G. Adinarayana, (2003) 8 SCC 300 in which it was held that if no demand for payment of amount was made, the notice would fall short of its legal requirement. The Court, on a perusal of the said notice, found that demand of payment of the amount was made in the notice sent by the complainant. In view thereof, the Court held that the impugned notice was meeting the requirements as under Section 138(b) of the Act. The Court also declined the petitioner’s contention that the notice was defective as the nature of the debt or liability was not mentioned. It was held that there was no statutory mandate that the notice should narrate the nature of debt or liability. All the other pleas of the petitioners were not sustained as they were pertaining to questions of facts and the Court held that it would not express its view on disputed questions of fact in a petition under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1974.

In view of the above, the Court held that the impugned notice met the requirement under Clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138 of the Act and hence the petition to quash the said complaint was dismissed.[B. Surendra Das v. State of Kerala, 2019 SCC OnLine Ker 1624, decided on 20-05-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Madras High Court: N. Anand Venkatesh, J. dismissed a petition filed by Prisoners Right Forum against the order of the Chief Judicial Magistrate whereby he had dismissed a complaint filed in the matter of the death of a prisoner in judicial custody. It was held that the forum, being a third party who was neither a victim not an aggrieved person, had no locus standi to file the present petition.

The deceased, a prisoner, died in judicial custody in April, 2014. An FIR was registered, enquiry conducted, and criminal proceedings initiated against the respondent officials. However, ultimately, the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate came to the conclusion that no offence was established against the accused persons, and therefore he dismissed the complaint. The said order was challenged by the Forum in the present petition under Section 482 CrPC.

The High Court was of the opinion that the preliminary issue to be decided was as to the locus standi of the petitioner Forum to file the petition. M. Radhakrishnan, Advocate led arguments on behalf of the Forum. Per contra, the respondents were represented by C. Emilias, Additional General, assisted by M. Mohamed Tiyaz, APP; and Senior Advocate N.R. Elango; and A. Gokulakrishnan, Advocate; all of whom opposed the petition.

The Court noted that the term locus standi is commonly understood as the right or the capacity to bring an action or to appear in a Court. The march of law, more particularly by way of public interest litigations, has now allowed anyone from the society, not related to the cause of action to approach the Court seeking justice for those who cannot or who could not approach themselves or in cases which involves the public interest at large. However, it was held that such right cannot be extended in a criminal case to a third party who is not in any way related to the case. It was observed: “If this practice is permitted in a casual manner, a meddlesome bystander can easily decide to attack a person who has been held to be not guilty by a Subordinate Court, by initiating a frivolous proceeding and thereby cause irretrievable injury to the life and liberty of the accused person.” The only exception that has been created in this regard is by the Supreme Court which has held that third parties will have right, in very exceptional cases, to approach the Supreme Court under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. Reference was made to Amanullah v. State of Bihar, (2016) 6 SCC 699; National Commission for Women v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2010) 12 SCC 599; Harsh Mandar v. Amit Anilchandra Shah, (2017) 13 SCC 420.

Holding that the petitioner had no locus standi to maintain the present petition, the Court dismissed the same.[Prisoners Right Forum v. State of T.N., 2019 SCC OnLine Mad 2476, decided on 22-07-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Punjab and Haryana High Court: Hari Pal Verma, J. quashed the criminal proceeding as there was a compromise signed between the parties.

A petition was filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 for quashing the FIR registered under Sections 406, 498-A of the Penal Code, 1860.

The records of the case are such that the parties appeared before the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class in which it was submitted that compromise was effected between the parties voluntarily without any coercion or undue influence. The complainant/respondent made a joint statement in which she had made the statement regarding the compromise between the two.

Gaganpreet Kaur, counsel for State had not disputed the fact of the compromise between the parties.

The Court thus opined that no useful purpose would be served to continue with the proceedings before the trial court. The Court reiterated the case of Gold Quest International (P) Ltd. v. State of T.N., 2014 (4) RCR (Criminal) 206, in which the Supreme Court held that “disputes which are substantially matrimonial in nature, or the civil property disputes with criminal facets, if the parties have entered into settlement, and it has become clear that there are no chances of conviction, there is no illegality in quashing the proceedings under Section 482 CrPC read with Article 226 of the Constitution.” Thus, all the proceeding was quashed qua the petitioner on the basis of the compromise entered between the parties.[Pankaj v. State of Haryana, 2019 SCC OnLine P&H 1112, decided on 04-07-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Orissa High Court: Dr A.K. Mishra J., allowed a criminal miscellaneous appeal to quash an on-going proceeding and also a cognizance order dated 07-02-2011 passed by the Learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate on the ground of settlement reached between the parties.

In the instant case, the petitioner, husband and the opposite party 2, the wife, had settled their marital dispute and had reached a divorce. However, the Learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate, on finding sufficient grounds had taken cognizance of the matter on police report under Sections 498-A (Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty) and  406 (Punishment for criminal breach of trust) of the Penal Code, 1860. The parties thereafter reached a settlement and approached the High Court under Section 482 (Saving of inherent powers of High Court) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to quash the criminal proceedings and the impugned order of the Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate.

The Learned Additional Government advocate representing the opposite party 1, S. Pattnaik did not dispute the fact of settlement between the parties. The Learned advocate also brought to the High Court’s notice the joint memorandum filed in the Family Court, Srikakulam, that the wife should take necessary steps to withdraw the Criminal Case in order to maintain amity.

Counsel representing the petitioner, Samir Ku. Mishra agreed to the fact of settlement between the parties.

The High Court, felt justified to quash the criminal proceeding and the impugned judgment to prevent oppression and prejudice. The Court also placed reliance on the Supreme Court decision in Parbatbhai Aahir v. State of Gujarat, (2017) 9 SCC 641, and quoted “In the exercise of the power under Section 482 and while dealing with a plea that the dispute has been settled, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the offence.” The Supreme Court laid down that the serious offences under criminal cases shall be distinguished from criminal cases having an “overwhelming or predominant element of civil dispute” and in such cases, the High Court shall be able to exercise power under Section 482 CrPC.

Thus, in the present case the High Court reiterated the position and stated that noting the gravity of the offence having a civil element, the Court exercised its power under Section 482 CrPC.[Ashish Kumar Rout v. State of Orissa, 2019 SCC OnLine Ori 222, decided on 02-07-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Patna High Court: Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J. dismissed an application filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 praying for quashing of cognizance taken against petitioner, in a case pertaining to demand of dowry and torture therefor.

Petitioner, along with eight others, was charged with offence of torture, assault, demand of dowry and conspiracy to kill the opposite party 2 (daughter-in-law of the petitioner herein). In a complaint case filed by opposite party 2, the learned Sub-Divisional Judicial Magistrate passed an order taking cognizance of offences under Sections 323, 498-A of Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Aggrieved thereby, the instant application was filed praying for quashing of the said order.   

Learned counsel for the petitioner, Sanjay Kumar Ojha, contended that the opposite party 2 did not reside in the matrimonial home and she had got divorced from the petitioner’s son in 2011.

Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor, Jharkhandi Upadhyay contended that the matrimonial case wherein divorce was granted to opposite party 2, was filed in the year 2010 while the complaint case in question was filed in 2004. Thus, the opposite party 2 was still the petitioner’s daughter-in-law when the complaint case was filed. Hence, the petitioner’s main contention of divorce was of no relevance. Further, the cognizance order in complaint case, was passed in the year 2003, i.e., ten and a half years ago, which made the application unfit for consideration. 

The Court noted that the complaint case was of the year 2004 and the order of cognizance was also of the same year. Thus, the present application, filed in the year 2015, challenging cognizance order of the year 2004 was clearly unfit to be entertained on the ground of gross delay and laches. Further, the main contention of the petitioner that her son and opposite party  2, were already divorced, was of no consequence, as the matrimonial case (for divorce) was filed in the year 2010 by opposite party 2; and that itself was proof of the fact that she was tortured in the matrimonial home. 

In view of the above, it was held that the cognizance order did not suffer from any infirmity, and it did not warrant any interference by the Court in exercise of its inherent power under Section 482 CrPC.[Sushila Devi v. State of Bihar, 2019 SCC OnLine Pat 653, decided on 13-05-2019] 

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Punjab and Haryana High Court: The Division Bench of Daya Chaudhary & Sudhir Mittal, JJ. allowed the application for the enhancement of compensation to minor rape victim under Punjab Victim Compensation Scheme, 2017.

An application for enhancement of compensation was made in this case which was awarded by Sessions Judge.

The victim child was awarded compensation of Rs 6000 out of the amount of fine. The appeal was filed for enhancement of compensation which was earlier admitted. Victim (minor) through her natural guardian and mother also filed an application under Section 482 CrPC read with Section 357-A CrPC seeking recommendation to Respondent 2 i.e. District Legal Services Authority to grant compensation to her under the Punjab Victim Compensation Scheme, 2017 framed under Section 357-A of CrPC.

Ravinder Kaur Manaise, Counsel for the applicant submitted that applicant-victim was five years of age at the time of occurrence and suffered injury. It was submitted that for her physical and mental rehabilitation adequate compensation is required to be awarded to her as per Punjab Victim Compensation Scheme, 2017.

H.S. Sullar, DAG, Punjab for the respondent contended that the amount of compensation can be recovered from the accused, later on as he was in custody.

The Court referred to the Punjab Victim Compensation Scheme and noted the relevant clause of the said scheme as “the applicant is entitled to compensation, which is to be disbursed through the Bank account of the victim or through a designated person to be nominated by the Punjab Legal Services Authority or District Legal Services Authority as the case may be. The compensation is required to be paid in lump sum or in two installments as decided by the Punjab Legal Services Authority or District Legal Services Authority.” Regarding the amount of the compensation it was directed that “in case victim is less than 14 years of age, the amount of compensation is to be increased by 50% over the amount specified in the schedule, meaning, thereby, she is entitled to Rs 4,50,000.”  Thus, the petition was allowed and respondents were directed to grant the compensation to minor as per Punjab Victim Compensation Scheme, 2017. It was further directed that the Punjab State Legal Services Authority was at liberty to recover the amount so paid to the victim from the accused. [‘X’ v. State of Punjab, 2019 SCC OnLine P&H 1026, decided on 22-05-2019]

Case BriefsHigh Courts

Allahabad High Court: Dinesh Kumar Singh, J. disposed of the petition on the ground that no substantial ground was made for exercising the power under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

A petition was filed in order to quash the summoning order passed by 1st Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate under Section 498-A, 323, 504 and 506 of the Penal Code, 1860.

Rajendra Prasad, counsel for the petitioner submits that First Information Report had been lodged against the petitioner on the basis of false and fabricated facts. It was also submitted that the petitioner was ready to surrender before the court below and some protection may be granted to him.

The Additional Government Advocate had opposed the petition. It was discussed that the  power under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not to be exercised in a routine manner, but it is for limited purposes, namely, to give effect to any order under the Code, or to prevent abuse of process of any Court or otherwise to secure ends of justice. It was reiterated that according to the precedents the power under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 should not preempt a trial and cannot be used in a routine manner so as to cut short the entire process of the trial before the courts below.

Case of  Lee Kun Hee v. State of U.P., JT 2012 (2) SC 237, was brought in light,  in which it was held that “Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC cannot go into the truth or otherwise of the allegations and appreciate evidence, if any, available on record. Interference would be justified only when a clear case of such interference is made out. Frequent and uncalled interference even at the preliminary stage by High Court may result in causing an obstruction in the progress of inquiry in a criminal case which may not be in public interest”

High Court after perusal of matter on record opined it cannot be said that a cognizable offence was not made out and thus there was no sufficient ground to quash the impugned proceedings, although it was directed that if the petitioner surrenders before the court within ten days with an application for bail the same shall be considered and disposed of expeditiously in accordance with the law.[Anil Kumar Srivastava v. State of U.P, 2019 SCC OnLine All 2299, decided on 01-04-2019]